Religion

The population is fragmented into myriad ethnic, linguistic, religious, kin﷓based, and regional groupings. One of the few commonalities in this diverse country is Islam. Even in the matter of religion, however, sectarian differences and differences over Quranic and legal interpretations divide Afghans. In addition, minorities of Hindus and Sikhs (originally traders from India) and Jews have lived in the country for generations. Islam, however, appears to be one of the few factors crosscutting virtually all other groups.

In late 1985 all resistance groups striving for a pan-Afghan constituency appealed to Afghans on the basis of their common Muslim identity. Indeed, the term used for the resistance fighters, mujahidiin, translates as "those waging jihad." Jihad is a duty of Muslims and refers to the struggle for the predominance of God's will, both within oneself and between people. As of 1985 Islam had been a most effective rallying point. Afghan society, with its fragmented groupings, has often been composed of a congeries of warring factions. Although themes common to the many groups resident in the country (such as honor or family loyalty) ramify throughout the country, these more easily serve to divide than to unite Afghans into multitribal and multiethnic groups. Islam, however, represents a common and potentially unifying symbolic system. The potency of Islam as a unifying factor lies partly in the essence of Islam itself, partly in the meaning of Islam to Afghans, and partly in the fact that religion is one of the few shared symbolic systems in the society. Before proceeding to a discussion of what Islam means in Afghanistan in the mid-1980s, it is necessary first to understand Islam as a religion and then to comprehend how Islam is practiced in Afghanistan.

Tenets of Islam.

In A.D. 610 Muhammad (later known as the Prophet), a merchant belonging to the Hashimite branch of the ruling Quraysh tribe in the Arabian town of Mecca, began to preach the first of a series of revelations granted him by God through the angel Gabriel. A fervent monotheist, Muhammad denounced the polytheism of his fellow Meccans. Because, however, the town's economy was based largely on the thriving pilgrimage business to the Kaabah shrine and numerous polytheist religious sites located there, this vigorous and continuing censure eventually earned him the bitter enmity of the town's leaders. On September 24, 622, he and a group of followers were invited to the town of Yathrib, which came to be known as Medina (from Madinah al Nabi﷓The Prophet's City) because it became the center of his activities. The move, or hijra, known in the West as the hegira, marks the beginning of the Islamic era and of Islam as a force on the stage of history; the Muslim calendar, based on a 354﷓day lunar year, begins in 622. In Medina, Muhammad continued to preach, eventually defeated his detractors in battle, and consolidated both the temporal and the spiritual leadership of all Arabia in his person. He entered Mecca in triumph in 630 and returned there to make the pilgrimage shortly before his death in 632. After Muhammad's death his followers compiled those of his words regarded as coming directly and literally from God as the Quran, the holy scripture of Islam; others of his sayings and teachings and precedents of his personal behavior, recalled by those who had known him during his lifetime, became the hadith. Together they form the Surma, a comprehensive guide to the spiritual, ethical, and social life of the orthodox Muslim. 

The majority of Afghan Muslims are Sunnis and adhere to the tenets of the Sunna. The Shia, however, differ in some respects. The shahada (literally, testimony or creed) succintly states the central belief of Islam: "There is no god but God (Allah), and Muhammad is his Prophet." This simple profession of faith is repeated on many ritual occasions, and its recital in full and unquestioning sincerity designates one a Muslim. The God preached by Muhammad was not one previously unknown to his countrymen, for Allah is Arabic for God rather than a particular name. Instead of introducing a new deity, Muhammad denied the existence of the many minor tribal gods and spirits worshiped before his ministry and declared the omnipotence of the unique creator. God exists on a plane of power and sanctity above any other being and to associate anything with him in any visual symbol is a sin; events in the world flow ineluctably from his will, and to resist it is both futile and sinful.

Islam means submission (to God), and one who submits is a Muslim. Muhammad is the "seal of the prophets"; his revelation is said to complete for all time the series of biblical revelations received by the Jews and the Christians. God is believed to have remained one and the same throughout time, but humans had strayed from his true teachings until they were set aright by Muhammad. True monotheists who preceded Islam are known in Quranic tradition as hanifs; prophets and sages of the biblical traditions, such as Abraham, Moses, and Jesus (known in Arabic as Ibrahim, Musa, and Isa), are recognized as inspired vehicles of God's will. Islam, however, reveres as sacred only the message, rejecting Christianity's deification of the messenger. It accepts the concept of guardian angels, the existence of jinn, the Day of judgment (last day), general resurrection, heaven and hell, and eternal life of the soul.
The duties of the Muslim form the five pillars of the faith. These are the recitation of the creed (shahada), daily prayer (salat), almsgiving (zakat), fasting (sawm), and pilgrimage (haj). The believer is to pray in a prescribed manner after purification through ritual ablutions each day at dawn, midday, midafternoon sunset, and nightfall. Prescribed body movements, including genuflections and prostrations, accompany the prayers, which the worshiper recites while facing toward Mecca. Whenever possible, men pray in congregation at the mosque under a prayer leader and on Fridays are obliged to do so. The Friday noon prayers provide the occasion for weekly sermons by religious leaders. Women may also attend public worship at the mosque, where they are segregated from the men, although most frequently those who pray do so at home. A special functionary, the muadhdhin, intones a call to prayer to the entire community at the appropriate hour; those out of earshot determine the proper time from the sun. Daily prayer consists of specified glorifications of God. Prayers seeking aid or guidance in personal difficulties must be offered separately.

In the early days of Islam, the authorities imposed zakat as a tax on personal property proportionate to one's wealth; this was distributed to the mosques and to the needy. In addition, freewill gifts (sadaka) were made. Many properties contributed by pious individuals to support religious and charitable activities or institutions have traditionally been administered as inalienable religious foundations (waqfs). Such endowments support various charitable activities.

The ninth month of the Muslim calendar is Ramadan, a period of obligatory fasting in commemoration of Muhammad's receipt of God's revelation, the Quran. Throughout the month all but the sick; the weak; soldiers on duty; menstruating, pregnant, or lactating women; travelers on necessary journeys; and young children are enjoined from eating, drinking, smoking, and having sexual intercourse during daylight hours. Those adults excused are obliged to endure an equivalent fast at their earliest opportunity. In many places in the Muslim world a festive meal breaks the daily fast and inaugurates a night of feasting and celebration. The pious well﷓to﷓do usually do little or no work during this period, and some businesses close for all or part of the day. Because the months of the lunar calendar revolve through the solar year, Ramadan falls at various seasons in different years. Though a considerable test of discipline at any time of year, a fast that falls in summertime imposes severe hardships on those who must do physical work. Frayed tempers and poor work performances are annual concomitants of the fast.
Finally, all Muslims at least once in their lifetime should if possible make the haj to the holy city of Mecca to participate in special rites held there during the twelfth month of the lunar calendar. Those who have completed the haj merit the honorific haji. The Prophet instituted the requirement, modifying pre﷓Islamic custom to emphasize sites associated with Allah and Abraham, founder of monotheism and father of the northern Arabs through his son Ismail. In Islamic belief Abraham offered to sacrifice Ismail, son of the servant woman Hagar, rather than Isaac, son of Sarah, as described in the Torah.

The permanent struggle for the triumph of the word of God both within oneself and between people, the jihad represents an additional general duty of all Muslims, construed by some as the sixth pillar. In addition to specific duties, Islam imposes a code of ethical conduct encouraging generosity, fairness, honesty, and respect for oneself and others and forbidding adultery, gambling, usury, and the consumption of carrion, blood, pork, and alcohol.
A Muslim stands in a personal relationship to God; there is neither intermediary nor clergy in orthodox Islam. Those who lead prayers, preach sermons, and interpret the law do so by virtue of their superior knowledge and scholarship rather than because of any special powers or prerogatives conferred by ordination.

Early Development.

During his lifetime Muhammad held both spiritual and temporal leadership of the Muslim community; he established the concept of Islam as a total and all-encompassing way of life for humanity and society. Islam teaches that Allah revealed to Muhammad the immutable principles governing decent behavior, and it is therefore incumbent upon the individual to live in the manner prescribed by revealed law and upon the community to perfect human society on earth according to the holy injunctions. Islam traditionally recognized no distinction between religion and state. Religious and secular life merged, as did religious and secular law.

Islam recognizes that the Prophet Muhammad was the last of the line of prophets that includes Abraham, Moses, Jesus, and others from the Jewish and Christian traditions. The Prophet, however, was also the spiritual and secular leader of the Muslim community (umma). After Muhammad's death it was necessary to select a successor to administer the umma and to lead prayers and decide questions on which the Quran was not explicit. The Prophet neither designated his successor nor decreed how a successor should be chosen, and as a result there was some difficulty in agreeing upon a new leader. Some members of the umma felt that Muhammad's successor should be a close blood relative of the Prophet, i.e., Ali, who was a member of the Hashimite line, the Prophet's father's brother's son, and the husband of Fatima, Muhammad's sole surviving daughter. Other Muslims believed such kinship was not a necessary prerequisite and held that the caliph (from khalifasuccessor) should be chosen by the community. A split in the ideally egalitarian and harmonious umma developed over this issue; the rift would in time enlarge and generate the two major divisions of Islam: Shia, from Shiat Ali (the party of Ali), and Sunni, from men of the Surma and Jamaa (i.e., those who favored a leader chosen by the community).

Some of the reasons for the divisiveness were political. Aisha, Muhammad's favorite living wife, was the opponent of both Fatima, Muhammad's daughter by a different wife, and Ali. Aisha supported the election of her father, Abu Bakr (also one of the Prophet's earliest followers and closest friends), to succeed her late husband. She and her allies won the political battle, and Abu Bakr was chosen caliph by the consensus of the leaders of the umma. S. Husain J. Jafri, an Islamic scholar, contends that the as yet minor rupture in the umma antedated Islam and had its roots in the north﷓south religious, political, and tribal differences within the Arabian Peninsula﷓the Adnani and Qahtani. Abu Bakr was apparently quite popular, and Ali and his supporters recognized Abu Bakr's legitimacy. Historical events after Abu Bakr's death tended to solidify the Sunni﷓Shia political and ideological differences.
Umar, who succeeded in 634, and Uthman, who took power in 646, enjoyed the recognition of the entire community. Dissatisfaction with the rule of Uthman, however, began to mount in various parts of the Islamic empire. For example, the codification of the Quran, which took place under Uthman, hurt the interests of the professional Quran reciters. Some, such as those at Al Kufah in what is present﷓day Iraq, refused to go along with this reform. Others accused Uthman of nepotism. Although himself an early Muslim, Uthman came from the Bann Umayyah lineage of the Quraysh, who had been Muhammad's main detractors in Mecca and had resisted him for a long time. The appointment of many members of this house to official posts naturally caused resentment among those who had claims based on earlier loyalty. Still others objected to corruption in financial arrangements under Uthman's caliphate.
Ali, with his frustrated claim to the caliphate, became a perfect focus for dissatisfaction. In 656 disgruntled soldiers killed Uthman. After the ensuing five years of civil war, known to most Muslims as fitnah (the time of trials), the caliphate finally devolved on Ali. Aisha, continuing her earlier rivalry, objected, demanding that Uthman's killing be avenged and his killers punished by the Hashimites.

The killers insisted that Uthman, by ruling unjustly, had relinquished his right to be caliph and deserved to die. Ali, whose political position depended on their action and their support, was forced to side with them. From his capital at Al Kufah he refused to reprimand the killers.

At this point Muawiyah, the governor of Syria and a member of the Banu Umayyah, refused to recognize Ali's authority and called for revenge for his murdered kinsman, Uthman. Ali attacked, but the Battle of Siffin was inconclusive. Muawiyah's soldiers advanced with copies of the Quran on their spears, thus symbolically calling God to decide or submitting the question to arbitration. Ali agreed to this settlement, and each side selected an arbitrator. Some of Ali's supporters rejected the notion that the caliph, the Prophet's successor and head of the community, should submit to the authority of others. By so doing, they reasoned, he effectively relinquished his authority as caliph. They further argued that the question of Uthman's right to rule had been settled by war. When Ali insisted on his course, the group seceded and came to be known as the Kharajites; they withdrew to Haura, near Al Kufah, and chose their own leader. 

The arbitration went against Ali in 658. He refused to accept the decision but did not renounce the principle of arbitration. At this point the Kharajites became convinced that personal interest, not principle, motivated Ali. His support dwindled, and he tried unsuccessfully to attack Syria. Muawiyah gained in battle, and in 661 a Kharajite murdered Ali. His death ended the last of the so﷓called four orthodox caliphates and the period when the entire community of Islam recognized a single head. Muawiyah then proclaimed himself caliph from Damascus. The Shiat Ali, however, refused to recognize Muawiyah or the Umayyad line. They withdrew, and in the great schism of Islam proclaimed Hassan, Ali's son, the caliph. Hassan, however, eventually relinquished his claim in favor of Muawiyah and went to live in Medina, supported by wealth apparently supplied by Muawiyah.

The breach between supporters of the Alid (an adjective derived from Ali) claims and Sunnis was by this time too wide to be repaired by Hassan's actions. In 680 Yazid I, Muawiyah's son, succeeded to the caliphate with the support of his father, who was still alive. Ali's younger son, Husayn, refused to recognize the succession and revolted at A1 Kufah. He was unable to gain widespread support, however, and was killed along with a small band of soldiers at Karbala in Iraq in 680. To the Shia, Husayn became a martyred hero, a tragic reminder of the lost glories of the Alid line, and the repository of the Prophet's family's special right to the caliphate. The political victor of this second period of fitnah was Marwar of the Umayyad line, but Husayn's death aroused increased interest among his supporters that was enhanced by feelings of guilt and remorse and a desire for revenge.

The Shia founded their objections to the Umayyad and later non﷓Shia caliphs on a notion that members of the house of Muhammad, through Ali, were the most appropriate successors to his positions both as political leader and, more important, as prayer leader. Many believed that Ali, as a close associate, early had a special insight into the Prophet's teachings and habits. In addition, many felt that he deserved the post because of his personal merits and, indeed, believed that the Prophet had expressed a wish that Ali succeed him. In time, for many Shia, these views became transformed into an almost mystical reverence for the spiritual superiority of Ali's line. Some Shia also believe that Muhammad named Ali his successor in a written will that was destroyed by Ali's enemies, who then usurped leadership. Because the correct selection of the Imam (see Glossary) was the crucial issue over which the Shia departed from the main body of Sunni Islam, the choice of later successors also became a matter of conflict. Disagreements over which of several pretenders had the truer claim to the mystical power of Ali precipitated further schisms (see Ismailis, this ch.).

The early political rivalry remained active as well. Shiism eventually gained numerical dominance in Bahrain, Iran, Iraq, and the Yemen Arab Republic (North Yemen). Shia are also numerous in Syria and Afghanistan and are found in varying numbers in most present-day Muslim countries. The early Islamic polity was intensely expansionist, motivated both by dedication to the new religion and by economic and social factors. Conquering armies and migrating tribes expanded from Arabia, spreading Islam by military triumph and by suasion. By the end of Islam's first century, Islamic armies had reached far into North Africa and eastward and northward into Asia.
Muhammad enjoined the Muslim community to convert polytheists, but he also recognized the special status of the People of the Book, Jews and Christians, whose revealed scriptures he considered perversions of God's true word but which nevertheless contributed to Islam. These peoples, approaching but not yet having achieved the perfection of Islam, were spared the choice offered the polytheists﷓conversion or death. Jews and Christians in Muslim territories could live according to their own religious law and in their own communities if they accepted the position of dhimmis, or tolerated subject peoples. This status entailed recognition of Muslim authority, special taxes, prohibition of proselytism among Muslims, and certain restrictions on social, economic, and political rights. Although communities of native Afghan Christians have never existed, Jews have lived in the country for centuries. By 1985, however, virtually all Jews had departed. Afghan Jews, like Afghan Sikhs and Hindus, were traditionally traders.
The first centuries of Islam saw the Muslim community grow from a small and despised cult to a powerful empire ruling vast domains. They also saw the evolution of sharia, a comprehensive system of religious law to regulate life within the community. Derived from the Quran and the hadith by various systems of reasoning, four schools of religious lawthe Hanafi, Shafii, Maliki, and Hanbali﷓are generally recognized; each Sunni Muslim theoretically acknowledges the authority of one of them. Afghan Sunnis follow the Hanafi school. Over the centuries Islam gradually absorbed influences from sources other than the prophetic revelation. Pre﷓Islamic practices reappeared; people resumed venerating trees and stones but maintained their identification with the Muslim community. Various holy men, especially those who claimed descent from the Prophet, established reputations for having exceptional spiritual or magical powers. Pre﷓Islamic beliefs in the inheritance of special spiritual powers in certain family lines blended smoothly into popular Islam. Stories of miracles circulated, and people began visiting those individuals or their graves to seek cures, the fulfillment of wishes, or other favors.

Sunnis of the Hanafi School

Islam is a legalistic religion with no clerical hierarchy. Muslims, like Jews, were presented with a set of God﷓given laws and pronouncements that they then had to apply to everyday life. The two religions differ, however, in that the code was presented to an established, well﷓defined people in Judaism but in the case of Islam was given to any who would accept it. Nevertheless, the problems confronting the two groups of believers were similar; the law was not specific to every situation, but all human behavior was expected to comply with God's will. How could the often general Quran be extended to particular situations? Islam resolved the issue by including the hadith, which expanded the number of specific circumstances in which God's will was known. Still, the problem remained largely unresolved. Furthermore, during the course of time new situations arose in which a judgment based on God's will was required. Arguments about how the information in the Quran and hadith should be extended were based on qiya (analogy) and ijma (consensus).
Abu Hanifa, who died in Al Kufah, Iraq in 767, was one of the earliest Muslim legists and the founder of the school of Islamic jurisprudence that bears his name, the Hanafi. In the mid﷓1980s about 60 percent of the world's Muslims followed the Hanafi school. Abu Hanifa's original thinking was elaborated by two of his disciples and then by later followers. Abu Hanifa's interpretation of Muslim law was extremely tolerant of differences within the Muslim community. He also separated belief from practice in Islam and accorded primacy to belief. This was, indeed, an important contribution. Because of the difficulty in deciding legal matters based on the Quran and hadith, many different opinions existed. Proponents of the various positions often accused those who disagreed with them of being infidels (kaf rs), which is still a common practice among the mullahs of Afghanistan and elsewhere, Hanafi jurisprudence notwithstanding.
The Hanafi school of f qh (Islamic jurisprudence) achieved preeminence under the Abbasid caliphate (750﷓945), spreading east from Iraq to Afghanistan and Central Asia. Followers of the Hanafi school also existed at the time as far from Iraq as North Africa. Hanafi dominance fell with the fortunes of the Abbasid caliphate. With the rise of the Ottomans, who favored Hanafi interpretation, this school of f qh once again dominated jurisprudence in a great empire. In the late twentieth century, Hanafi Sunnis predominated not only in Afghanistan and the rest of Muslim Central Asia but also in Egypt, Turkey, Pakistan, and India, and in Tunisia it was equal in influence to the Maliki school.

Twelver or Imami Shia

"Twelver," or Imami Shias, area minority in predominantly Sunni Afghanistan. Anthropologist Robert L. Canfield writes of Imami Shia distribution in Afghanistan: "The most numerous rural Imami groups are the Hazara﷓Sayyed Imamis dwelling in the inaccessible mountain massif of central Afghanistan, the Hazarajat, and the Tajik Imamis of Herat Province." Religious succession is at the base of Shia/Sunni differences, although through time Shia have developed their own rituals and legal traditions. All Shia acknowledge Ali as the legitimate successor of the Prophet and believe that the male descendants of Muhammad (and Ali) are uniquely qualified to lead the Muslim community. Twelver Shia view Husayn's martyrdom as the most heinous symbol of their persecuted minority status in a largely Sunni world. The anniversary of Husayn's martyrdom is the most important Shia celebration and is marked in many parts of the Shia Muslim world by mourning processions where participants engage in acts of self﷓flagellation, by the performance of plays ritually reenacting the events surrounding Husayn's death, and by other memorial rituals.
Leadership of the Shia community is held by the Imam, a lineal male descendant of Ali. A son usually inherited the office from his father. In the eighth century, however, succession became confused when the Imam, Jafar al Sadiq, first named his eldest son, Ismail, his successor, then changed his mind and named a younger son, Musa al Kazim. Ismail died before his father and thus never had an opportunity to assert his claim. When jafar died in 765, the Imamate devolved on Musa. Those Shia who followed Musa are known to Western scholars as the Imami or Twelver Shia. The portion of the community refusing to acknowledge Musa's legitimacy and insisting on Ismail's son's right to rule as Imam became known to others as Ismailis. The appellation "Twelver" derives from the disappearance of the twelfth Imam, Muhammad al Muntazar, in about 874. He was a child, and after his disappearance he became known as a messianic figure, Al Mahdi, who never died but remains to this day in occultation. The Twelver Shia believe his return will usher in a golden era.


Ismailis

The Ismailis are Shia known as Seveners because for them Ismail was the seventh Imam. There are fewer Ismailis in Afghanistan than Imami Shia. Afghan Ismailis, in the words of Canfield, "follow the contours of the Hindu Kush Mountain range from its southern extremity in Besud northeastward into the Pamirs, even into Russian Central Asia and Northern Pakistan."
The dichotomously divided Ismaili sect contains the Mustalian branch, found primarily in North Yemen, and the Nizari branch, to which Afghan Ismailis belong. Nizari Ismailis are also found in the Iranian district of Salamiya, Soviet Central Asia, India, the Chitral and Gilgit areas of Pakistan, and East Africa. In Islam, when a sect diverges from a larger group of believers the split is virtually always rooted in a dispute of succession to leadership of the community. Ismailis bifurcated into two branches over such a disagreement. At first, unlike other Shia, all recognized Ismail's son Muhammad as imam. But in 1094 the Ismaili Imam died after having designated his son Nizar to succeed him. Nizar's brother, Mustali, usurped Nizar's position, captured him, and put him and his son to death. The majority of Ismailis remained loyal to the murdered Nizar. Nizaris believe that Nizar's other son, Muhtadi, who was still an infant at the time of his father's and brother's deaths, was smuggled to Iran. He was raised there in great secrecy. Upon Muhtadi's death in 1162, his son revealed himself as the true imam and became the recognized Imam of the Nizari Ismailis. Later in history it once again became necessary for the Imams to go into hiding. When conditions grew more favorable for the Imams to reveal themselves, they again emerged from hiding. The current Nizari Imam is a revealed, not occultated ruler, and is well known, even in the West, as the Agha Khan.
Ismaili beliefs are complex and syncretic, combining elements from the philosophies of Plotinus, Pythagoras, Aristotle, gnosticism, and the Manichaeans, as well as components of Judaism, Christianity, and Eastern religions. Ismaili tenets are, in fact, unique among Muslims. Ismailis place particular emphasis on taqiyya, the practice of dissimulation about one's beliefs to protect oneself from harassment or persecution. Their beliefs about the creation of the world are idiosyncratic, as is their historical ecumenism, toleration of religious differences, and religious hierarchy. Furthermore, the secrecy with which they veil their religious beliefs and practices (together with their practice of taqiyya) makes it extremely difficult to establish what their actual religious beliefs are. What is clear is that there is a division of theology into exoteric (including the conservative sharia) and esoteric (including the mystical exegesis of the Quran, which leads to haqiqa, or the ultimate reality and truth). Their conceptions of the Imamate also differ greatly from those of other Muslims.

Sufis

In the beginning of the eighth century, bands of mystics, or Sufis (from suf, wool, of their rough clothing), sprang up in various countries, claiming to achieve communion with God through various ecstatic means. In most regions people fell away from the austere cult preached by Muhammad and adopted practices that made it more personal and emotional. Sufi orders gradually arose among both Sunnis and Shias, their leaders teaching particular mystic ways to God. Sufism gained acceptance in large parts of the Islamic world. Sufism tends to be more widespread among Sunnis, however, because most Shia sects embrace mysticism and encourage emotional responses to God and to Shia martyrs. Thus, members of Shia groups may not feel the need for the additional ecstatic experience provided by Sufism.

Sufi religious life generally centers on orders, or brotherhoods, that follow a leader, or shaykh, who teaches a mystical discipline known as a tariqa(way). Sufism places great emphasis on a verse from the Quran (7:172) that recounts a longstanding covenant between God and all humans, even, the verse implies, those humans not yet born: God cherishes and sustains humans, while humanity recognizes this and agrees to submit to God's will. Peter Awn, a scholar of Islam, asserts that "the goal of every mystic is to reestablish the living intimacy between the Lord of the world [sic] and the human soul proclaimed at that moment of the covenant." To achieve such an ecstatic state of intimacy and union with God, Sufis have recourse to a variety of methods, including repeated rhythmic movements, bodily gyrations, whirling, dancing, and music. Sufism has considerable influence in Afghanistan.

Meaning and Practice

Descriptions of sharia, Sunna, and formal ideology, while a necessary basis for understanding Islam, contribute little to a knowledge of how most Muslims live their lives. In his sophisticated analysis of religion among the Ghilzai Pashtun, anthropologist Jon W. Anderson demonstrates that Afghan Islam consists of three components﷓qawm (tribe), tariqa, and shariaand that these interweave to form a texture of meanings and social structure encompassing personnel, practice, ideology, and meaning. Religion permeates Ghilzai life, and God's name is invoked routinely. Indeed, this is true not only among the Ghilzai Pashtun but also in all Muslim communities. Several ethnographers who have studied other Afghan tribal and eth me groups, while not carrying their analysis to the extent of Anderson's, have observed common themes.

Among the Ghilzai a sense of, and membership in, the unama is conferred by tribal membership because, unlike other groups in Afghanistan, the Pashtun believe that they became Muslims at the time of the Prophet. Their apical ancestor, Qays, journeyed to Mecca and accepted Islam from Muhammad. Their long association with Islam leads Ghilzai to conceive of tribal membership as synonymous with membership in the Muslim community. Therefore, tribal solidarity is equated with the solidarity of the umma, and Ghilzai perceive anything that threatens tribal solidarity as evil and associated with the devil. 

Historically, khans have arisen as tribal leaders with the ability to unite the tribe. Their role had both religious and political aspects because the harmonious Ghilzai tribe is equivalent to the harmonious unama. As political leaders their realm is the social; in their role as khans they do not dabble in the individual's relation to God, nor do they attempt to authoritatively interpret sharia.

Mullahs, however, are paid religious teachers who are supposed to be learned in Quran, hadith, and sharia, i.e., the Sunna, and are the qualified arbiters of disputes in religious interpretation. Their role is also part of the social aspects of Islam, for they must ensure that their community is knowledgeable in the fundamentals of Islam and must rule on religious questions for the community. In reality, Afghan mullahs may be barely literate﷓only slightly more educated than the tribesmen they serve. Furthermore, their role as religious arbiters forces them to take positions on religious issues; these positions have political ramifications. They must also insist on the correctness and righteousness of their stand, lest their position as religious savant be jeopardized. Mullahs often disagree with each other, pitting different communities of the same tribe against each other. It is in such instances that the mullah's accusations of kafr may fly all too frequently. Sharia and its mullah interpreters often serve to divide the politico﷓religious qawm community. Ghilzai tribesmen, in fact, perceive mullahs as disruptive, as do tribesmen from some other parts of the country.
In contrast to the community mullahs and tribal khans, Sufi shaykhs, pirs, miyans (or mians), and malang (or fakirs) preoccupy themselves with the individual's relationship to God. "Around such figures [as pir, miyan, etc]," Anderson writes, "form networks of loyalties whose most organized expression is the Sufi tariqa". Malang focus their being on their own relationship to God, eschewing home, family, and property to wander the countryside "sleeping in graveyards", especially those containing saints' shrines (see table 5, Appendix). In a culture where family, territory, and property are of utmost importance, a man relinquishing these is viewed as both extremely devout and crazy. These figures have passed out of the social realm almost entirely to better forge links with the divine.
Miyans and pirs (i.e., saints), as well as Sufi shaykhs, are part of the social world while representing and/or espousing the individual's relationship to God. As such, their function is opposed to the spirit of sharia, which ideally stresses uniformity in Muslim behavior. Saints and shaykhs collect followings. Generally those from the same region and ethnic group will follow the same pir, although this is a matter of individual choice. Members of the same pir network or Sufi brotherhood form ties among themselves as well as to the religious leader, although the relationship to the leader remains paramount. Pir networks, primarily composed of kin or people with similar ethnic, sectarian, and regional loyalties, also serve to unite rather than to disrupt social relations. Mullahs are often opposed to such religious figures and the loyalties they engender because their brand of Islam does not strictly follow sharia. Despite the mullah's teaching among tribesmen, Anderson observed that "sheikhs [of Sufi orders] with pir and miyan (saints) in general have a reputation of men of peace whose interest in God makes them disinterested in mundane conflicts-in contrast to mullahs who, as purveyors of learning, often involve themselves in escalating conflicts into Islamic ones". For, according to sharia, people must act according to God's will in all situations. Hence all events have religious overtones, and those whose job it is to decide God's will according to sharia must necessarily render every political situation religious. Because they are "men of peace", saints as well as sayyids (descendants of the Prophet) are often called upon to act as mediators in tribal disputes. Sufism is not for everyone, unlike pir networks. Anderson notes that disgruntled Ghilzai, "particularly second sons and younger brothers who have reason to feel shortchanged in tribal society, may be more or less secretly occasionally drawn to Sufi devotions". This redirects hostile energies that might otherwise be disruptive to the qawm.

While Anderson's analysis may be unique, the elements he reports are not. Canfield carried out research in Bamian Province, a heterogeneous area with respect to ethnicity and religion. Before the 1978 revolution Sunnis lived in the central lowlands of the Bamian Valley, and Twelver Shia resided in the highlands to the west, south, and east of the valley. Ismailis, Canfield notes, were interspersed among the other Shia in highland valleys in the east of the region. Canfield found pirs and mullahs in opposition in Bamian, and he observes that "mullahs all over the Islamic world have opposed or at least distrusted pirs and the Sufi tradition which provides the conceptual basis for the pir's authority."

In Bamian the role of pirs is very similar to their role among the Ghilzai, but Canfield adds that pirs have karamat, "a spiritual or moral essence attributed to people especially close to God." He cogently explains the logic behind the pir figure: "All the sects [of Islam present in Afghanistan] generally shared the belief that God's favor was passed to believers through walis, friends or vice﷓regents (i.e., the pirs); indeed without walis there would be no blessing at all in the world . . . This belief in walis was the ultimate cultural basis for the pir's influence." Pir networks in Bamian are highly politicized and are simultaneously both political and religious coalitions, although, as among the Ghilzai, the dyadic tie to the pir is preeminent.

The Durrani Pashtun were the subject of research by British anthropologist Richard Tapper. In a 1984 article he describes Sufism among the Durrani. Like the Ghilzai Pashtun, Sufism attracts only Durrani who are thwarted within their social system, for example, barren women and improverished men. Durrani do not despise Sufism by any means, although it can be in conflict with mullah and mosque Islam; Durrani religious and political leaders exercise control over the Sufi form of Islam so that it is integrated into the broader Durrani religious and political system. Sufi shaykhs are called aghas by the Durrani and "are respected by all, [because they] have the power to curse if authority is flouted."

Yet another anthropologist, Bahrain Tavakolian, worked with nomadic Sheikhanzai in the northwest of the country. This group also belongs to the Durrani Pashtun. His descriptions of the role of pirs, shaykhs, and other such leaders agree with other accounts. Unlike other researchers, however, he observed that Sheikhanzai accord mullahs a great deal of respect for their learning and religious participation.

The multifaceted phenomenon of Islam in Afghanistan is rich in meanings and plays multiple roles in the society. It lends meaning to the lives of individuals, comforts and channels the ire of the deprived, forms a structure for political coalitions, is inseparable for some from tribal identity, and is included in all Muslim Afghan's most basic personal identity (even if, as the Ghilzai state, they consider themselves "bad Muslims" with regard to the Sunna). No Afghan is less of a Muslim for failing to adhere to sharia, for this contributes only a part to the role and meaning of Islam.
Traditionally, then, throughout the country Islam is a politico religious entity and a deeply felt belief system. As such it is ideally suited to the needs of a diverse, unorganized, often mutally antipathetic citizenry wishing to wage war against a common enemy. Mujahidiin leaders, as is the case with Sufi shaykhs or pirs, are charismatic figures with dyadic ties to followers. Followers select their leader based on personal choice and precedence among others from the region, sect, ethnic group, or tribe. Theirs is a politico-religious war against an anti-Muslim enemy threatening the politico-religious sanctity of their group and hence the personal identity of Afghans. Competing aspects of Afghan Islam still exist, and the mullah leader is not necessary to wage jihad. Given the tripartite division of Islam, as Anderson notes, "it does not detract from their sincerity as Muslims, nor does it make them fanatics, that these tribesmen do not need mullahs for theirs to be a Muslim combat. Rather, it points to the depth of that sincerity that national liberation can be cast as a combat for religion in extremis because that religion is so essentially a part of what they conceive themselves to be." The marriage of religion and politics in Afghanistan has not gone unnoticed by the Afghan government. The government strived to enlist the support of mullahs and the country's ulama (Islamic scholars) to secure the support of the populace (see the Search for Popular Support, ch. 4). The Soviet Union invited groups of such people to tour areas of Soviet Central Asia and experience, firsthand, Islam under the Soviet state. In addition, it appeared in late 1985 that units and companies of the Afghan army had their own imams. The government held seminars for the imams, the "spiritual personalities," and "religious ulama." Although it was difficult to assess the effectiveness of such campaigns, American journalists traveling the country felt that such governmental strategies met with little success in converting religious figures to a pro-government position.

This page maintained by Luke Griffin and last updated on 01/14/2002 .