Reign of King Amanullah, 1919-29

On February 20, 1919, Habibullah was assassinated on a hunting trip. Theories about his murder abound and, although arrests were made, there is still some uncertainty about the affair.

Habibullah had not declared a successor, but his third son, Amanullah, had been left in control in Kabul when his father left on his last hunting trip. Controlling both the national treasury and the army, Amanullah decided to seize power, although his two older brothers and his uncle had equal claims to rule. There had been rumors of Amanullah's involvement in his father's murder, which added to the claims of his rivals. Soon, however, the support of the army allowed Amanullah to suppress other claims and imprison those of his relatives who would not swear loyalty to him. Within a few months the new amir had gained the support of most tribal leaders and had established control over the cities as well. '

The 10 years of Amanullah's reign were a period of dramatic change in Afghanistan in both foreign and domestic politics. Starting with the achievement of complete independence after his attack on Britain in the month-long Third Anglo-Afghan War, Amanullah went on to alter Afghan foreign policy through his new relations with external powers and to transform domestic politics through his social, political, and economic reforms. Although Amanullah's reign ended in tragedy, he achieved some notable successes, and the failure of his efforts can be traced as much to the centrifugal forces in tribal Afghanistan and the machinations of Russia and Britain as to political folly on his part.

Amanullah came to power just as the detente between Russia and Britain broke down following the Russian revolution of 1917, and once again Afghanistan provided a stage on which the great powers played out their schemes against one another. Amanullah's dramatic changes in foreign policy began as soon as he had ascended the throne. Sensing postwar British fatigue, the frailty of British positions along the Afghan border, unrest in British India, and confidence in the consolidation of his power at home, Amanullah suddenly attacked the British in May 1919 in two thrusts. Although, as Poullada reports, Amanullah had written the British viceroy, rejecting British control of his foreign policy and declaring Afghanistan fully independent, the British were taken by surprise. Afghan forces achieved some success in the early days of the war as Pashtun tribesmen from both sides of the border joined forces with them. The military skirmishes soon ended in stalemate as the British recovered from their initial surprise. The war did not last long, however, because both sides were soon ready to sue for peace; the Afghans were unwilling to sustain continued British air attacks on Kabul and Jalalabad, and the British were unwilling to take on an Afghan land war so soon after the bloodletting of World War I. What the Afghans did not gain in battle they gained ultimately at the negotiating table.

The British virtually dictated the terms of the 1919 Rawalpindi Agreement, a temporary armistice agreement that did provide-somewhat ambiguously-for Afghan autonomy in foreign affairs. Before negotiations on a final agreement were concluded in 1921, however, Afghanistan had already begun to establish its own foreign policy, including diplomatic relations with the new government in the Soviet Union in 1919.

The second round of Anglo-Afghan negotiations on a final peace were inconclusive. Although both sides were ready to agree on Afghan independence in foreign affairs, as mentioned in the previous agreement, the two nations disagreed on the issue that had plagued Anglo-Afghan relations for decades and would continue to cause friction for many more, i.e., authority over the Pashtun tribes on both sides of the Durand Line. The British refused to agree to Afghan control over tribes on the British side of the line, while the Afghans insisted on it. The Afghans regarded the 1921 agreement as an informal one.

The 1920s saw diplomatic relations established between Afghanistan and the Soviet Union in 1919; Iran in 1921; Britain, Turkey, and Italy in 1922; and France in 1923. Other manifestations of Amauullah's independence were his change of title from amir to padshah (king) in 1923 and his series of visits in 1927 to the capitals of British India, Egypt, Turkey, Iran, and most of the European nations, including Britain.

Despite his newly independent foreign policy, Amanullah's relations with the British and the Soviets remained the most important aspects of Afghan foreign policy during his reign. In the aftermath of the 1907 Saint Petersburg Convention between the British and the Russians, the Great Game tensions over Afghanistan had subsided greatly. The rivalry of the great powers in this area might have remained subdued had it not been for the dramatic change in government in Moscow with the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917. Facing many internal and external challenges, the Bolshevik leaders could not immediately and straightforwardly subjugate their Muslim subjects, who then made up about 15 percent of the population. Moscow initially adopted a strategy of appeasement. In their efforts to placate the Muslims within their borders, the Soviet leaders were eager to establish cordial relations with neighboring Muslim states. In the case of Afghanistan, the Soviets could achieve a double purpose: by strengthening relations with the leadership in Kabul they could also threaten Britain, which was one of the Western states supporting counterrevolution in the Soviet Union.

When Amanullah, trying to move away from British control of Afghan foreign policy, sent an emissary to Moscow in 1919, Lenin received the envoy warmly and responded by sending a Soviet representative to Kabul and offering aid to Amanullah's government. As Poullada notes, this entente with the Soviets left Amanullah in a position to exploit Britain's weak, post-World War I position in India during and after the Third Anglo-Afghan War of 1919 and helps to explain how Afghanistan was able to turn a weak military position in that war into a brilliant diplomatic triumph.

Throughout Amanullah's reign, Soviet-Afghan relations waxed and waned according to how valuable Afghanistan was to the Soviet leadership at any particular time. The Soviets valued Afghanistan only insofar as it was a tool for dealing with Soviet Muslim minorities and for threatening the British, and therefore they were truly cordial to Amanullah only when they were appeasing the Soviet Muslims or when Anglo-Soviet relations were poor. The Soviets wanted Amanullah to help them suppress anti-Bolshevik elements in Central Asia in return for help against the British, but the Afghans were still interested in regaining lands across the Amu Darya lost to Russia in the nineteenth century. Afghan attempts to regain the oases of Merv and Panjdeh were easily repulsed by the Red Army, which was rapidly subduing the rebellious Central Asian khans. Throughout the 1920s rebellious Muslims revolted against the growing consolidation of Soviet rule in Central Asia. Amanullah clearly sympathized with these rebels, whom the Soviets called bashmachi. Amanullah, despite his sympathy, could offer little support, although volunteers from both Afghanistan and British India were permitted to cross the border to aid their fellow Muslims in Soviet Central Asia.

Poullada's extensive study of the reign of Amanullah makes it clear that the king mistrusted the Soviets but wanted aid from them and wished to use his relations with them as a prod to the British. In May 1921 the Afghans and Soviets signed a Treaty of Friendship, Afghanistan's first international agreement since gaining full independence in 1919. The Soviets provided Amanullah with aid as early as 1919, and throughout the 1920s they made cash subsidies; provided 13 airplanes, pilots, and transport and communication technicians; and carried out the laying of telephone lines between Kabul and Mazar-e Sharif and Herat and Qandahar. Despite this, Amanullah became increasingly disillusioned with the Soviets, especially as he saw growing Soviet oppression of his fellow Muslims across the border. Thousands of Muslims fled to avoid Soviet efforts to pacify Soviet Central Asia through deportations, secularization, and oppression.

Anglo-Afghan relations during Amanullah's reign soured over British fear of Afghan-Soviet friendship, especially the introduction of Soviet planes into Afghanistan. In addition, Amanullah maintained contacts with Indian nationalists and gave them asylum in Kabul. He also used his Soviet connection to taunt the British, and he sought to stir up unrest among the Pashtun tribes across the border. For their part the British were assiduously patronizing in their dealings with Amanullah. Poullada recites a litany of the insults the British visited upon the Afghan ruler, including their refusal for many years to call him "Your Majesty," restrictions on the transit of goods through India, and a host of other petty refusals to treat Afghanistan as an independent state.

Amanullah's domestic reforms were no less dramatic than his initiatives in foreign policy, but the king's achievement of complete independence was not matched by equally permanent gains in domestic politics. The great Afghan intellectual and nationalist, Tarzi, was Amanullah's father-in-law, and he encouraged the monarch's interest in social and political reform. Tarzi, however, urged gradual reform built on the basis of a strong army and central government, as had occurred in Turkey under Mustafa Kemal (Ataturk), who offered to send Turkish officers to train the royal army. Amanullah, however, was unwilling to put off implementing his ideas. His reforms touched on many areas of Afghan life, but among the first (and perhaps the most important) were those that affected the army.

Although Amanullah has been accused of neglecting the army and of trying to strip it of its power, the foremost scholar of this period, Poullada, concludes that the king was simply trying to cast the army in a different mold. It was under Amanullah, for instance, that in 1921 the Afghan air force was established, based on a few Russian planes and pilots; Afghan personnel later received training in France, Italy, and Turkey.

The king had come to power through the army's support, but within a few years he had begun a process that steadily eroded military loyalty to his regime. Having raised military pay substantially as soon as he took power, he subsequently lowered it in the expectation of making up for the loss to individual soldiers by providing increased benefits (better food and shelter). He also hoped that the pay reduction would decrease the size of the army, as recommended by his Turkish advisers, who were totally unfamiliar with Afghan notions of military service. When the other benefits did not materialize in the wake of the pay reduction, however, the soldiers were alienated. Amanullah infuriated the tribes by changing recruitment methods to prevent tribal leaders from controlling who joined the army and by increasing the period of conscription from two years to three.

His Turkish advisers also suggested that the king retire older officers and men who were set in their ways and could be expected to resist the creation of a more professional army. Amanullah's minister of war, General Muhammad Nadir Khan, opposed these changes, preferring to recognize tribal sensitivities. The king's refusal to heed Nadir Khan's advice created an anti-Turkish faction, and in 1924 Nadir Khan left the government to become ambassador to France, ostensibly because he (and his brothers) could not support the king's domestic policies.

Amanullah's reforms-if fully enacted-would have totally transformed Afghanistan. Most of his proposals, however, died with his abdication. Among the social and educational reforms were the adoption of the solar calendar; requirement of Western dress in parts of Kabul and a few other areas; discouragement of the veiling and seclusion of women; abolition of slavery and forced labor; introduction of secular education, including education for girls; adult education classes; and education for nomads.

Political and judicial reforms were equally radical for the time and included Afghanistan's first constitution (1923); guarantee of civil rights (first by decree and then in the constitution); universal national registration and issuance of identity cards; establishment of a legislative assembly; creation of a court system and of secular penal, civil, and commercial codes; prohibition of blood money; and abolition of subsidies and privileges for tribal chiefs and the royal family. Although sharia (Islamic law) was to be only the residual source of law, it regained its prominence after the Khost rebellion of 1923-24. Religious leaders, who had become influential under Amanullah's father, were unhappy over the king's extensive religious reforms. Economic reforms instituted by Amanullah included the reorganization and rationalization of the entire tax structure, antismuggling and anticorruption campaigns, a livestock census for taxation purposes, the first budget (1922), use of the metric system (which did not take hold), establishment of the Banki-i-Melli (National Bank) (1928), and introduction of the afghani (see Glossary) as the new unit of currency (1923).

Conventional wisdom holds that the tribal revolt that overthrew Amanullah grew out of opposition to his reform program. Poullada, however, makes a strong argument against this position. The people most affected by Amanullah's reforms were the urban dwellers, not the tribes, and urban Afghans were not universally opposed to his policies. Poullada believes that Amanullah's opponents simply seized on his radical reform program as a means to transform a minor tribal revolt into a major one. Religious leaders who were threatened by the king's reforms found common cause with tribal leaders, whose power Amanullah had systematically undermined through his efforts to create a modern administrative and political system. The loyalty of the army, which had been the base of Amanullah's accession to power, had been eroded by the measures the king had taken to create a professional army. Poullada concludes that "social change or religious liberalism did not destroy Amanullah so much as his efforts to create a strong central government . . . and this classical struggle between centralized power and tribal separatism was resolved in blood."

In late 1928 Amanullah's regime started to unravel as Shinwari tribesmen revolted in Jalalabad. Many of the king's troops deserted as tribal forces advanced on the capital. He faced two threats, for in addition to the Pashtun tribes, forces led by a Tajik were moving toward Kabul from the north. In January 1929 Amanullah abdicated in favor of his oldest brother, Inayatollah, who ruled only three days before going into exile in India. Amanullah's efforts to recover power by leading a small, ill-equipped force toward Kabul failed. The deposed king crossed the border into India and went into exile in Italy.

This page maintained by Luke Griffin and last updated on 01/14/2002 .