Political Institutions Under Soviet Domination

With the death of Amin, the Afghan state lost its last shred of independence. Soviet advisers wielded great influence while Taraki and Amin were in power. After the invasion, the advisers ran the government's ministries and departments as surely as British colonial officials ran those of nineteenth-century India. Afghan administrators were carefully watched and allowed to make, at best, only routine decisions. Karmal enjoyed considerably less freedom than his counterparts in the Warsaw Pact. A puppet in every sense of the word, he presided over a government that had virtually no power, no popular support, and no room to challenge decisions handed down by the Soviets.

Testimony to the extent of Soviet control was provided by Abdul Majid Mangal, a diplomat whose last post was the Afghan embassy in Moscow and who defected to Pakistan in 1983. He noted that after the invasion, the Soviets sent noncommunist Afghan diplomats to Warsaw Pact countries to keep them under surveillance. They also trained a new generation of Afghan diplomats at universities in the Soviet Union. Safronchuk remained, in the mid-1980s, a very important figure. Though resident in Moscow, Safronchuk, described by Mangal as "the real foreign minister of the Kabul regime," cabled instructions to the foreign ministry by way of the Soviet embassy in Kabul. Before traveling to international meetings, such as those of the UN or the Nonaligned Movement, the nominal foreign minister, Shah Mohammad Dost, customarily stopped over in Moscow to receive instructions. According to Mangal, "each communique, each statement issued by the Foreign Ministry in Kubul is prepared, drafted, and finalized in Moscow."

Observers in the mid-1980s described the network of Soviet advisers as an efficient, well-oiled machine that got things done but preserved the facade of Afghan independence. Limits to Soviet power, however, were apparent. Eighty percent of the country remained outside effective government control. Soviet advisers were also unable to stop the costly blood-feud that continued to rage between Parcham and Khalq.

The Political Role of KHAD

Because the regime depended so much on coercion to stay in power, the most important political institution, from the standpoint of ordinary Afghans in the mid-1980s, was probably the internal security organ, the State Information Service (Khadamate Ettelaate Dowlati, in Dari-KHAD). Successor to AGSA and KAM, KHAD was nominally part of the Afghan state, but it was firmly under the control of the Soviet KGB (see Internal Security, ch. 5). Little is known of its internal organization, but KHAD's system of informers and operatives extended into virtually every aspect of Afghan life, especially in the government-controlled urban areas. Aside from its secret police work, KHAD supervised ideological education at schools and colleges, ran a special school for war orphans, and recruited young men for the militia. Its importance to Moscow was reflected in the fact that it was chiefly responsible for the training of a new generation of Afghans who could be loyal to the Soviet Union. One observer, John Fullerton, calls it "the primary instrument used in the Sovietisation of the country." KHAD was also responsible for co-opting religious leaders. It funded an official body known as the Religious Affairs Directorate and recruited proregime ulama and mosque attendants to spy on worshipers. Another important area was work with tribes and ethnic minorities. KHAD collaborated with the Ministry of Nationalities and Tribal Affairs to foster support for the regime in the countryside. KHAD also had a political role that was clearly unintended by the Soviets. Its director, Najibullah, and other high officials were Parchamis. Thus, KHAD was zealous in suppressing Khalqis in the government and in the armed forces. There was a bitter rivalry between Najibullah and Sayed Muhammad Gulabzoi. Gulabzoi, a Khalq sympathizer, was minister of interior and commander of Sarandoy (Defenders of the Revolution), the National Gendarmerie. In late 1985, Najibullah was promoted to be a secretary on the PDPA Central Committee; in this capacity he may be able to exercise party authority over all security organs, including those attached to the Khalq-dominated defense and interior ministries.

The PDPA after the Invasion

In A Socialist Oriented State, Chirkin and Yudin classify the PDPA as a "revolutionary vanguard party of the working people." They suggest that it can be considered to be in the process of evolving into a genuine Marxist-Leninist party. They note that "the 1982 Rules of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan define the PDPA as a new type of party, the highest form of political organization, the leading and guiding force of society that unites advanced and most class-conscious workers, peasants, servicemen, intellectuals, nomads, craftsmen and other patriots."

Like other parties with Marxist-Leninist affinities, the PDPA was organized according to the principle of democratic centralism. This was a concept developed by Lenin before the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution. It meant, simply, that although party members could discuss issues freely when policies were being formulated, once a decision had been made by the party as a whole, they had to adhere to it strictly. In the PDPA constitution, allegedly adopted at its First Congress in 1965, democratic centralism was defined according to several criteria: election of party leadership on all levels; adherence of a minority to the decisions made by the majority; adherence of lowerranking party officials to the decisions made by higherranking ones; and "enforcement of collective basic leadership and individual responsibility." Lenin's determination to build a tightly organized and highly disciplined party meant that, in practice, the centralist component of the theory was always more apparent than the democratic one. In the PDPA, however, factionalism impeded the smooth operation of democratic centralism, and party discipline was notoriously lax. A second Marxist-Leninist organizational principle is the parallelism of party and state bodies. Party units in theory supervised and directed the operations of their state counterparts on the national, provincial, district, and subdistrict levels (see fig. 7). This conformed with the concept that the revolutionary party uses the state as an instrument for the transformation of society. Most Western observers agreed, however, that the mujahidiin prevented the PDPA from extending its organization down below the provincial level in most parts of the country. Local party figures were easy targets for assassination.

According to the party constitution, the highest authority in the PDPA is vested in the Party Congress, consisting of delegates elected by provincial party conferences. It convenes every four years, although the Central Committee, or twothirds of the party membership, may call an extraordinary Party Congress at other times. The congress selects the members and alternate members of the Central Committee. This body, responsible to the congress, has an executive function. It administers the party and its constituent organizations and is responsible for its finances. In 1984 Western observers identified 46 full and 27 alternate members. The Central Committee chooses the membership of its Politburo Secretariat, and the party secretary general. The Politburo, in practice the most powerful party organ, consisted of nine full members and four alternate members in 1984.

Factionalism

In the mid-1980s repeated Soviet attempts to foster party discipline and unity had come to naught, and the PDPA remained bitterly divided along the Parcham-Khalq faultline (see table 13, Appendix). Each faction had bitter memories of torture and abuse at the hands of the other. Within the two groups, smaller factions, organized around individual leaders, could be identified. Within Parcham, Karmal, Keshtmand, and Solayman Laeq allegedly had the strongest personal followings. Najibullah, as head of the KHAD apparatus, was also extremely powerful. Important faction leaders among Khalqis included Gulabzoi, the minister of interior, and Muhammad Zahir Ofagh, a founder and member of the PDPA with close Soviet ties. Gulabzoi apparently led the former followers of the notorious Sarwari, an anti-Amin Khalqi who after the 1979 invasion was elected to the Politburo but then was sent off to become ambassador to Mongolia. Some observers believed that Ghulam Dastagir Panjsheri, usually identified as a Khalqi, was forming his own faction, Kar (Labor), distinct from Parcham and Khalq. He was reportedly encouraged in this effort by the Soviets. There was evidence that Moscow was recruiting other individuals, such as Ofagh, to build an "independent" power base outside the old factional structure. Rather than exhibiting the discipline of a democratic centralist party, the internal dynamics of the PDPA continued to resemble the loosely structured personalism of traditional tribal politics.

In late 1985 the depth of factionalism was indicated by the fact that in the 20 years since its founding, the PDPA had convened only one full-fledged Party Congress-on January 1, 1965, the date of its formal establishment. A second congress was scheduled for March 1982. Around 1,700 delegates elected from lower-level party units were expected to attend. Parchamis attempted to pack the congress with their own people by appointing delegates rather than by allowing them to be elected. In this way they obtained a 60-percent majority, but they roused the ire of Khalqis, who still composed the majority of party members. Only 841 delegates attended the meeting on March 14. Gulabzoi, described by a commentator as the "standard-bearer of the Khalq faction," noisily interrupted a speech by Karmal and demanded to know why some people in the PDPA were calling his interior ministry the "ministry of bandits." KHAD director Najibullah attempted to silence him. The atmosphere became so heated that the meeting ended a day earlier than planned.

Although the conclave produced the "Rules of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan" mentioned by Chirkin and Yudin, the questionable way delegates were chosen and the lack of consensus thereafter resulted in its being downgraded in status from a congress to an ordinary party conference. There were several violent incidents. At least five party members were killed in shoot-outs.

There was a significant change in the 1982 party rules compared with the 1965 constitution, most notably the omission of references to socialism and Marxism-Leninism. This shed light on a rather ironic development. Western observers tended to describe the 1979 invasion in terms of Moscow's determination to spread communism; but Moscow seemed to want gradualism, rather than revolution, in Afghanistan. The rules reflected the orthodox view that such an underdeveloped country-a socialist-oriented rather than socialist state was in the national democratic stage of development. This viewpoint was bitterly opposed by Khalqis.

The party was severely crippled organizationally because the majority of rank-and-file members, Khalqis, were continually at odds with the Parcham-dominated upper ranks. Eight of the 13 members and alternate members of the Politburo in 1984 were Parchamis: Karmal, Keshtmand, Najibullah, Nur Ahmad Nur, Muhammad Rafi, Ratebzad, Qader (though he was not in the Politburo in 1985), and Mahmud Baryalai. Muhammad Aslam Watanjar, Salih Muhammad Zeary, Muhammad Ismail Danesh and, possibly, Ghulam Dastagir Panjsheri, were Khalqis (the affiliation of an alternate member, Abdul Zahoor Razmjo, was not clear). Watanjar, commander of rebel tanks during the April 1978 coup, had been involved in the plot to remove Amin, while Zeary, nicknamed "Quicksilver," was known for his skill in evading ideological commitments. Danesh was another hardy survivor, having served as minister of mines and industries under Taraki, Amin, and Karmal. Panjsheri's ambition to form his own faction and his close ties to the Soviets made him a doubtful exponent of Khalq interests. None of the men in the Politburo shared the perspective of the Khalqi rank-and-file.

Frequent shootings gave party life a Dodge City atmosphere. In late September 1985, for example, it was reported that 14 people had been killed in Parcham-Khalq confrontations. Disaffected Khalqis often assisted the mujahidiin. Khalqis in the armed forces often accused their Parchami officers of using them as cannon fodder and complained that young Parchami men were exempted from compulsory military service. Even Afghan students at Soviet universities kept alive the old animosity. One source reported that two Khalqi students fell out of a window of the Afghan embassy in Moscow under highly suspicious circumstances. When PDPA meetings were held by Afghan students at Moscow State University, the two factions reportedly met in different rooms.

By the mid-1980s the party's problems were too severe to hide. Karmal, in an address before the Central Committee plenum in March 1984, warned against excessive leftism (presumably a reference to Khalq), castigated the party's lack of zeal, factional selfishness, obstructionism, and "narcissism," and asserted that "a solid unity can only be ensured through an iron discipline." There was little prospect, however, that the PDPA had the will or the resources to cure its factional ills.

Membership

Figures on PDPA membership were highly unreliable. In late 1984 the party claimed a figure of 120,000 persons. This was considered by many Western observers to be as many as 10 times the actual figure. The 1984 edition of the Yearbook on International Communist Affairs, published by the Hoover Institution, suggests a figure as low as 11,000, composed of 3,000 Parchamis and 8,000 Khalqis. In a 1985 article Arnold offers a much more generous estimate of between 50,000 and 90,000. Even the higher figure is significantly less than 1 percent of the total Afghan population (around 14.7 million; for purposes of comparison, the CPSU composed in the mid-1980s about 7 percent of the Soviet population, and the Chinese Communist Party, 4 percent of China's). The statistics suggest that the party has had only limited success in recruitment, despite the rewards of membership. According to the Peshawar-based Afghanistan Information Centre Monthly Bulletin, the salaries of civil servants who joined the party were quadrupled, and those of armed forces personnel were doubled or tripled. Balanced against this, of course, was the risk of being assassinated by the mujahidiin.

During Amin's months in power-September-December 1979party membership plunged because of his brutal purges of both Parchamis and pro-Taraki Khalqis. After the invasion the party grew slowly but steadily. It was prepared to accept practically anyone who applied. One noticeable trend in the 1980s was the decline in members' educational qualifications. The party had been founded by intellectuals, but Arnold notes that only 40 of the 841 delegates attending the March 1982 conference were intellectuals or professionals. About half the party members were from worker, craftsman, or peasant backgrounds. Other sources give 60 percent of the party membership as belonging to the armed forces, Sarandoy, or KHAD.

Although the Soviets could not curb factional violence or transform the PDPA into a disciplined party, their involvement in its internal affairs meant that they had a decisive role in choosing who would succeed Karmal. In 1985 Karmal was a relatively young 56 years of age, but the life expectancy of Afghan leaders has tended to be short. Soviet support of Karmal, moreover, was far from unequivocal. He was an ineffectual leader. Rumors circulated in Kabul and émigré circles that he was deeply disillusioned about the revolution and drowned his sorrows in alcohol. Politburo member Ratebzad, his mistress, was reportedly the power behind a very powerless throne, but given the sexual prejudices of a still strongly Muslim country, it was unlikely that the Soviets would back her as a new leader.

The Soviets apparently cultivated Ofagh and Panjsheri in an attempt to find an alternative to Karmal. Other possible candidates included the prime minister, Keshtmand, and the chairman of the National Fatherland Front (NFF), Abdul Rahim Atef. But Keshtmand, a Hazara, would not be acceptable to Pashtuns and other nationalities, and Atef, an old parliamentarian, was not well-known. In April 1985, however, he came into the spotlight as chairman of the Loya Jirgah, and he assumed his position as head of the front a month later. Another candidate at that time was the old Pareham stalwart, Nor Ahmad Nor. Though he was a member of the Politburo, he reportedly resided in Moscow, kept "on ice" by the Soviets like Karmal himself. After his appointment as PDPA party secretary, Najibullah emerged as another candidate. Coverage in the local press indicated in late 1985 that he was ranked third in the party hierarchy.

Government Structure

In late 1985 the basic document of the Afghan state, serving as a provisional constitution, was the Fundamental Principles of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan. Replacing the Thirty-two Basic Lines of Revolutionary Duties promulgated by Taraki, it was adopted by Karmal's Revolutionary Council (RC) on April 14, 1980, and put into effect a week later. It is divided into 10 chapters containing 68 articles that explain the regime's basic principles and define government structure. There is little mention of socialist or MarxistLeninist themes. Afghanistan is described as an "independent, democratic State belonging to all Moslem working people of Afghanistan ranging from workers, peasants, nomads and the intelligentsia to other toilers and the entire democratic and patriotic forces from all nationalities, tribes and clans of this country" (Article One). Article Five guarantees "respect, observance and preservation of Islam as a sacred religion" and religious freedom for members of other religions. Article Eleven, however, declares the government's determination to "expand and strengthen its friendship and traditional all-out co-operation with the Soviet Union" and other members of the "socialist alliance.

The Loya Jirgah, or national assembly, is defined as the "highest organ of state power." When it is convened, as the Fundamental Principles declare it will be, a permanent constitution will be ratified. Until that time, the RC stands at the apex of the government system. This body holds plenary sessions twice a year. At other times, its responsibilities are performed by the RC's Presidium. These include the ratification of laws and decrees, approval of economic plans, appointment of members of the Council of Ministers, convening (when appropriate) of the Loya Jirgah, and ratification of treaties and other agreements with foreign states. Laws are passed by a majority of the members of the RC. They choose the Presidium and its chairman, who is president of the RC.

The RC president, Karmal in late 1985, fills the role of head of state. He is commander of the armed forces, accepts the credentials of foreign diplomatic representatives, and signs laws and decrees into force. Karmal, like Taraki and Amin, simultaneously held the post of PDPA secretary general.

The Council of Ministers, with 28 members in the summer of 1985, is the highest executive body. It implements policy and submits draft laws to the RC. The president of the Council of Ministers, the prime minister, is head of the council and is assisted by several deputy prime ministers. In late 1985 the prime minister was Keshtmand.

Afghanistan was divided in the mid-1980s into 29 provinces (wilayat). These, in turn, were divided into districts (wu luswali), and subdistricts (alaqadari). Provincial governors were appointed by the RC, and district and subdistrict commissioners were also central government officials. Because of the widespread nature of the resistance, however, the local government administration was inoperative in most of the country. After the 1979 invasion, Soviet advisers established a new system of administration. Afghanistan was divided into seven military districts, each jointly administered by a Soviet military commander and a PDPA political officer.

The Loya Jirgah on the national level and the provincial, district, and subdistrict jirgahs (assemblies) are elective bodies. In July 1985 the RC passed the Law on Elections and Local Organs of the State Power and Administration. The following month, local elections were held with great fanfare in Kabul. How widely they were held in other parts of the country at this time was unclear. A Soviet observer, commenting that the elections were being held in several places, noted that "it must be said that the elections in Afghanistan are of a rather peculiar character . . . because of the military-political situation which remains difficult and because of the many national traditions and practices."

The Fundamental Principles declare that all citizens are equal before the law. The highest court is the Supreme Court. It administers the lower courts (on the provincial, municipal, and district levels) and "ensures a uniform application of laws by all courts." Court judges on all levels are appointed by the RC Presidium. Article Fifty-four provides for "special courts" to judge "specific cases according to law." According to the United States Department of State's Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1984, "revolutionary" courts, controlled by the PDPA and similar to those established during the Taraki era, still functioned.

Although Islamic law is not designated as the foundation of the legal system by the Fundamental Principles, courts may settle cases according to sharia when there are ambiguities in the law (Article Fiftysix). Cases can be tried in Pashtu, Dari, or the languages of minority nationalities. In areas controlled by the mujahidiin, qazis (religious judges) continued to dispense justice.

Although the Fundamental Principles pledge "due respect" to the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights, both the United States Department of State and Amnesty International identified significant human rights abuses in the mid1980s. These included the use of torture, particularly by KHAD; the use of predetermined "show trials" to dispose of political prisoners; and widespread arbitrary arrest and detention. Secret trials and the execution of prisoners without trial were also common.

The Search for Popular Support

In the mid-1980s only a tiny minority of the total populationperhaps 3 to 5 percent-actively supported the regime. The largest group were PDPA and state cadres and their families in the urban areas, who depended on Soviet armed protection and subsidies for physical survival. The PDPA's postinvasion unitedfront strategy-aimed at groups as diverse as women, youth, national minorities, tribal leaders, Islamic clergy, peasants, workers, and intellectuals-was regarded by observers as largely ineffectual. In people's eyes, the regime combined the worst features of the reigns of Shah Shuja, the nineteenth-century king installed as a puppet by the British in 1839, and the radically unorthodox King Amanullah (see The First Anglo-Afghan War; Reign of King Amanullah, 1919-29, ch. 1).

Certain rural communities were proregime because they had relatives in important government positions or received special treatment because of their strategic location near the country's borders. One, Lakan in Paktia Province, was nicknamed "little Moscow." The authorities were typically reduced to buying people's loyalty. A Swedish journalist, writing in 1984, notes that the regime discovered it was cheaper to bribe guerrillas to lay down their arms than to repair sabotaged facilities. A guerrilla source claimed that the authorities paid the equivalent of US$500,000, a princely sum in Afghanistan, to keep the peace in one district. Government sinecures, in Kabul or provincial centers, were another inducement.

On January 2, 1980, Karmal announced that he intended to establish a united-front organization, but it was not until June 15, 1981, that the NFF held its founding congress. Zeary, the "quicksilver" Khalqi, was named its first chairman.

Designed to serve as a bridge between the PDPA and the people, the NFF contained around 15 mass, elite, and professional organizations. The most important were similar to those found in the Soviet Union: the Central Council of Trade Unions (200,000 members), the Democratic Youth Organization of Afghanistan (25,000 members), and the Pioneers (like the Soviet Pioneers, similar to boy and girl scouts; 85,000 members). Other constituent groups in mid-1985 included the Council of Religious Scholars and Clergy, the Council of Tribal Elders, local Jirgah (assemblies-see Glossary), peasants' cooperatives, paramilitary units, the Afghan Red Crescent Society, and the Kabul University Center for Social Activities (apparently the equivalent of a student union). Recruitment for some of these groups was reportedly coerced. The NFF published its own newspaper, Anis, in Kabul. PDPA leaders in late 1984 heaped criticism on the NFF for its lack of discipline and initiative. This may explain the replacement of Zeary as chairman by Atef in May 1985.

The convening of a Loya Jirgah, or grand assembly of tribal chiefs, local notables, and religious leaders, has traditionally been an event of tremendous significance in Afghan politics. Since 1747, when a grand assembly in Qandahar elected Ahmad Shah Durrani king of Afghanistan, the institution has functioned as an elite referendum on major national issues. It draws on the tradition of the tribal jirgah, a vital feature of Pashtun political life. Given the weakness of the central government, rulers have needed the consensus of members of the powerful local elite to initiate new policies. In 1924 King Amanullah convened a Loya Jirgah to approve the country's first constitution. Four years later, he called together around 1,000 of the country's most prominent men to approve his radical political and social reforms. When they rejected his proposals, which included enforcement of monogamy and the unveiling of women, he convened a "rump" jirgah of 100 reformist notables to gain their approval. Outraged conservatives then sought to overthrow him. Loya Jirgahs were convened to approve Afghanistan's neutrality in World War II, lend moral support to the Pashtunistan movement in 1955, and ratify new constitutions in 1964 and 1977.

It is not surprising that the Fundamental Principles designate this vital symbol of legitimacy-in many ways the foundation of the modern Afghan state's identity-as the "highest organ of state power." The first postinvasion Loya Jirgah was assembled in Kabul on April 23, 1985. With much fanfare, elections of representatives from the different provinces were hastily conducted in early spring of that year. According to the April 17 Kabul New Times, "the election of representatives of the people for the Loya Jirgah is taking place through traditional tribal and popular jirgahs in each province in a democratic and free atmosphere." Many local notables, however, had to be bribed to attend. In late 1985, moreover, it was unclear what exactly the meeting had accomplished. The Fundamental Principles state that one of the first tasks a Loya Jirgah would undertake is ratification of a permanent constitution, but this did not occur. One observer of Afghan affairs has suggested that Karmal's sponsorship of the assembly was an act of desperation meant to show that the regime was a genuinely Afghan government and not a Soviet implantation.

Resistance groups have also attempted to use the Loya Jirgah as a vehicle of legitimacy. A grand assembly was convened in Peshawar Pakistan, in May 1980. Although representatives from all the major mujahidiin groups attended, the meeting failed to produce a consensus or establish the basis for a truly unified movement.

After the invasion, Karmal attempted to put the Soviet wolf in Islamic sheep's clothing, claiming that "the date of 27 December represents the intervention of God Almighty. That the USSR is helping us is also an act of God." The more credulous Afghans must have reflected that God was indeed acting in mysterious ways, since the Soviets were universally known as kafirs, or unbelievers. The regime sought to assuage, if not win over, the country's deeply religious population. The old Afghan tricolor, with the Islamic color of green, was restored. Beginning in April 1980, the traditional invocation, "In the name of God the Merciful, the Compassionate", was again used to preface official documents.

The regime attempted to co-opt Islamic clergy and scholars, the mullahs and ulama. Numerous clergy conferences, with top leaders in attendance, were sponsored. The Council of Religious Scholars and Clergy was given a prominent place in the NFF, and the state's ministry of religious affairs and endowments was responsible for subsidies to the Islamic establishment. The theology faculty at Kabul University trained a new generation of ulama in the mid-1980s. Karmal claimed, in an August 1985 address commemorating the Islamic holiday at the end of Ramadan, that there were 20 madrasa and schools for memorizing the Quran in the country and that religious subjects were taught in all the schools. He also claimed that the regime had distributed thousands of copies of the Quran.

In the mid-1980s mullahs were given ration coupons and special allowances. According to the Kabul New Times in February 1985, the equivalent of US$3.4 million had been donated by the state for the construction or repair of mosques in the 1982-85 period. The paper also noted that US$9.4 million had been donated to subsidize the haj (pilgrimage) to Mecca. Special supplies of firewood were made available to mosques to keep them warm during the winter months.

The regime's goal of creating an "official," and subservient, Islam was frustrated by the nature of the religious community in Afghanistan (see Meaning and Practice, ch. 2). Like temporal authority, spiritual authority tended to be diffuse. Clerical hierarchies were poorly developed, and individual mullahs had very limited prestige outside their local communities. According to Alexandre Bennigsen, an expert on Soviet and Central Asian Islam, the most powerful religious figures were members of spiritual families that claimed descent from the Prophet. Many of these had been persecuted while Taraki and Amin were in power and, after the Soviet invasion, played a prominent role in the resistance. The few mullahs or ulama foolish enough to express support for the regime risked a grisly death at the hands of the mujahidiin.

The PDPA's Soviet advisers discovered that Moscow's experience with Muslims in the Central Asian republics bordering Afghanistan was of limited relevance. There, clerical hierarchies were well-established and had tremendous prestige. Thus, it was relatively easy.for the Soviets to foster the growth of a co-opted elite of "red mullahs" commanding the allegiance of local Muslims.

The PDPA regime, with Soviet guidance, apparently planned over the long terms to combine support of official Islam with an educational and cultural program designed to loosen its hold on the population. As a Soviet scholar living in the Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic north of the Amu Darya has commented, "there can be no harmless religious beliefs." Observers have noticed preliminary moves in this direction, such as the gradual abandonment of the study of Arabic, the language of the Islamic scriptures, in schools; the introduction of materialist philosophy into curricula; and the promotion of secular festivals, such as the "orange blossom festival" held in Jalalabad in April 1983, to compete with traditional religious observances. Although the PDPA was in no position in the mid1980s to initiate a campaign of antireligious propaganda, the promotion of "scientific atheism"-a prominent theme in the cultural life of the Central Asian republics-was likely to be one of the later fruits of the Soviet occupation.

National Minorities

Given centuries-old animosity between minorities and the Pashtun majority, exploitation of the nationality issue seemed to Western observers in the mid-1980s to be an excellent way for the regime to gain popular support. The Soviets were able to use a tribal and ethnic divide-and-conquer policy to undermine resistance in the ethnically heterogeneous areas of the Caucasus and Central Asia. Available evidence suggests that although the PDPA, urged by the Soviets, had initiated such a policy, by the mid-1980s it had limited effectiveness. One reason was that the party was still a predominantly Pashtun organization, and its policies reflected a Pashtun point of view. Parcham was more ethnically diverse in its following than Khalq, but only a handful of its top adherents, such as Prime Minister Keshtmand, were non-Pashtuns. The radical policies of Taraki and Amin, moreover, had alienated most national minorities. Minority areas remained centers of rebellion that were as much anti-Pashtun as they were anticommunist. The largest mujahidiin-controlled region was the Hazarajat, inhabited by the Shia Hazaras and covering parts of the three central provinces of Bamian, Ghowr, and Oruzgan.

Two features of nationality policy were apparently heavily influenced by the Soviets. One was the deep involvement of the KGBdirected KHAD in work in minority areas. KHAD collaborated closely with the state ministry of nationalities and tribal affairs, headed by Solayman Laeq. The second feature was an emphasis on cultivating cultural and other ties between Afghan minorities and their ethnic counterparts in Soviet Central Asia. There are large populations of Turkic-speaking Uzbeks, Tajiks, and Turkmen on both sides of the Amu Darya. Official histories written since 1979 stressed Afghanistan's traditional ties with Central Asia, not with India or Iran. Cultural exchanges between the Afghan minority areas (or at least those areas under government control) and the Soviet Central Asian republics were frequent. The regime also encouraged the development of minority, particularly Turkic, languages and literature. Thus, it established a number of Uzbek and Turkmen journals, schools, and cultural centers. Non-Turkic minority languages, such as Nuristani and Baluchi, were also encouraged. In this manner, the regime and its Soviet advisers sought to fragment the country linguistically and culturally in a manner very similar to Soviet policy in Central Asia.

One social division the regime apparently did not exploit was between the majority Sunni Muslims and the Shia Muslims. Bennigsen suggests that the PDPA was too fearful of "Khomeiniism" to encourage a sense of Shia identity, particularly among the rebellious Hazaras.

This page maintained by Luke Griffin and last updated on 01/14/2002 .