Political Bases of The Resistance

Like the elephant in the Indian fable of the blind men, the Afghan resistance has been characterized in different ways by different observers. If the analogy of the blind men holds, each grasps a part of the truth but lacks a comprehensive perspective.

For example, Gerard Chaliand, an expert on guerrilla movements worldwide, describes the resistance as a traditionalist uprising, a violent repudiation of the PDPA's ambitious modernization schemes. He notes that "unlike virtually all guerrilla movements of Asia, Africa, or Latin America, the Afghan resistance has nothing new to show the visiting observer: no new elected village committee, for example; no program for the integration of women into the struggle; no new clinics or schools; no newly created stores that sell or exchange essential goods; no small workshops contributing to economic selfsufficiency of the sort one finds in guerrilla camps elsewhere throughout the world. The Afghan rebels have undertaken no political experiments or social improvements."

Leftist writers such as Fred Halliday also see the resistance in essentially negative terms. In his 1980 essay, "War and Revolution in Afghanistan," Halliday explains the revolt in terms of the underdeveloped state of the Afghan countryside. Because of the strength of tribal loyalties, the lack of classconsciousness, Afghanistan's violent political ethos, and the reactionary nature of militant Islam, the PDPA's reforms in 1978-79 roused widespread popular opposition. Afghan peasants were not ready for revolution because they still had strong economic and emotional ties to members of the local elite.

On the other end of the political spectrum, sympathetic commentators describe the resistance in terms of either Afghan nationalism or a struggle between the forces of "freedom" and "totalitarianism." Like the leftists, their perspectives and judgments are often compromised by adherence to Western concepts. Those close to the scene realize that Western ideas such as nationalism or freedom are meaningless to all but a rather small minority of resistance fighters.

Finally, there is the Islamic perspective. In a 1984 article, "Islam in the Afghan Resistance," French scholar Olivier Roy argues that "the Afghan resistance sees its struggle more in terms of a'holy war' (jihad) than as a war of national liberation. In a country in which reference to the 'nation' is a very recent phenomenon, where the State is perceived as exterior to society, and where allegiance belongs to the local community, Islam remains the sole point of reference for all Afghans." Edward Girardet, a journalist who spent time with the resistance in Afghanistan, notes that "Russia's most formidable foe is not a military one, but Islam . . . Difficult for the Western (and Russian) mind to understand, faith is the greatest strength of the Afghan, whose whole approach to life is closely bound to his constant struggle for survival."

Although the Islamic concept of jihad is a theme common to all the major resistance groups, it would be simplistic to assume that they share a single Islamic ideology. Rather, there are several Islamic constituencies with widely diverse perspectives on religion, society, and the state. In a country where 99 percent of the population is Muslim, Islam ostensibly provides a basis for unity and legitimacy. Yet the variations within the Muslim community are so pronounced that different groups, professing Islamic goals, have little in common except the vocabulary of the Quran, hostility to the foreign invader and, sometimes, appreciation of the material benefits of united action (see Religion, ch. 2).

Perhaps more basic to the resistance than even Islam is Afghanistan's cultural ethnic, and social diversity (see Ethnicity and Tribe, ch. 2). The Afghan state has existed since the rise of Ahmad Shah Durrani in the mid-eighteenth century. It has had, however, minimal impact on the daily life or self-conceptions of most Afghans. As Roy indicates, the state has been largely unsuccessful in fostering a coherent sense of Afghan nationhood (although some sense of this was found among Pashtun close to the royal family). Old social divisions, then, remain extremely important: those between the various ethnic groups, between Durrani and Ghilzai, between speakers of Pashtu and speakers of Dari, between Sunni and Shia, between Sufi communities and other Muslims, and between farmers, nomads, and urbanites, to mention some of the most important. The local elites that emerged from this social complexity enjoyed with a few exceptions, unchallenged authority. The downfall of Amanullah in 1929 shows that they could sabotage the state's efforts to exercise power on the local level or promote radical social change. The mujahidiin resistance beginning in 1978 was probably as much an expression of local political interests as it was a religious struggle. Revolt, moreover, was nothing new. In Afghan politics, violence is not extremism but part of a centuries-old status quo.

Thus, the resistance in the mid-1980s reflected the diversity and complexity of Afghan society. Western analysts counted as many as 90 localities where armed groups operated. With the exception of a few famous commanders, such as the intrepid Ahmad Shah Mahsud in the Panjsher Valley, these groups and their leaders were less well-known to outsiders than the seven émigré parties based in Peshawar, Pakistan, which are identified in the Western press as leading the mujahidiin. The Peshawar groups played a vital role in publicizing the Afghan struggle worldwide and in funneling arms and funds from outside donors (such as the Arab states of the Gulf) to the fighting groups inside the country. They also represented the broad currents of Islamic ideology and politics. But they did not directly control or command the unquestioning loyalty of the mujahidiin. Observers such as Louis Dupree have commented that the guerrillas were growing increasingly dissatisfied with the émigré parties' inefficiency, corruption, and quarrelsomeness.

The complexity of the resistance was accentuated by Afghanistan's rugged topography and the economic effects of the war. Soviet attacks and mujahidiin sabotage of highways and bridges isolated communities, making them economically more self-reliant than they had been before 1979. At the same time, the smuggling of foodstuffs and other goods from Pakistan and Iran flourished. Because the majority of the population, including the guerrillas, consisted of subsistence farmers and nomads, their survival did not depend on an integrated economic system of the kind found in developed countries. Thus, the Soviets found it relatively difficult to impose an economic stranglehold on the country and starve the scores of self-sufficient liberated areas into submission.

Both the mujahidiin and Western observers generally classified the different resistance groups-the guerrilla units within the country and the emigre parties based in Pakistan-into "Islamic fundamentalist" and "traditionalist" categories. These are sometimes misleading labels, but they reflect significant social and political cleavages. A third category consisted of Shia groups. Some, but not all, had close ties with revolutionary Iran in the mid-1980s. There were also small groups of Maoist leftists involved in the resistance, although their role in the mid1980s appeared to have been minimal.

Islamic Fundamentalists

Islamic fundamentalists were ideologically and organizationally the most coherent groups in the resistance, and they most resembled modern revolutionary parties in other parts of the world. Influenced by the Muslim Brotherhood (Al Ikhwan al Muslimun) in Egypt and to a lesser extent by modern Muslim thinkers on the Indian subcontinent, the movement originated on the campus of Kabul University in the late 1950s. Principal figures were professors of the Faculty of Theology, such as Burhannudin Rabbani (in late 1985 the leader of a major émigré fundamentalist party, the jamiat-i-Islami). Many of these scholars had studied at the venerable A1 Azhar University in Cairo, a center of Islamic political thought. In the early years, the Jamiat-i-Islami, the predecessor of the resistance group established by these professors, was concerned primarily with encouraging cultural activities among students. Because of their critical views of the monarchy, however, many Jamiat-iIslami members were arrested, and their activities were conducted in a semiclandestine manner.

During the 1965-72 period, when Kabul University was wracked with political turmoil, students formed the Sazman-e Jawanan-a Musalman (Organization of Muslim Youth). More militant than their teachers, they held demonstrations against Zionism, United States involvement in Vietnam, and-most controversially-against the creation of Pashtunistan. Given the importance of this issue to the government, they suffered severe repression. Muslim students also had violent confrontations with leftist students. The organization gained recruits not only at the university but also at teachers' training colleges and the polytechnic and engineering schools in Kabul. Among the most important were engineering student Gulbuddin Hikmatyar (leader in late 1985 of the Hezb-e Islami, or Islamic Party, the largest fundamentalist émigré party) and polytechnic student Mahsud, the Panjsher Valley commander. Islamic fundamentalist students came from diverse regions of Afghanistan; but significantly, the movement gained only a few adherents from Pashtun tribal areas.

In his 1984 article Roy argues that the fundamentalists were distinct both from Afghanistan's traditional religious authorities (the ulama, or scholars, and the pirs, or Sufi holy men) and from conservative Muslims (sometimes also known as "fundamentalists"), who advocated restoration of sharia (Islamic law) as the basis of the state but opposed the creation of a modern state. Unlike these groups, they were not inimical to Western ideas. Roy notes that "Islamism [his term for fundamentalism" attempts to think of Islam in terms of a political ideology which is fit to compete with the great ideologies of the West (liberalism, Marxism, nationalism). It borrows the conceptual framework of western political philosophy (the sense of history, the State, the search for a definition of politics) and endeavours to fill it with the traditional concepts of Muslim thought." Their political activism and self-awareness as modern intellectuals rather than traditional scholars gave them a perspective that was deeply at odds with Afghan tradition. In many ways, they were as remote from the society in which they lived as the more radical members of the PDPA. This was particularly true of Hikmatyar, who sought to build a highly disciplined, Leninist-style "vanguard" party.

As revolutionaries, the fundamentalists were committed to establishing a just society based on Islamic principles. On this issue they were at odds with the often corrupt religious authorities who were concerned with tradition and hairsplitting interpretations of sharia. These divergent viewpoints engendered much suspicion and hostility.

Fundamentalists were opposed to Daoud's regime after he came to power in July 1973 because of his collaboration with Parcham, his initially friendly relations with the Soviet Union, and his Pashtun nationalism. Their opposition to the Pashtunistan issue gained them the active support of Pakistan. The Pakistani armed forces trained Afghan units in the early 1970s, and around 5,000 guerrillas were based at camps near the border at Peshawar. In July 1975 they launched an insurrection. Although the Jamiat-i-Islami, like the PDPA, had established cells in the armed forces, army sympathizers did nothing to aid the revolt. Insurgents attacked government installations in the Panjsher Valley, Badakhshan, and other parts of the country. The uprising was brutally crushed, and the survivors fled back across the border to Peshawar. There, the foundations were laid for the later mujahidiin movement.

The history of the Jamiat-i-Islami parallels, in a striking fashion, that of the PDPA. As in the leftist party, there were radical and moderate wings. Hikmatyar, the youthful "Leninist," bitterly opposed the more moderate and accomodating united-front strategy of Rabbani. In 1976 or 1977 the two leaders went separate ways. Hikmatyar formed the Hezb-e Islami, while Rabbani retained control over the original Jamiati-Islami. In 1979 a second split occurred. Yunis Khales, one of the few traditional ulama to become involved in the fundamentalist movement, broke with Hikmatyar and formed his own Hezb-e Islami. This group was more moderate than Hikmatyar's and in the mid-1980s enjoyed good relations with Rabbani's party.

Four major Islamic fundamentalist émigré parties were prominent in the mid-1980s: Hikmatyar's Hezb-e Islami; Rabbani's Jamiat-i-Islami; Khales' Hezb-e Islami; and Abdul Rasool Sayyafs Ittehad-e-Islami (Islamic Alliance) (see Resistance Forces, ch. 5). Hikmatyar's party had widespread support in the Pashtun areas of the north and east, especially Konduz, Baghlan, Konarha, and Nangarhar provinces. Though Hikmatyar led the best organized, best led, and numerically strongest party (it had between 20,000 and 30,000 adherents in the mid-1980s), he was often accused of greater zealousness in attacking resistance rivals than the Soviet or Afghan armed forces. The 1979 rumors of a plot between him and Hafizullah Amin also tainted him with the stigma of a collaborator. Chaliand calls him "the most intelligent, ambitious and ruthless resistance leader in Peshawar."

Rabbani's Jamiat-i-Islami derived most of its popular support from the Dari- and Turkic-speaking national minorities in the northern part of the country. One of his most supportive guerrilla commanders was Mahsud, who, like Rabbani himself, was a Tai ik. Khales' Hezb-e Islami maintained its power base in the southeastern part of the country, particularly Paktia Province. Sayyaf s group was well-armed and well-equipped, but it was regarded as having little support outside his native area, Paghman, near Kabul.

The Traditionalists

Traditionalist resistance groups differed from the Islamic fundamentalists chiefly in their reliance on personal networks, defined in terms of religion or tribe, rather than Western-style ideology or political organization, as a basis for allegiance. Thus, they reflected more faithfully Afghan values and social institutions, particularly in the Pashtun tribal areas. Politically and militarily, their factional jealousy and loose structure hampered their effectiveness. Yet local networks of mujahidiin, affiliated with tribal notables or local religious figures, were an indispensable component of the resistance. Groups that before the PDPA coup d'etat had served religious and social functions were readily adapted afterward to become fighting units.

The fundamentalist-traditionalist distinction was not clearcut. Rather, there was a continuity between the traditionalists and the more moderate fundamentalists, represented in Peshawar by Rabbani and Khales. Three major traditionalist emigre parties were recognized in the mid-1980s: the Harakat-e Inqelab Islami (Islamic Revolutionary Movement) of Muhammad Nabi Muhammadi; the Jebh-e Nejat-e Milli (National Liberation Front) of Sibaghatullah Mojadeddi; and the Mahaz-e Milli Islami (National Islamic Front) of Pir Sayyid Gilani. In "Afghanistan: Islam and Political Modernity", Roy defines three traditional networks that play a formative role in the resistance: ulama, or Islamic scholars (known as mawlawi in Afghanistan), and their followers; Sufi communities, organized around a pir or holy man; and tribal networks whose leaders often had blood or other ties to the old royal family. Such networks were not feudal or authoritarian. Leadership was generally defined in terms of consensus. "The khan must always show, by his generosity and availability, that he alone is worthy to fulfill the post."

Ulama were scholars and teachers resident at madrasa (theological schools) located throughout the country. During their careers, individual scholars moved from less to more prestigious madrasa as they acquired greater knowledge of the Quran and Islamic law. Networks were built up as scholars, in their passage from one school to another, acquired teachers, colleagues, and students. These associations tended to be lifelong. Ulama were generally affiliated with the more conservative, private madrasa rather than the state-supported institutions established in the 1950s. These schools emphasized the legalistic interpretation of texts rather than the kinds of political issuesthe redefinition of Islam in society-that were important to fundamentalists. Politically, they supported the restoration of sharia as the legal basis of the state. This was natural, since interpretation of sharia was the scholars' principal role in society.

Roy notes that the ulama networks "massively" joined Muhammadi's Harakat-e Inqelab Islami, making this group the largest in the resistance after the Soviet invasion. Yet its fortunes had declined drastically by the mid-1980s. A loosely organized "clerical association" rather than a genuine political party (Roy calls it "an `invertebrate' party, a mere juxtaposition of local fronts revolving around mawlawi without any political experience"), the Harakat-e Inqelab Islami lost members to Rabbani's Jamiat-i-Islami. The change in affiliation reflected ethnic and linguistic cleavages. Dari-speaking and non-Pashtun networks switched over to the Jamiat-i-Islami, while Pashtuns remained generally more faithful to Muhammadi's group. It remained influential in the southern and eastern provinces of Qandahar, Ghazni, Kabul, Lowgar, and Baghlan. Its membership was estimated in late1985 at between 10,000 and 25,000.\

Sufi networks consisted of a holy man and his followers, organized into a brotherhood (see Sufis, ch. 2). Central to these groups' identity was the lifelong association of brotherhood members and their master, who often assumed the venerable Arabic title of shaykh. Roy describes the brotherhoods as "closed but not secret societies.' Members are expected to show the utmost loyalty and devotion to the master, who ideally occupies himself almost incessantly with prayer and meditation. The history of Sufi brotherhoods throughout the Muslim world is a complex and multifaceted one. One central concept was that charisma could be passed from generation to generation within a single family. Thus, holy families emerged as the core of Sufi orders that persisted for centuries. Generally described as "mystics," Sufis were also in the forefront of struggles against foreign invasion in many countries, including Afghanistan. They, rather than the established Islamic clergy, backed the basmachi insurrection against the Soviets in Central Asia during the 1920s. Two leaders of traditionalist emigre partiesMojadeddi and Gilani-were members of holy families with high status in Sufi communities.

The membership of Mojadeddi's Jebh-e Nejat-e Milli and Gilani's Mahaz-e Milli Islami was drawn largely from communities that over the generations maintained close ties with their holy families. This was particularly true in Pashtun tribal areas. The brutal treatment of the brotherhoods by the Khalqis in 1978-79 ensured that leaders of the holy families would be firmly on the side of the resistance. On the local level, highly disciplined brotherhoods were ideal fighting units. Unlike the ulama networks, they were almost impossible for informers to penetrate. Roy notes that the region around the town of Chesht-e Sharif in Herat Province became a "veritable little Sufi republic" after the brotherhoods seized the town from the government in 1983-84.

Tribal Networks

Because Sufi holy families were often intimately associated with tribal groups, these two kinds of networks were often difficult to distinguish. The most important tribal network consisted of lineages belonging to or related to the old Mohammadzai royal family. These were elitist, highly conservative groups with strong monarchist sympathies. They provided both Mojadeddi's and Gilani's groups with the majority of their adherents. Because of their nonclerical and monarchical associations, the Jebh-e Nejat-e Milli and the Mahaz-e Milli Islami were the most secular of the emigre parties. They drew as much on Pashtunwali (the Pashtun code) as on Islam to provide the basis of their legitimacy. Both suffered in competition with Islamic fundamentalist groups and in the mid-1980s had limited influence.

Both emigre parties were loosely organized. Roy describes Gilani's group as a coalition of tribal notables (khans) and noble families. More like a royal court than a genuine political party, it distributed arms solely on the basis of the recipients' personal relationship with Gilani. Mojadeddi's group was less blueblooded, including some non-Durrani tribes and even Nuristanis.

Shia Groups

Little was known of Shia groups in the mid-1980s. This was because they were based either in Iran, a country still largely closed to Westerners or in the remote central part of Afghanistan known as the Hazarajat. Home of the minority Hazaras, Shia Muslims who have suffered the worst discrimination at the hands of other groups, this region covers parts of Bamian, Ghowr, and Oruzgan provinces. It remained independent of Soviet and Afghan control in the mid1980s. Roy describes the Hazarajat as a poor area with a social system that was more hierarchical and oppressive than that of the Pashtuns. Sayyids, members of families claiming descent from the Prophet Muhammad, formed what was virtually an elite and inbred caste. Beginning in the 1960s, educated Hazara youth, resentful of sayyid privileges, joined Maoist, nativist, or Islamic fundamentalist organizations. The latter had close affinities with movements in Iran. One of the earliest youth groups, the Hezb-e Moghol (Mongol Party), reflected their self-conception as an oppressed "Mongol" people, unlike other inhabitants of Afghanistan. This viewpoint may have encouraged ties with fellow "Mongols" in China in the 1960s and 1970s.

In late 1979 Hazara religious, temporal, and intellectual leaders established the Shura-i Inqelabi-e ettefaqqe Islami-e Afghanistan (Revolutionary Council of the Islamic Union of Afghanistan) and elected Sayyid Ali Beheshti as their president. By 1981 the insurgents were successful in expelling Soviet and Afghan forces from most of the Hazarajat. The Shura took over the local government, dividing the territory into nine provinces (wilayat). Governors and mayors were appointed, and the majority of the population was disarmed. This was, for Afghanistan, a relatively strong-but also corrupt and oppressive-state.

The Shura was soon divided by factional infighting. Roy identifies three major factions: a sayyid-dominated traditionalist group, a leftist (Maoist) group, and a pro-Khomeini, Islamic fundamentalist group. Outside the Shura, there was a proIranian party, the Sazman-e Nasr, which had been founded in Iran in 1978. In 1983 another proIranian group, the Pasdaran (guardians of the revolution) emerged. In 1984 the Sazman-e Nasr and the Pasdaran were successful in driving Beheshti out of his capital at Varas in Ghowr Province and gaining at least temporary control over most of the Hazarajat.

Another Shia group was the Harakat-e Islami (Islamic Movement), led by Shaykh Mohsini. This originally had been proIranian. Although it retained its identity as an Islamic fundamentalist group, it had become disillusioned with Iran's revolution by the mid1980s. Based on the borders of the Hazarajat, its membership included not only Hazaras but other Shia minorities and even Pashtuns.

Leftist Groups

Leftist movements were minimally important in the resistance in the mid-1980s. Settem-i-Melli, the group that allegedly held United States ambassador Dubs hostage in February 1979, had been exterminated, largely by Islamic groups. Remnants of the Shula-iJawid formed the Sazman-i Azadibakhshi-i Mardum-i Afghanistan (SAMA-Organization for the Liberation of the Peoples of Afghanistan) in 1978. Its leader, Abdul Majid Kalakani, was arrested and executed by the regime in 1980. A third party, the Itihad-i Inqelabi-Islamwa Afghan Milli (the National Islamic Revolution of the Afghan People, often referred to as Afghan Milli or Afghan Millat) was a socialist group with a largely urban following. Afghan Milli cadres attempted to establish a base in Nangarhar Province on the Pakistan border, but they were wiped out by guerrillas belonging to Khales' Hezb-i Islami.

Building Resistance Unity

Resistance unity remained an elusive goal as the Soviet occupation entered its seventh year in December 1985. The history of guerrilla movements in other parts of the world suggests that if ideological and organizational unity cannot be achieved, a strong leader, like Josip Broz Tito in wartime Yugoslavia is needed to coordinate disparate fighting groups. Such a leader can also foster an emerging sense of national identity. Given the disparity in worldviews between Islamic fundamentalists, traditionalists, Shia mujahidiin, and leftists, it appeared unlikely that Afghanistan would have its own Tito. Observers believed that the best that could be hoped for was an effective united-front strategy that would improve mujahidiin fighting abilities and prevent the different groups from attacking each other.

In May 1980 the different mujahidiin groups convened a Loya jirgah in Peshawar, but this failed to create consensus or promote genuine unity. One reason may have been that the Loya jirgah remained primarily a Pashtun tribal institution with limited relevance for minorities or detribalized Pashtuns. With the withdrawal of traditionalists from a single, Peshawarbased alliance, coalitions formed around the fundamentalist and traditionalist polarities, while Shia groups remained isolated or closely associated with Iran. Two coalitions with the same name, the Ittehad-i-Islami Mujahidiin-iAfghanistan (Islamic Alliance of Afghan Mujahidiin) emerged: one contained the four major and three smaller fundamentalist parties and was commonly known as the Group of Seven; the other included the three traditionalist parties, known as the Group of Three.

The Group of Seven was deeply divided between moderates and radicals. Abdul Rasool Sayyaf, one of the original founders of the Islamic fundamentalist movement at Kabul University in the 1950s, had been designated its head in 1981. Moderates resented him, however, for his closeness to Hikmatyar and his determination to use funds donated by foreign countries to build his own power base.

Traditionalists in the Group of Three flirted with the idea of employing exiled King Zahir Shah as a focus for resistance unity. The king issued statements that although he did not wish a restoration of the monarchy, he still had an important role to play in promoting unity. Fundamentalists regarded him as corrupt and reactionary and blamed him for allowing Afghanistan to drift into the Soviet sphere of influence during his years on the throne.

Attempts at building unity continued, however, through the mid1980s. An alliance was forged between the seven major fundamentalist and traditionalist parties in Peshawar in May 1985. Although concrete accomplishments were not evident by the end of the year, the alliance was viewed by Western observers as a significant development. Also, observers such as Louis Dupree noted that a new generation of resistance leaders inside the country was growing impatient with emigre factionalism and was developing an increasingly effective working arrangement among themselves.

Probably the most comprehensive account of the Soviet invasion and its background in English is Henry S. Bradsher's Afghanistan and the Soviet Union, published in 1983. Anthony Arnold's book, Afghanistan's Two-Party Communism: Parcham and Khalq, also published in 1983, is a thoroughgoing, though hardly sympathetic, description of the career of the PDPA. A more creditable leftist perspective is given in Fred Halliday's articles on Afghanistan, which appeared in the New Left Review in 1979 and 1980.

Louis Dupree's partly eyewitness account of the April 1978 coup d'etat and its aftermath appears as a six-part series, Red Flag over the Hindu Kush in American University Field Staff Reports. The anthology edited by M. Nazif Shahrani and Robert L. Canfield, Revolutions and Rebellions in Afghanistan, provides excellent insights into the cultural bases of the resistance. Probably the most comprehensive account of the mujahidiin, expecially the Islamic fundamentalists, is Olivier Roy's L'Afghanistan: Islam modernite politique, published in 1985; a passable, though not elegant, English translation of Roy's book appears in the joint Publications Research Service Near East/South Asia Report series. (For further information and complete citations, see Bibliography.)

This page maintained by Luke Griffin and last updated on 01/14/2002 .