National Security

THE SOVIET ARMED FORCES that invaded Afghanistan in December 1979 consisted of about 40,000 officers and men and their equipment. The fierce resistance by Afghan guerrilla forces-mujahidiin, literally meaning warriors engaged in a holy war-forced the Soviets to increase the size and sophistication of their military units, and in late 1985 a United States government official estimated that Soviet units in Afghanistan comprised about 118,000 men, of which about 10,000 were reported to be in the Soviet secret police and other special units. 

One reason for the Soviet buildup was the ineffectiveness of Afghan military and paramilitary units. When the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) seized power in a coup d'etat in April 1978, the army consisted of about 80,000 officers and men and the air force of about 10,000. Both services were almost completely dependent on the Soviet Union for equipment and spare parts. A very large number of commissioned and noncommissioned officers had been trained in the Soviet Union, and Soviet military advisers were posted throughout the services. Nevertheless, by the time of the Soviet invasion the services had been seriously weakened by widespread desertions and by infighting among adherents of the two major factions of the PDPA-Parcham and Khalq. Although data on the armed forces were necessarily incomplete and speculative, informed observers in late 1985 estimated the strength of the army at no more than 40,000. Most army personnel were conscripts, and many of them had been forced into service by roving press-gangs. The air force reportedly had about 7,000 men in uniform, who were watched over by an estimated 5,000 Cuban and Czechoslovak advisers. Soviet military officers were responsible for important and routine military decisions, not only in the Ministry of National Defense but also in all units and detachments. 

The pampered, feared, and well-paid Afghan secret police, KHAD, was active and aggressive in the urban centers, especially in Kabul. In 1985 organizations such as Amnesty International continued to publish detailed reports of KHAD's use of torture and of inhumane conditions in the country's prisons and jails. KHAD reportedly has had some success in penetrating the leadership councils of the several resistance groups, most of which are headquartered in Pakistan. Conversely, the mujahidiin presumably had numerous informants in KHAD, other police and intelligence units within the Ministry of Interior, and the armed forces. 

In six nears of fighting, the resistance forces had inflicted considerable damage on Soviet and government forces. Reliable observers estimated that the Soviets had experienced 10,000 fatalities and many times that number in other casualties. Huge sections of the countryside remained beyond the reach of the government, and such major urban centers as Herat and Qandahar were war zones in which neither side could claim supremacy. The cost to the Afghan people, however, had been immense. Millions had fled their homes and resided as refugees in foreign lands, most of them in Pakistan. An unknown number, but certainly scores of thousands, of warriors and noncombatants had been killed or had died as a result of injuries or disease brought on by the war. If, as many observers speculated, the Soviet policy was to depopulate the country as a prelude to imposing control, in the mid-1980s the policy seemed to be succeeding. 

Background
Military operations, particularly those of tribal forces, have been vital factors in shaping the country's history. The celebration of military prowess is firmly embedded in folklore and songs. Indeed, the martial valor of the Afghan warrior is proverbial in his own country and among his neighbors. Conquerors such as Cyrus the Great (550 B.C.), Alexander the Great (331 B.C.), and Genghis Khan (A.D. 1220) overpowered the peoples in this area by armed force, but they ruled only as long as constant armed force was applied, and their successor dynasties were driven out. The acme of Afghan military prowess, however, at least until the current struggle against the Soviet Union, was reached in three wars waged against the British between 1838 and 1919. From these victories the Afghans felt they had gained the right to boast that they alone, of all Islamic nations, had never been subjected to occupation or subservience to European colonialists. 

Afghan groups, such as the Pashtuns, cultivated the image of warrior-poet. Folk heroes, such as Khushal Khan Khattak, excelled both in warfare and in verse. Yet even Pashtuns have rarely cooperated with each other for very long in common military operations. One observer remarked that tribal wars "have been characterized by their blitzkrieg nature, by their swift irresistible penetration and by the rapid, inevitable disintegration of the lashkar (tribal war party). Often the Pashtun warrior will simply pack up and leave after a hard day's fighting without coordination with, or command from, the lashkar." 

This martial tradition rendered the position of Ahmad Shah, a tribal chief who in 1747 established himself as the first independent ruler of Afghanistan, most difficult (see Ahmad Shah and the Durrani Empire, ch. 1). From the rule of Ahmad Shah to that of Babrak Karmal, the Afghan government's task has been to rule over an extremely well-armed, pugnacious population. At the same time, the government army has been beset by numerous problems resulting from the divisiveness of its component ethnic, linguistic, and religious pluralities. Tribes were responsible for providing troops to the king. The only national army that existed during Ahmad Shah's time consisted of small groups that functioned as royal bodyguards. 

From the mid-eighteenth century onward, two fundamental strategies were attempted. The first effort to create a more or less professional armed force that was not under tribal control occurred in 1834, when Shah Shuja ul Mulk, one of the contestants for the throne, secured the services of a British officer, Captain John Campbell, to train the forces that were to oppose those of Amir Dust Mohammad (1826-38; 1842-63), a rival contestant. Although Shuja's forces fought well on the battlefield, Shuja fled the area, leaving Dust Mohammad the victor and the wounded Campbell a prisoner. After recovering from his wounds, Campbell resumed his military services under Dust Mohammad, serving directly under the amir's son, Sardar Afzal Khan, father of Abdur Rahman Khan (18801901), who later became one of the country's most colorful and forceful rulers. The innovations introduced by Campbell during this period gave the army the rudiments of its ultimate British character. 

Campbell was very influential, but Dost Mohammad employed many other foreign soldiers, including Europeans (especially British and French) and other Muslims (Iranians and Indians), as well as some North Americans. The incorporation of foreigners into the military was unprecedented among Afghan rulers before Dost Mohammad. 

Sher Ali, Dost Mohammad's son, continued his father's reliance on outside military advice. An 1869 visit to colonial India inspired him to undertake the reform of the Afghan army. He attempted to undermine the army's tribal structure and to create a national armed force. Whereas Ahmad Shah's troops had been compensated in booty, Sher Ali sought to provide his soldiers with regular cash payments. He further tried to incorporate European military tactics and technology by publishing Pashtu translations of European manuals and producing copies of European weapons. The year 1869 also marked Britain's provision of Afghanistan's first major foreign military assistance: artillery pieces and rifles. The British, in addition, provided 1.5 million Indian rupees. Sher Ali's army, consisting of 37,000 cavalry troops, had quadrupled since Dost Mohammad's reign and was a far cry from Ahmad Shah's royal bodyguard. 

Although these changes might appear impressive, the reality was much less so. Economic, social, and cultural factors defeated Sher Ali's dreams of a national armed force. The treasury simply could not support the demands of such an army. In addition, the cultural factors that had prevented the previous formation of a national nontribal military also sabotaged Sher Ali's efforts. For example, soldiers were accustomed to nonhierarchical tribal organization rather than blind submission to officers. Officers, who achieved their position through tribal and interpersonal ties, never received adequate training. Furthermore, military equipment was less than adequate. 

Tribesmen, however, were extremely knowledgeable about the topography in their own areas, and on their own turf they could outmaneuver and outfight any invading force. A prominent historian remarks that "the real problems of a European army fighting the Afghans began only after the `war' against the Afghan regulars was over, as was clearly demonstrated in both the First (1838-42) and Second (1878-80) Afghan wars.- In both wars the British vanquished the Afghan army and deposed the rulers but were ultimately defeated by massive tribal uprisings. Opposition by the Afghan tribes would have forced the British to wage a long-term guerrilla campaign against them, The British opted to settle hostilities by political means. Thus in 1842 the price for British extrication from Afghanistan included reinstatement of the ruler (amir) they had deposed. The amir's nephew, Abdur Rahman, had been living outside the country under Russian protection for 10 years when, in 1880, the British had to recognize him as amir as part of the political rapprochement ending the Second Afghan War. 

Abdur Rahman was the creator of the modern Afghan state. When he came to the throne, the army was virtually nonexistent. With the assistance of a liberal financial loan from the British, plus their aid in the form of weapons, ammunition, and other military supplies, he began a 20-year task of creating a respectable regular force by instituting measures that formed the long-term basis of the military system. These included increasing the equalization of military obligation by setting up a system known as the hasht nafari (whereby one man in every eight between the ages of 20 and 40 took his turn at military service); constructing an arsenal in Kabul to reduce dependence on foreign sources for small arms and other ordnance; introducing supervised training courses; organizing troops into divisions, brigades, and regiments, including battalions of artillery; developing pay schedules; and introducing an elementary (and harsh) disciplinary system. 
Abdur Rahman's army was beset by many of the same problems that had plagued the earlier Afghan forces, such as lack of formal military education and preferred treatment for Durrani officers. In addition, Abdur Rahman reverted to the earlier practice of eschewing foreign military aid, which may have damaged the attempt to modernize the armed forces. The army was probably effective at preserving national security, however. 

In 1904 Amir Habibuflah, Abdur Rahman's son, created the Royal Military College. He accepted foreign military advice, and in 1907 the school's commandant was a Turkish colonel. In fact, Afghanistan received Turkish military aid until the 1960s. 

The Afghan army responded to the Third Anglo-Afghan War (1919) in ways similar to the two earlier wars. The ruler during this conflict was King Amanullah (1919-29). Amanullah had been educated in the new military college, and he continued his grandfather's military program. His lack of method and rash policies in financial matters, however, virtually bankrupted the country and led to reductions in the army and a serious loss of effectiveness. Two noteworthy military events did emerge from his desire to modernize the country. One was the creation of an air force in 1924 through the purchase of two British aircraft (and the acceptance of aircraft as a gift from the Soviets) and the hiring of German pilots, who helped put down a rebellion that his attempted social programs had inspired. The other was the acceptance of a second Turkish mission in 1927-an earlier mission had left Kabul in 1921 after an unsuccessful effort to reorganize the army-to assist in training and improving the efficiency of the army.

 
Amanullah's persistence in forcing reforms on the people led to greater popular dissatisfaction and eventually serious revolts broke out in 1928 and 1929. The army shared the widespread feeling against the king, and this together with its long-term neglect was a major factor in its defeat by the rebel leader Bacha-i Saqqao, a "mountain Tajik" who took Kabul in January 1929 and declared himself king. Amanullah's government and army disintegrated. Soldiers deserted in large numbers, leaving materiel and fortifications to Bacha-i Saqqao's forces. Muhammad Nadir Khan, an exiled prince, managed to defeat Bacha-i Saqqao by mobilizing the remnants of the army, as well as tribes loyal to him. A tribal jirgah (see Glossary) acclaimed Nadir Khan king (King Nadir Shah) on October 16, 1929. 

Both the Afghan army and state were in lamentable condition following the events of 1928-29. Nadir Shah and his brothers labored hard to recreate the armed forces and government. Nadir Shah accepted foreign loans and equipment offered by the British, the Germans, and the French. These loans enabled him to introduce several measures. These measures included an increase in military pay; acquisition of 10,000 rifles and a substantial loan from the British; appointment of his brother, Shah Mahmud Khan, as minister of war and commander in chief; the reopening of the Royal Military College for officers; reinforcement of the Turkish military mission with some German instructors; and the hiring of Soviet air technicians to improve instruction in the deteriorated air force. By 1933, when Nadir Shah was assassinated, military morale and capabilities had improved appreciably, and the army was a factor in achieving the peaceful accession of his young son, Muhammad Zahir Shah. 

The new king and his uncle, Sardar Hashim Khan, who as prime minister exercised great influence over governmental affairs for many years, continued the policy of military development initiated by Nadir Shah. Progress, however, was retarded by the materiel shortages and other restrictions imposed by World War II. During the war the country proclaimed its neutrality and concerned itself primarily with efforts to stabilize conditions within the country and to increase internal security. Some improvements were made in the organization of the embryonic air force through acquisition of a limited number of relatively modern aircraft. 

In 1933 the army boasted 45,000 members. By 1945 the membership was counted at 90,000. An additional 20,000 Afghan men belonged to the Gendarmerie, a quasi-military force created by the government during the years of World War II. The officers of the Gendarmerie were Afghan army officers, and their duties included maintaining internal security in rural areas, i.e., virtually the whole country. 
The immediate post-World War II period was one of further adjustment between internal security forces and the army. The autocratic Sardar Mohammad Daoud Khan, proclaimed prime minister after a palace coup in 1953, required a strong army. Although Daoud relinquished his prime ministerial duties in 1963, he resumed power in 1973 and ruled until 1978 as the first president of the republic. 

Daoud sought United States aid for Afghanistan's armed forces. The United States was unable to help, however, because Daoud's strong stance on the Pashtunistan issue would have embarrassed the American government. (The Pashtunistan issue basically was the insistence by the Afghan government and others that the Pashtu- and Pakhtu-speaking residents of Pakistan be granted autonomy, independence, or the right to join Afghanistan.) When Daoud's requests to the United States proved fruitless, he decided to turn to Afghanistan's northern neighbor and successfully obtained arms from the Soviet Union. 

In August 1956 Afghanistan and the Soviet Union concluded their first military agreement. Afghanistan received US$25 million in jet airplanes, tanks, and heavy and light weaponry at a greatly discounted price. By October 1956 an IL-14, 12 MiG-15s, and a few helicopters appeared at Mazar-e Sharif's new airstrip. Nine years later foreign observers reported Afghanistan's possession of about 100 Soviet T-34 and postwar T-54 tanks. The new air force employed about 100 aircraft, including a few helicopters, as well as IL-28 bombers and MiG-17 fighters. 

With the Soviet weapons came Soviet technicians. Afghan commissioned and noncommissioned officers (NCOs) were also sent to military schools in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union to learn to handle the new weapons. The air force was 1,500 strong in 1967. By 1970 the decision to rely on the Soviet Union for military equipment had produced a dependence on the Soviet Union for new weapons as well as parts for older equipment. In the course of the relationship between the two countries, Soviet culture (as well as materiel) was transmitted, including political beliefs and language. Russian became the Afghan military language. 

During this period Pashtuns continued to dominate the officer corps at the highest levels; low-level officers were usually Tajiks. Males were conscripted for two years, and most were Tajiks or Hazaras. 
Although officers were now well-trained, old problems still haunted the conscripts, e.g., their poor or nonexistent military training and the disproportionately small number of Pashtuns. Many Pashtuns, as well as the educated urban elite, managed to avoid conscription. Pashtuns did volunteer, however, for certain elite services, such as the air force, Guard Brigade, and armored units. These came to be Pashtun domains. From 1963 to 1973 the king successfully drafted Kabuli elite males into the military. This had the effect of introducing the complaints of disgruntled Kabulis to men who might not otherwise have had been quite so dissatisfied at this time.

 
The Coup of 1973
British journalist Henry S. Bradsher provides the following detailed account of the military events that toppled the Mohammadzai monarchy. The king was in Italy receiving medical treatment when "before dawn on 17 July, a small group of officers leading several hundred troops seized the palace in downtown Kabul, the radio station, airport, and other key positions. There was little resistance; only four soldiers and four policemen died . . . At 7:20 A.M. Kabul radio announced that Afghanistan had become a republic." Opposition to the monarchy came from those closest to it. Daoud led the coup, but General Abdul Mustaghni, who had been chief of staff of the army, was also reported to have been active in the coup. The general, however, was overshadowed by younger officers, who Bradsher observes "included a Tajiki major, Abdul Qadir Dagarwal, and engineer Pacha Gul Wafadar, both of the air force, and Mohammed Aslam Watanjar and Faiz Mohammed from the army." 

Despite his initiation of Soviet military aid as prime minister, as president Daoud attempted to lessen his country's dependence on Soviet assistance. He established military assistance programs for Afghan personnel in other countries with significant Muslim populations, i.e., India, Egypt, and (shortly before his ouster) Pakistan. Bradsher notes that this policy must certainly have angered Soviet leaders. "A purge of leftist military officers in 1975 indicated that he [Daoud] feared political influences in the armed forces in a way that he had not in the late 1950's and early 1960's, presumably as a result of having seen the political connections of some officers who helped him seize power . . . .[In] India. . . Afghan soldiers could use Soviet-made equipment without being subjected to Marxist indoctrination." Egypt, although at the time on a far less friendly basis with the Soviet Union than India, could also provide the opportunity to train with Soviet equipment. 

Daoud's foreign policy notwithstanding, he was able to arrange additional Soviet aid, including 300 T-54/55 medium tanks and more than 50 T-34 tanks, as well as 90 37mm antiaircraft guns, 30 120mm mortars, and SA-2 Guideline surface-to-air missiles (SAMs). The air force also received its share of Soviet hardware: 36 MiG-17 Fresco-C fighters and spare parts for the 27 IL-28 bombers-Beagles-stationed near Shindand (see fig. 6). In addition, Czechoslovakia sold 12 L-39 airplanes to Afghanistan to be used for training purposes. 

Politicization of the Officer Corps
The elite officer corps indulged in political conflict. Daoud and other members of the royal family had their loyal factions, and members of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) were divided into the Khalq (Masses) and Parcham (Banner) factions (see Evolution of the PDPA as a Political Force, ch. 4). The PDPA may have become secretly active in the armed forces during the early 1960s. 

According to Anthony Arnold, a former United States intelligence officer, in 1973 the Khalq faction energetically began to encourage military personnel to join them. Nur Muhammad Taraki had been in charge of Khalq activity in the military. In 1973 he passed his recruitment duties to Haflzullah Amin, whom Arnold describes as Taraki's "most active and efficient lieutenant." Amin was highly successful; Arnold reports that "by the time of the communist coup, in April 1978, Khalq outnumbered Parcham by a factor of two or three to one." 

By 1977, Arnold observes, the Soviet Union had provided Afghanistan with the equivalent of US$600 million in military equipment. It had been necessary to send 3,700 officers and NCOs to the Soviet Union to teach them to use the sophisticated hardware. These Afghans not only were exposed to the Soviet belief system, but some were, according to observers, also recruited to serve as Soviet intelligence agents. Others left for home sympathetic to, but not employed by, the Soviet Union. It was to such officers and NCOs that Khalq appealed. In addition, Arnold asserts that "at least one former Afghan official believes that the Soviets passed along such promising leads to Khalq through their embassy in Kabul." 

Daoud inadvertently furthered Khalq aims through his own political wariness. He sought out men who were politically weak (often non-Pashtuns and those whose landholdings were small) for preferment in the military. He hoped by so doing to meld the weak components into an officer corps united primarily by personal loyalty to him. To this end he also frowned on the traditional practice of promotion based on kinship ties, and he refused to allow provincial military governors to occupy a post for too long. Instead of creating an officer corps personally loyal to him alone, his actions had the effect of producing a disaffected, disunited, easily recruitable pool for the PDPA. 

1978 Revolution
Daoud's fears about his possible overthrow led to his increasingly repressive internal policies. He used the police to try to forcibly squelch any opposition. In November 1977 anger over Daoud's excesses caused a temporary rupture between Daoud on one hand and his younger brother Naim and six cabinet ministers on the other. From late summer of 1977 to early spring of 1978, a series of prominent Afghans were murdered, including the chief pilot of Ariana Afghan Airlines (who was the leader of a recent strike) and the minister of planning. On April 17, 1978, Mir Akbar Khyber, a Parchami theorist, was murdered. His was the most important death for Afghan politics. The identities of the perpetrators were never fully ascertained, but at the time, many believed Daoud's police to be the executioners. 

Louis Dupree, who was present at the time of the PDPA takeover, vividly describes the events of April 27-28, 1978. Upon Khyber's death, Khalqi army cells prepared for a massive uprising. On April 27 the Khalqi military leaders began the revolution by proclaiming to the cells in the armed forces that the time for revolution had arrived. Khalqi Major Watanjar (of the Fourth Armored Unit at Pol-a Charkhi) readied his troops. This included his leading a convoy of nine light tanks and 40 or 50 heavy T-62 tanks to Kabul. Daoud's defense minister, General Rasooli, remained loyal to the government and "ordered a special unit to protect the Presidential Palace." The unit was unable to comply with the defense minister's order because Khalqi officers killed the commander of the unit and prevented the unit from assuming its position. 

Rasooli next contacted the air force. He could not rely on nearby Bagrami Air Base because he and Daoud suspected that the pilots' political sympathies lay with the PDPA. He therefore called upon Shindand Air Base, which sent two "fully armed" MiG-21s to Kabul. At this point the 1,800 men of the Presidential Guard came to support the palace. The uprising proceeded rapidly, and by midday Khalqi tanks approached the Ministry of National Defense compound just opposite the palace. The revolutionaries' occupation of the ministry compound prevented loyal officers from contacting provincial units that might have come to their aid. The airport was still in government hands; the 15th Armored Division, under the command of Colonel Muhammad Yousuf, was firmly entrenched. Watanjar sent tanks to wrest the airport from Yousuf s forces. 

Shortly after the defense ministry fell, the Presidential Guard, with well-aimed bazookas and an active defense, succeeded in driving PDPA tanks out of firing range of the palace. Daoud waited in vain for the antitank units and Eighth Mechanized Division; Khalqi officers were in the majority and prevented the units from reaching Daoud. The two MiG-21s dispatched from Shindand flew over Kabul, but ground-to-air contact was nonexistent, so the pilots had no idea who controlled what and where they should strike. 
Daoud and Rasooli were correct in their assessment of the Bagrami base's loyalty. At approximately 3:00 P.M. on April 27, MiG21s and Su-7s at Bagrami Air Base were armed, pursuant to the command of Colonel Abdul Qader (deputy commander of the air force and instrumental in the 1973 coup). It was Watanjar and Qader who were responsible for the coordinated ground and air attack on the palace. While Watanjar and Qader met to plan the attack, loyalist General Rasooli, Abdul Ali, and Abdul Aziz arranged for deployment of the 8th Infantry Division to Kabul. At about 3:30 P.M., Dupree reports, "the first two Su-7s attacked, launching rockets and firing 120mm cannon into the Presidential Palace . . . . Air strikes from Bagram began in earnest, MiG-21s or Su-7s remained constantly in the air, but no more than six were over Kabul at one time." Daoud's Presidential Guard was sorely pressed and unable to mount an effective antiaircraft defense. By 7:00 that evening the only pockets of loyalist resistance were the 7th Infantry Division stationed south of Kabul at Rishkor and the Presidential Guard at the palace. Dupree recalls that the Presi dential Guard "continued to fight gallantly, holding out against constant pressure from the tanks while being hammered from the air." After dark, the unfortunate Presidential Guard took rocket fire from helicopters and was attacked by jets. Dupree noted that "a bright half-moon made further sorties by jets
possible."

Although Rasooli led the 7th Division out under cover of darkness, he unhappily chose to march in full battle gear and in tight military formation, providing a perfect target for Khalqi aircraft. By midnight the Seventh Division was no more. The force had been stopped before achieving its objective of reaching the palace and never even made it into downtown Kabul; many of the surviving soldiers chose to defect to the PDPA forces. The beleaguered Presidential Guard bore the unremitting air and ground assaults unrelieved by reinforcements, and by 4:30 A.M. on April 28 they surrendered. As for Rasooli, when the PDPA found him and some associates hiding in a chicken coop, the ensuing skirmish put an end to both him and his colleagues. By 5:00 A.M., Mohammadzai rule had ended. 

Mortality figures for the revolution differ; Taraki claimed that 72 people died, whereas others cite numbers ranging into the thousands. Most observers agree that Taraki's figure is too low. PDPA forces murdered senior members of Daoud's government during and immediately after the revolution, and these deaths were almost certainly omitted from Taraki's accounting. It is not known for certain who commanded the PDPA during the takeover. Bradsher believes that the commander was neither Taraki nor Amin. 

The Armed Forces After the PDPA Takeover
Military analyst George Jacobs writes that before the revolution the armed forces included "some three armored divisions (570 medium tanks plus T-55s on order), eight infantry divisions (averaging 4,500 to 8,000 men each), two mountain infantry brigades, one artillery brigade, a guards regiment (for palace protection), three artillery regiments, two comman do regiments, and a parachute battalion (largely grounded). All the formations were under the control of three corps-level headquarters. All but three infantry divisions were facing Pakistan along a line from Bagram south to Qandahar." Although there had been heated verbal exchanges with Pakistan over the Pashtunistan issue, Pakistan had never threatened attack. It was unclear to some observers why the prerevolution Afghans needed so many Soviet weapons. Certainly fewer and lighter weapons could have provided sufficient firepower to quell internal rebellions. Anthropologists suspected that the hardware was obtained for cultural reasons-as an expression of Afghan notions of manhood. 

The effect of so many sophisticated weapons in Afghanistan was to bring down Daoud more easily. The PDPA regime sought to develop the armed forces even further. High on the list of PDPA military priorities was the preservation of the armed forces' unity. The fledgling government purchased more hardware from the Soviet Union and invited what Jacobs terms "Soviet company-level units" to visit. 

According to Bradsher, 350 Soviet military advisers participated in the PDPA military coup. Soviet personnel appear to have accompanied the PDPA-controlled armored units that were responsible for the successful takeover of the military section of Kabul International Airport. Soviet advisers came, in a managerial and supportive capacity, to the aid of the air force at Bagrami Air Base. 

The Soviet Union sent the person in charge of its army's Main Political Administration, General Aleksey Alekseyevich Yepishev, to Afghanistan in April 1979 to evaluate how his country could best support the increasingly weak Afghan government. Although it was clear to Yepishev that the Afghans could not effectively counter a large-scale popular uprising, the PDPA government had not been idle in its attempts to strengthen the military. According to the account published by Jacobs, "efforts were being made to raise two added infantry divisions (to ten); to raise the strength of the tank units (200plus T-55s and 40 to 45 T-62s were being delivered during this period); and to begin modernising the air force (adding later model MiG-21s, delivery of 12 Mi-24 Hind-As and a few Hind-Ds and possibly augmenting the 12 Czech L-39s delivered in late-1977)." Yepishev's visit produced an increased presence of Soviet advisers in Afghanistan (about 1,000 in preinvasion Afghanistan) and an increase in the number of Afghan military personnel sent for training to the Soviet Union. 


Khalqi-Parchami differences began to rend the military as Khalqi leaders, fearful that the Parchamis retained their cellular organization within the military, mounted massive purges of Parchamis. In June 1978 an estimated 800 Parchami military personnel were forced to quit the armed forces. Indeed, Taraki refused to tolerate any Parehamis in the military and insisted that all officers affiliate with Khalq. The secret police, AGSA (Da Afghanistan da Gato da Satalo Adara, in Pashtu, and translated as Afghan Interests Protection Service), headed by the well-educated Hafizullah Amin, acted to rid many sectors, including the military, of Parchamis. Most were simply dismissed, but Bradsher reports that some were incarcerated as well. 
Taraki arrested some of the men most instrumental to his success in the 1978 takeover, alleging a Parchami plot. These included Qader, defense minister and army chief of staff. In Bradsher's opinion, and other scholars would agree, these men "were not Parchamis but essentially Moslem nationalists who might disapprove of the regime's radical new course . . . [or] had already done so." Taraki, assisted by Amin, took control of the defense ministry at the insistence of the PDPA Political Bureau (Politburo). Bradsher writes that the Parchami ministers of planning and public works were arrested and "widespread arrests followed. Virtually everyone known to be, or suspected of being, a Parchami was imprisoned. Some were tortured to death." 

Armed resistance grew slowly. At first, Dupree reports, Gulbuddin Hikmatyar and his Hezb-e Islami (Islamic Party) attacked occasionally from their base in Pakistan, and bombings occurred in Kabul (see Resistance Forces, this ch.). Opposition spread, but during the remainder of the spring and summer of 1978 Hikmatyar's group was virtually the only organized resistance. Many potential opponents were waiting to see what happened, while others were busy farming. Dupree points out that feuds and antigovernment campaigns traditionally occur during the slack agricultural season, from fall to spring. So it was in late summer that grievances against the government were expressed in a Nuristani valley by a raid, in the traditional style, on the local military post. The government had also displeased other areas of Nuristan and other parts of Afghanistan. Rebellions soon followed, according to Dupree, in "the rest of the Kunar Valley and the provinces of Paktya, Badakhshan, Kapisa/Parwan, Oruzgan, Badghis, Balkh, Ghazni, Farah, and Herat" (see fig. 1). Instead of responding to the traditional opposition in a traditional way, by a slap on the wrist followed by a Loya jirgah of concerned parties, the government retaliated with its Soviet-equipped armed forces, bombing and napalming villages. Such acts caused villagers to change their modus operandi as well; they fought throughout the 1979 agricultural season to topple the government, not merely to express displeasure. The resistance began to organize, and Bradsher describes "the development of a network of guerilla training camps and supply routes" in Pakistan.

 
The army was also not immune to antigovernment sentiment. Soldiers began to desert and mutiny. Herat, one of the country's major cities and located in close proximity to antiMarxist Iran, was the site of an uprising in March 1979 in which a portion of the town's military garrison joined. Bradsher reports that the rebels butchered Soviet citizens as well as Khalqis. "At least twenty Soviet men, women, and children are definitely known to have died, but the toll of Soviet citizens probably was much higher, 100 or more." Bradsher opines that this brutal act of frustration led to the 1979 Soviet invasion. The government responded by quashing the rebellion with loyal forces from Qandahar. It was then the turn of Qandahar. Some of the troops in that city were not as loyal as the troops sent to Herat, and they mutinied, followed by troops in Kabul, Jalalabad, and Khowst. The militias, whose members were handsomely paid, also proved disloyal to the government. 

By late spring of 1979 the government was plagued by a multiplicity of problems, including armed revolt in all but three provinces and defection and rebellion in its military. The Soviet Union acted to shore up the government. An unknown number of Soviet military personnel (estimates range from the hundreds to thousands) were deployed to Afghanistan. From Fergana Air Base in the Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic, the Soviets shipped hardware to their southern neighbor: armored personnel carriers (APCs), light tanks, Mi-24 and other helicopter gunships, and other aircraft, some armed with napalm. 

The redoubtable Nuristanis, last to be forcibly converted to Islam and first to rebel against the PDPA, presented the government with its largest problem in late 1978 and early 1979. In late 1978 local Nuristani tribes controlled Konarha Province. According to some reports, the resistance fighters were Hezb-e Islami members. The government deployed the 11th Infantry Division (of Jalalabad). Nuristani rebels claimed that 1,500 of these troops defected, but the government denied the allegation. The guerrillas' tactics were traditional and their weapons outmoded. They had some captured Kalashnikov assault rifles, but they relied primarily on locally produced rifles and rifles dating from World War I. With these armaments they ambushed and sniped at government forces. 

With unrest growing steadily, the Soviets advised Taraki to temper his more radical programs. Most sources believe that he refused. In an effort to strengthen internal security, Watanjar, hero of the revolution, left his post in the defense ministry to assume duties in the Ministry of Interior. The creation of a nine-member Homeland High Defense Council led by Taraki with Amin as his deputy (and including Asadullah Sarwari of AGSA, Watanjar, Colonel Sher Jan Mazdoorya, and Major Dayed Daoud Tarsoon, the chief of Sarandoy) was supposed to aid in the administration of internal security. The government created Sarandoy (Defenders of the Revolution) under the Ministry of Interior to replace the old Gendarmerie (see The Sarandoy, this ch.). Although the council was established on the basis of decisionmaking by consensus, in practice I Taraki and Amin held the power. Furthermore, Amin parlayed
his position on the council to increase his own power base by forcing the dismissal of officers disloyal to him. Amin succeeded in becoming prime minister on March 27, 1979, although Taraki retained the presidency. Eventually, however, Taraki's assassination gave Amin full control.

In August the Soviet deputy minister of defense, commander of all ground forces, and the 1968 commander of the forces that invaded Czechoslovakia, General Ivan G. Pavlovskiy, led a visiting group of 50 Soviet officers to Kabul. Suspicions of a future Soviet invasion mounted with Pavlovskiy's arrival. One observer commented that in August the Afghan army was in deep trouble. Taraki's assassination in September and the Soviet delegation's visit demonstrated that the PDPA's tenuous hold on authority was rapidly weakening. 

As Afghan soldiers' discontent became increasingly obvious, Soviet advisers took on an ever increasing role in the military. Soon all orders of any consequence required approval by Soviet advisers. The Afghans were not allowed use of the Soviet-provided advanced weapons. Reports from the Afghan press indicate that Amin was less than happy about this increasing dependence on the Soviet Union. Originally Soviets had stepped in only to replace those Afghans who fell victim to the purges, but in light of the disintegration of the military, dependence on the advisers could only increase. 

Even with massive Soviet aid, the government's war against the rebels did not prosper. For example, at the end of October a significant operation directed against resistance fighters in Paktia Province was only successful in the very short term. Soviet advisers planned the attack, commanded the Afghan forces, and provided air support. About 40,000 refugees fled to Pakistan during the 10-day offensive. The Afghan military employed recently obtained T-62 tanks, APCs, Mi-4 Hind helicopter gunships, and MiG-21s. Afghan tribal warfare had always included the principle of retreat in the face of a superior force; accordingly, the guerrillas withdrew. No sooner was the operation over and the tanks back in Kabul than the resistance returned to take up their old positions.

 
Still the guerrilla war continued, and still Afghan troops defected. Cases of large-scale defections abounded. For example, Indian political scientist Vijay Kumar Bhasin describes a massive defection that occurred in mid-November 1979 in Gardez (in Paktia) involving 30 tanks and 300 government soldiers. Guerrillas may also have captured the Zabol military cantonment and seized large numbers,of weapons, including antiaircraft guns. Reportedly 1,000 government soldiers surrendered in this action. 

The defections hit closer to home. A severe battle occurred at Rishkor, just a few kilometers southwest of the capital. The garrison revolted. Bhasin describes the battle from accounts by eyewitnesses: "There were several hundred casualties in hours of heavy fighting in the Rishkor Division. During the battle which lasted from 14 October to the afternoon of 15 October, the government brought in its tanks, mortars, modern Soviet Mi-24 assault helicopters and bombers." 

Amin was now in power. His rule was notable for its brutality. Even the Soviets admitted that perhaps 500 PDPA members had forfeited their lives. The official Afghan figures are much higher-1,500 to 4,500. Amin was not a popular person. His policies angered rural Afghans, his rigidity and independence upset the Soviets, he was rapidly accumulating as enemies a large group of very angry relatives of victims, and PDPA members must have lived in fear of their lives. Because of or in spite of this, Amin attempted to solidify his hold on the country militarily. 

In mid-November 1979 Amin launched a large military operation against the resistance at Sayd Karam in Paktia Province. Two army formations were used, one column moving out of Gardez, the other an armored attack from Khowst. The offensive was successful, eliminating as many as 1,000 or more resistance fighters, relatives, and supporters, driving most of the remainder into Pakistan, and obliterating sympathetic villages. 

Even with the significant military victory, Amin's position was unenviable. He had to cope with widespread military resistance among the citizenry and widespread antipathy to himself in the government armed forces. New York Times reporter David Binder notes that in early December 1979 the government's control extended only to Kabul and a few other cities. The government sought to ascertain the loyalties of army members through loyalty checks and to indoctrinate military personnel politically. Binder accounts for the certain loyalty to Amin of most of the senior ranks by the lack of any other option within the PDPA. Although assessment of Afghan military strength is notoriously difficult and the figures unreliable, a respected source reports that army strength fell from 80,000 to 50,000 from the April Revolution in 1978 to the Soviet invasion in 1979. 

The Soviet Invasion
Early in the winter of 1979-80 the Soviet Union began military deployment along its border with Afghanistan. Soviets usually refer to their presence in Afghanistan as "The Limited Contingent of Soviet Forces in Afghanistan." The official epithet translates into the English acronym LCSFA. The forces are "limited" in that they represent only a very small proportion of the total Soviet military machine. 
Security was tight before the invasion. The newly formed planning staff and theater-level headquarters had rapidly built up the units and deployed these at the border with Afghanistan, particularly in the Kushka and Termez areas. These Soviet towns possessed both railroads and easy access to major Afghan roads. Already by December 7 one regiment had been deployed to Afghanistan. Another reached Afghanistan sometime between December 21 and 23. Three others from this theater moved with the main force in the December 26-28 invasion. 

On Christmas eve of 1979 at 11:00 P.M., the Soviet airlift began. Troops and materiel arrived primarily at Kabul International Airport, but also at the air bases at Bagrami, Shindand, and Qandahar. One Kabuli witness remembered: "The planes started landing at night. You couldn't see anything [it was so dark]. You could only hear the constant roar of planes overhead. For two days and three nights the planes kept landing without a break." Bradsher reports that by the morning of December 27 about 5,000 Soviet troops occupied Kabul alone. 

Some Western witnesses took note of the large number of Soviet Central Asian troops among the invaders, but no accurate account of their representation in the invading force exists outside of the Soviet Union. It is known, however, that the arriving divisions held only twothirds of their full complement. 

Evidence that the Soviets anticipated a massive Afghan army rebellion is provided by their choice of weapons, for example, SA-4 antiaircraft missiles and FROG rocket battalions. These are certainly not the hardware of choice for counterinsurgency operations on poorly equipped tribesmen. Lieutenant General V. Mikhailov was stationed at the 40th Army Headquarters in Termez, from which he commanded the ground forces. His superior was the commander of the Turkestan Military District, Army General Y. Maximov, whose superior was Marshal Sergey Sokolov, chief of operations. 

Bradsher likens Soviet tactics in the invasion of Afghanistan to the strategy used in invading another neighbor, Czechoslovakia. In both cases the indigenous armies were told that the sudden influx of battleready Soviet troops was part of a military exercise. Both indigenous armies were ordered to turn in live ammunition for blanks, in keeping with the training exercise ruse. Not all Afghan units complied, however, including some tank units loyal to Amin. Amin appears to have realized what was happening but chose to put up a front of normality. 

The day when the air lift was completed was Friday. In most Muslim countries government offices close on Friday (see Tenets of Islam, ch. 2). Nikolai V. Talyzin, the Soviet minister of communications, paid a visit to Amin, perhaps to preserve the business-as-usual appearance or to divert Amin. The Soviets blew up Kabul's telephone system at 7:00 P.M. and by 7:15 occupied the Ministry of Interior. The Soviet military command at Termez did not wait until Amin's capture to announce on Radio Kabul (in a broadcast prerecorded by Babrak Karmal) that Afghanistan had been liberated from Amin's rule. 

Whatever the politics of the invasion, militarily the Soviet Union had found in Afghanistan, as the United States did in Vietnam, a testing ground for its early 1986 weapons and newest military tactics. Furthermore, the Soviets had played, as of December 1985, a major role in fighting and launching offensives, as well as deploying troops to hold key cities and strategic roads. 

Reorganization and Consolidation of the Soviet Forces
One month after the invasion there were as many as 40,000 Soviet troops in Afghanistan, and during the first year the occupation forces were reorganized. Some 10,000 of the troops-such as the support forces of the 40th Army, its artillery and SA-4 brigades, several FROG battalions, and a tank regiment-were useless in a guerrilla war and were sent back to the Soviet Union in mid-1980. These heavy units were replaced by infantry units, more helicopter gunships, and other, light forces more appropriate for guerrilla warfare. 

United States estimates were that there were about 85,000 Soviet troops in Afghanistan by late 1980 and about 100,000 by the end of 1981. The Soviets could not reduce troop strength anymore than this without risking control of key points in Afghanistan because they could not rely on the Afghan army.

In the early days of the occupation the Soviets limited combat to the minimum needed to maintain their hold on the major cities and towns of Afghanistan. During this period the; Afghan army itself, approximately 25,000 in number, was a major obstacle to Soviet aims, and the Soviets felt compelled to
use heavy weapons against the army whose government they were presumably supporting. It was only at significant cost in casualties that the Soviet occupation forces subdued major mutinies by the Afghan 8th Infantry Division in January 1980 and by the 14th Armored Division in July 1980.

Major guerrilla activities also harassed the Soviets only a few months after the occupation began, and the Soviets sent task forces as large as a division against the guerrillas in the Panjsher Valley in February 1980, Jalalabad in March 1980, and Herat in September 1980. There were also heavy bombardment and artillery attacks in 1981 against the latter two cities and Qandahar. Guerrilla strength in the Panjsher area was especially threatening, for it menaced the major Soviet supply line from Kabul to Mazar-e Sharif through the Salang Tunnel, and this area was the scene of several Soviet assaults. Early Soviet battle tactics in Panjsher and elsewhere were notably unsuccessful. A Soviet reinforced motorized rifle battalion in Paktia, for example, left the main road and appears to have been virtually destroyed when its inexperienced troops panicked and hid behind their vehicles until they ran out of ammunition and were killed. This and other incidents convinced the Soviets that small unit tactics, as well as individual marksmanship standards, had to be improved immediately. 

After the first few months the Soviets began to move toward decentralized support, such as ensuring that reinforced units had their own artillery, engineer, and helicopter support. New tactical units were also created, such as an air assault brigade, and new rifle battalions possessing integrated helicopter-mechanized capability. 

A major Soviet problem in the early days of the occupation resulted from the use of motorized rifle divisions from the Turkestan Military District. These units were low-readiness formations and had only been brought up to combat strength by the addition of recalled reservists. These Central Asian soldiers not only fraternized with soldiers of the Afghan army but also with guerrilla forces, especially Tajiks with whom they had ethnolinguistic ties. Concerned about this problem, Soviet leaders eventually replaced most Central Asian soldiers with troops from other areas of the Soviet Union. 

According to Soviet prisoners of war (POWs), most conscripts served six-month tours in Afghanistan. Many of the other ranks were given no special training before their tour of duty, and some servicemen were sent to Afghanistan only a few weeks after being called up. NCOs were sent to a training division for six months before being posted to Afghanistan. A large number of the NCOs in the occupation forces, plus some enlisted men, were trained in Ashkhabad in Turkestan Military District, where there were large battle training areas. 

The most significant units of the Soviet force in 1980-81 were the elite Guards Airborne regiments, elements of the 103d, 104th, and 105th divisions. These units established initial control around Bagrami Air Base at the time of the invasion, and in the next two years they were also stationed at the air bases at Kabul, Herat, and Shindand. These elite units, each with its own armor, were entrusted with the principal tasks of protecting the leaders of the new Afghan regime and controlling key urban centers and adjacent areas. 

To improve coordination between the army and the Air Assault Brigades, the Soviets began to construct permanent communication facilities to replace mobile field communications used in the early months of the occupation. This emphasis on centralization was inappropriate to the guerrilla war Soviet forces were fighting in Afghanistan, in which decentralized command would have been more effective. According to military analysts, decisions that would be made by a senior officer in conventional operations had to be made by junior officers, or even NCOs in a guerrilla conflict. According to David C. Isby, the NCO/junior officer group was the weakest command level in the Soviet occupation forces. There were few NCOs with extensive service experience, and junior officers were frequently not competent to undertake the tasks they faced. Commanders began to comment in Soviet military journals on the need to improve the capacity of junior officers, warrant officers, and NCOs to make independent decisions. 

Attempts were made during the first year of the Soviet occupation to rebuild the depleted Afghan army, first by such inducements as pay raises and reenlistment bonuses and then by such measures as more stringent conscription laws and impressment. None of these efforts was successful, not only because the regime itself was unpopular but also because the warfare in which potential recruits would be engaged was repugnant to most Afghans, i.e., a brutal guerrilla war against other Afghans. Intensified efforts in 1980-81, such as lowering the draft age and recalling discharged soldiers, were generally fruitless. According to the United States Department of State, press-gangs were sent into Kabul to capture youths as young as 15 years of age, although that was under the legal draft age. At the end of 1980 Afghan military strength was estimated at 20,000 to 30,000. !


Offensives, 1980-81 II
By 1981 the conflict that had been centered earlier on the eastern part of the country had begun to spread to almost every area. Mujahidiin attacked government and Soviet vehicles, which even in convoys were not safe on Afghan roads. The route from Kabul to Jalalabad and on to the Pakistani border was often under guerrilla control, forcing government and Soviet officials to use air transport to these areas. Even the key road from Kabul to Mazar-e Sharif and on to the Soviet border, although heavily guarded by Soviet troops, was not immune to attack from guerrillas, despite repeated offensives against them. 

The principal Soviet objective of the first six months of the occupation was control over the Pakistani border region, but the resistance in this region was quite strong, despite Soviet bombardment and the use of antipersonnel mines to hamper guerrilla movements. A significant number of the inhabitants of the region, however, fled their homes in the eastern part of the country in response to Soviet bombardment of civilian areas. The number of Afghan refugees in neighboring Pakistan grew in 1980 from 400,000 to about 1.4 million. Some peasants fled to the cities; following major Soviet offensives in Panjsher, Ghowr, Badakhshan, Nangarhar, Paktia, and Paktika in 1980, the population of some Afghan cities increased considerably. 

Despite their lack of coordination, the mujahidiin maintained only a few fighters in northwestern Afghanistan or in the semidesert regions. The guerrillas focused their assaults along two strategic lines, one running east-west from the Pakistani border to Hazarajat and the other running north-south delineating the eastern half of the country. Other than these two lines, the guerrillas established bases outside the cities of Qandahar and Herat. 

Although the Soviets lost some equipment and between 2,000 to 4,000 men during 1980, the Soviet offensives did not succeed in securing major roads or in halting guerrilla supply routes from Pakistan. An assault only a few kilometers northwest of Kabul in the Paghman mountains did not succeed. Hundreds of casualties were sustained on both sides, including local villagers, and the retreat of the Soviet-Afghan troops could not be easily concealed because it occurred so close to the capital. 

In early 1981 Soviet emphasis seemed to shift to a more political approach to subduing Afghanistan, but by the middle of the summer the deteriorating security situation again became the major focus of Soviet attention. At the end of the summer the Afghan government began to establish new "defense councils" at the national, provincial, and district levels to place all military matters under the clear control of the PDPA in response to what President Karmal called "increasing armed actions by counter-revolutionary elements." 
Further changes were also made in the Afghan army at this stage. The age of conscription was officially reduced from 22 to 20, and two senior Afghan officers were replaced: the minister of defense was sent to the Soviet Union with some other senior officers "for training" and did not return, and the general who headed political affairs in the Afghan army was also replaced in August. 


By the beginning of 1981 the mujahidiin had begun a war of terror, sending units even into Kabul to attack PDPA and Soviet personnel. In January 1981 a guerrilla group raided the large Soviet residential complex in Kabul, and on January 29, 1981 they attacked and destroyed the headquarters of the Afghan secret police, the State Information Service (Khadamate Ettelaate Dowlati, in Dari-KHAD). In April 1981 three 
senior Afghan security officials were assassinated, including the commander of the defense militia and the second-ranking commander of Afghan military intelligence.

The response to this campaign of terror took the form of attacks in Lowgar Province by Afghan and Soviet troops that were intended, according to Radio Kabul, "to annihilate mercenaries, criminals, terrorists and anti-revolutionary elements to preserve the gains of the revolution." As John Fullerton notes, the order of battle for this offensive was characteristic of such operations. Afghan militia units were sent in first, followed by Afghan army units with Soviet forces bringing up the rear. If the Afghans, sent in first to draw guerrilla fire, deserted (as was frequently the case), their Soviet allies were in a good position to fire on them. Soviet forces were only sent in on the ground when the area had been thoroughly prepared by artillery bombardment and with close air support.

Soviet losses in the second year of the occupation were higher than in the first: by the end of December 1981 Western intelligence sources believed that Soviet troops had lost hundreds of aircraft and lightly armored vehicles. It was also noticed that in 1982 the Soviets tried more consistently to recover military materiel that had been damaged in combat, especially APCs and tanks.

By the end of 1981 there began to be reports from guerrillas of Warsaw Pact and Cuban military personnel in Afghanistan. One guerrilla, describing the Cubans in combat, said they were "big and black and shout very loudly when they fight. Unlike the Russians they were not afraid to attack us in the open." There were also reports from guerrilla sources and a defecting Afghan officer of Bulgarian troops and of a Bulgarian military base in southern Mazar-e Sharif to protect the fuel pipeline to Sheberghan (see Mining, ch. 3). In addition, there were reports from intelligence sources of personnel from the German Democratic Republic (East Germany) training Afghan security and police forces.


Soviet Occupation Phase II, 1982-85
A major principle of Soviet military doctrine is the use of heavy air offensives to stun and disorganize resistance operations. In Afghanistan this has mainly taken the form of helicopter assault, although there, as elsewhere, the Soviet Army depends on the helicopters of the Soviet Air Force. Normally these Frontal Aviation units have been attached either to a front-level army command or, as independent mixed-helicopter squadrons, to selected motorized and tank divisions. The extent to which Soviet Frontal Aviation forces in Afghanistan were operationally integrated with the Afghan air force was unknown. The overall force disposition appeared to be under Soviet command. 

Helicopters
Estimates of the number of Soviet helicopters in Afghanistan has ranged from 500 to 650, and, of these, it is estimated that up to 250 have been the Mi-24 Hind gunship. The Hind, with up to 192 unguided rockets under its stub wings and machine guns or cannon in the nose turret, has room for eight to 12 soldiers and their equipment. The Hind has been used not only for search-and-destroy missions but also for close air support, assaults (sometimes along with fixed-wing aircraft) on villages, and armed reconnaissance missions against guerrillas.

 
Hind helicopters have been deployed in Afghanistan since before the 1979 invasion, but Soviet tactics in using them have changed since then. Up to as late as 1985 several Hind helicopters would be used in a circular pattern to engage guerrillas directly, attacking in a dive from 1,000 meters with 57mm rockets and with cluster and high-explosive 250-kilogram bombs. In 1985 Soviet use of Hinds began to change somewhat, and a wider variety of tactics began to be employed: using helicopters (either Hinds or Mi-8 Hips) as scouts; running in from 7,000 to 8,000 meters away, rising to 100 meters and drawing fire, and having other aircraft waiting behind a ridge to attack whomever opened fire; and using helicopters in mass formations. 

The Hip is armed with 57mm rocket pods or (in the Hip-E version) with a single-barrel 12.7mm gun. The drawbacks of the Hip, however, are the exposed fuel system, the relatively short rotor life (1,500 hours), and the time required for an engine change. 


Two other Soviet helicopters used in combat in Afghanistan have been the Mi-4 Hound and the Mi-6 Hook. The Hound has been used in what appears to be a forward aircontrol role for ground-based artillery attacks. It has also been deployed in conjunction with the Hind, usually to commence an operation and then to circle while the Hinds attack, dropping heat decoys to ward off hits by hand-held SA7 heatseeking missiles. The big Mi-6 Hook, which can hold up to 70 soldiers and their combat equipment and which has a range of 370 kilometers, has been attached principally to the 181st Independent Helicopter Regiment in Jalalabad and to the 280th Independent Helicopter Regiment in Qandahar and Shindand. 

Fighter-Bombers
Soviet fighter-bombers have been deployed primarily for Ii air-to-ground assault in Afghanistan. They have been used in terror bombing, scorched-earth bombing, and carpet bombing.Fighter-bombers have been deployed against guerrillas and against settlements and cities; for example, half of the city of Herat was reportedly destroyed in a 1983 assault.

Early in the war the Soviets relied primarily on the MiG21 Fishbed, with generally poor results. The MiG-21 is armed with one twin-barrel 23mm gun (with 200 rounds of ammunition in a belly pack), four 57mm rocket packs, two 500-kilogram bombs, and two 250-kilogram bombs or four 240mm airto-surface rockets. The MiG21 proved ineffective in combat in Afghanistan for several reasons: rockets were often fired from as far as 2,000 meters, which rendered them inaccurate; many bombs failed to explode on impact; the aircraft was best suited for air-to-ground combat situations; in a guerrilla war the early warning provided by fighter-bomber attack tended to negate the effects of the strike; and the mountainous terrain where guerrilla resistance has been concentrated has made airtoground fire from fixed-wing aircraft less effective, and the high altitudes, mountain peaks, and narrow valleys have made movement difficult for most fixed-wing aircraft. 

Because of the poor performance of the MiG-21 Fishbed, the Soviets introduced the other fixed-wing aircraft, the Su-25 Frogfoot and the Tu-16 Badger. The Frogfoot is a close-support aircraft designed for the same uses as the American-made A-10. Carrying up to 4,500 kilograms of ordnance and used primarily to hit point targets in difficult terrain, the Frogfoot operated in loose pairs in combat in Afghanistan. At least one squadron of Frogfoot aircraft operated from Bagrami Air Base. The other fixed-wing aircraft introduced by the Soviets was the Tu-16 Badger, a medium-range bomber that can carry up to 8,950 kilograms of ordnance and fly more than 12,000 meters above sea level. Before April 1984 Badger units were deployed on the Soviet border. The Badgers were first used in the bombing campaign against the city of Herat, and in April 1984 they were used for highaltitude carpet-bombing of guerrilla bases in the Panjsher Valley, during which a reported 36 Badgers were used and 30 to 40 strikes made per day. 

Although there appeared to be little threat to Soviet bombers because their guerrilla adversaries had no weapons that could reach fighter-bomber altitude, the Soviets appeared to remain worried about antiaircraft fire, as manifested in their bombing tactics. Nelson, observing five Soviet air attacks, noticed that bombs were dropped from too high an altitude and rockets fired from too far away, with visibly inaccurate results. Thus the Soviets appear to be increasingly dependent upon helicopter forces as a vital part of their overall strategy in Afghanistan. 

Air Bases
As of mid-1985 seven air bases had been built or significantly improved by the Soviets: Herat, Shindand, Farah, Qandahar, Kabul International Airport, Bagrami, and Jalalabad. Airfields at Mazar-e Sharif, Konduz, Ghazni, and Pol-a Charkhi also were improved somewhat. All were turned into all-weather, jet air bases (although Jalalabad continued to be principally for helicopters). The two most important air bases, where the sensitive technical support and maintenance capabilities were located, were at Bagrami and Shindandthe former serving as the supreme local headquarters for the entire Soviet military operation in Afghanistan. Most military aircraft were not permanently based at any one field, for maintenance and support were concentrated at these two fields. No Afghans were permitted on the Shindand Air Base. 

Chemical Warfare
The Soviet Union is believed to have an 80,000-man chemical and biological warfare establishment with specialist chemical defense units attached to divisions, battalions, and companies. Although the Soviets have described the main role of these forces as defensive, there have been many and varied reports of chemical weapon attacks by Soviet troops against guerrilla forces in Afghanistan. The United States Department of State reported that chemical bombs supplied by the Soviet Union were used against guerrillas in November 1978, even before the Soviet invasion. The State Department received reports of 47 different chemical attacks between mid-1979 and mid-1981, resulting in a death toll of more than 3,000. Thirty-six of these reports were from Afghan army deserters, guerrillas, journalists, and physicians. Another serious report came from an Afghan army defector who gave the Far Eastern Economic Review details of Soviet-supplied chemical and biological agents being used by Afghan army units. Although the veracity of the report was supported by its extensive detail, a number of questions remained. 

Other reports by foreign journalists abound, and they suggest that the Soviets have used chemical weapons from helicopter units to drive guerrillas from caves or other dwellings in order to attack them with conventional weapons. In general, the numerous reports of chemical and biological agents being used against Afghan guerrillas, from a wide variety of sources, suggest that Soviet use of such materials may be extensive but remains highly selective. There have been reports by Afghan resistance leaders of decreased use of such agents, and, although a State Department report of February 21, 1984 charged the Soviets with more uses of chemical weapons, it did state that, contrary to previous years, the Soviet use of chemical weapons in 1983 "could not be confirmed as valid." 

New Soviet Weapons
Several new weapons, which had not been seen outside the Soviet Union, have been introduced in combat in Afghanistan since the 1979 invasion. Most of these new weapons have been for ground forces. 
One weapon that appeared to have been specifically designed for use in Afghanistan is the "butterfly" mine with a "wing" that makes it look like a butterfly or a sycamore seed and allows it to spin slowly to the ground when dropped from the air. Made of green or brown plastic and powerful enough to blow off afoot or a hand, these mines seem to have been designed to blend in with the terrain and to maim rather than kill, although the inaccessibility of medical facilities means that many victims of these mines die of infection or loss of blood.

 
"Butterfly" mines have been used effectively against the guerrillas. Spread by Mi-8 Hip helicopters or large-caliber artillery, they enable the Soviets to sow a minefield very quickly. According to Jane's Defence Weekly, a Hip usually carries two mine dispersal units and can lay 144 mines. When released, the mines are scattered by airflow or on impact. The use of these "butterfly" mines is banned by the Geneva Convention, which specifically forbids combatants to use mines that cannot be detected by normal means and that have an unlimited lifespan. In 1981 John Fullerton witnessed an incident in which a guerrilla lost a hand and much of his face when washing his hands in a ditch in an area that had not been the object of mine-laying operations for nine months. Fullerton says that there was "little doubt that mines could last a decade and were a threat to children and livestock especially. 

Four other weapons noted for the first time outside the Soviet Union included a new automatic, 81mm mortar, the AGS-17 automatic grenade launcher, the AK-74 high-velocity rifle, and the new RPG-16 antitank weapon. The new mortar is capable not only of rapid and continuous fire but also has a high trajectory, which, although not normally advantageous, has proved useful in mountainous Afghanistan in support of infantry operations. The AGS17 automatic grenade launcher can either be mounted on a vehicle or used from a helicopter. Fired by two persons, it launches 30mm grenades from a drum that contains 30 rounds. In conjunction with the grenade launcher the Soviets have also used "flechette" rounds, which are small, razor sharp, steel slivers contained in 152mm artillery shells. The AK-74 high-velocity rifle, a 5.45mm caliber weapon equipped with an image-intensifying sight, resembles the standard AK47 rifle. This new rifle fires a hollow core bullet that is very damaging to the human target. The RPG-16 antitank weapon replaces the RPG7 and represents an improvement both in range and in accuracy. 

The Soviets have also used an improved APC in Afghanistan. The BMP-2, a variant of the BMP-1, is essentially an improved version of the standard BRT-60 APC, with which most Soviet and Afghan motorized units have been equipped. Armed with an automatic 30mm cannon, the new APCs have an improved hatch for safer evacuation and are considered to have better mobility. 

Despite the use of improved weaponry in Afghanistan, the Soviets continued to have logistical problems in 1985. Very long supply lines and the impossibility of depending solely on aircraft for resupply of the outlying areas have necessitated continuous repairs on the roads, bridges, and bypasses that are the targets of guerrilla attack. 

Combat Activity, 1984-85
Despite the intensive combat activity in all areas of the country and the costly offensives of previous years, by late 1985 neither the Soviets nor the mujahidiin had achieved significant territorial gains. During 1984-85 most Soviet-Afghan assaults were concentrated around major cities (especially Kabul), the Panjsher Valley, and the areas near the Pakistani border. 

Kabul
The guerrillas succeeded in threatening the general security of the capital, especially in the late summer and fall of 1984. Their attacks included, but went beyond, assassinations and kidnappings of Soviet and Afghan regime officials and interruptions of supply convoys. The guerrillas also carried out bombings, ground assaults, and rocket attacks (for example, on electrical facilities). Kabul remained to some extent a city under Beige. 

One of the largest guerrilla attacks since the 1979 invasion occurred in Kabul in September 1984, culminating in a violent twohour battle near the military base at the ancient Bala Hissar fortress. According to a State Department report, 15 Soviet armored vehicles were destroyed and 40 to 50 Afghan soldiers killed in the battle. In accordance with their practice in the Afghan conflict, the Soviets retaliated for the attack with a ground and air assault on villages nearby, resulting in considerable civilian casualties. 
With the stability of the capital deteriorating as a result of such attacks, the Soviets tightened security throughout Kabul and around the airport and increased the number of retaliatory attacks on areas from which they believed the guerrillas had launched their attacks. These measures did not appear to deter the mujahidiin, who launched another rocket attack on Kabul in late September 1984, resulting in extensive damage. Again the Soviets retaliated by attacking villages south of Kabul. 

Also in the fall of 1984 the guerrillas caused severe electrical shortages in Kabul by destroying pylons at the hydroelectric plant east of Kabul. Most homes were without electricity, and industrial output was also affected by the cutoffs to factories. 

Rocket attacks on Kabul by the mujahidiin continued in November 1984, and Western diplomatic sources also reported that they had killed a Soviet general by shooting down his helicopter. In response to the continued guerrilla rocket attacks on Kabul, the Soviets continued to bomb villages south of the capital. The Christian Science Monitor reported that in one attack on a village east of Kabul, a dozen or more Soviet aircraft dropped bombs from over 6,000 meters. Western diplomatic sources reported in early 1985 that guerrilla rocket attacks into Soviet military camps in and near Kabul reportedly had killed 60 and wounded 34. The Soviet response to these attacks included setting up a security network of eight concentric circles around Kabul: at each post an estimated 100 soldiers, plus eight to 10 tanks or APCs, were posted. 
The guerrillas did not restrict their attacks to the city or the military camps; airports were attacked repeatedly as well. SAMs were apparently used to destroy several aircraft in flight, and in September 1984 the only DC-10 of Ariana Afghan Airlines was damaged. The Soviets responded at first by curtailing air activity, but they later improved military facilities around the airport and deployed more armor and artillery in the vicinity. By the end of 1984 Kabul was often lit by flares fired from aircraft during takeoff or landing, apparently to defend against heat-seeking SAMs being, used by the guerrillas. Nearby Bagrami Air Base was also attacked in early 1985, and Western diplomatic sources reported the destruction of at least 10 helicopters. 

In June 1985 the Soviet Union announced 37 construction projects at Kabul International Airport, including new hangars and security posts, runway expansion, extended power supply, and an air communications network. This work, however, suffered repeated interruptions from sporadic guerrilla rocket attacks. 
In the summer of 1985 the guerrillas continued to be able to attack both Kabul and its airport, and the inability of the Soviet-Afghan forces to prevent this was considered to have shaken their confidence and resulted in even tighter security precautions by the Soviets. More patrols and armed positions were established in areas where there was a high concentration of government and military personnel, and helicopters on night patrol over Kabul were equipped with special night vision equipment. 

Panjsher Valley
The Panjsher Valley has been one of the major centers of resistance to Soviet forces since the 1979 invasion, and guerrilla fighters under the command of Ahmad Shah Mahsud (frequently spelled Massoud in the press) of the Jamiat-i-Islami (Islamic Society) group have repeatedly attacked convoys passing through the valley on the highway south to Kabul. In late April 1983 the Soviets broke a truce with Mahsud with a major offensive that sought to destroy resistance in the valley and eliminate Mahsud as a leader. To these ends this offensive, the seventh launched against the Panjsher area between 1979 and 1983, included the first use in Afghanistan of heavy, Sovietbased bombers, which carried out carpet bombing missions over the valley. The largest number of troops ever committed to a Panjsher operation, some 20,000 men, was supported by several thousand Afghan soldiers and also local militias. Adjacent valleys were also occupied in an attempt to seal off the Panjsher. 

The assault failed to achieve its objectives. The guerrillas followed their usual tactic of withdrawing from the valley floor to the surrounding areas, counterattacking whenever possible. Although the mujahidiin lost a significant number of fighters, their units remained intact. Mahsud was quoted as estimating Soviet-Afghan army losses at 2,500 killed or wounded. Although these figures were not verified, observers believed that the Soviet-Afghan troops had suffered heavy casualties. 

In 1984 the Soviets continued to maintain bases in the Panjsher Valley around Peshghor and conducted limited sweep operations in November of that year, bombing suspected guerrilla positions from Tu-16s. In 1985 the Soviets carried out a major offensive in the area beginning in April. According to intelligence sources, they brought in at least one motorized rifle division (about 12,000 men) and mounted bombing raids with Tu-16s and Mi-24 helicopter gunships. In June the offensive entered its second phase, with bomb and rocket attacks against guerrilla positions. The mujahidiin followed their usual pattern, withdrawing into the mountains and adjacent areas. 

As of late 1985 the Soviets did not appear to have succeeded either in driving Mahsud from the Panjsher Valley or in improving the security of their supply line from Mazar-e Sharif The fierce combat and bombing raids had, however, severely depopulated the valley. Guerrilla sources estimated that as many as 150,000 people had been forced to flee their homes although some observers suggested the number might be as low as 25,000. Most Panjsheris seemed to have taken refuge in neighboring valleys, hoping to return later, while some fled to Kabul and others to Pakistan. For those who remained, food had become very scarce and prices extremely high. 

Pakistan Border Area
Another area of violent confrontation included the regions adjacent to Pakistan: Paktia, Paktika, Nangarhar, and Konarha provinces. Attempting to seal the border-crossing routes between the two countries, the Soviets fortified garrisons with both Soviet and Afghan troops and conducted sweep operations and bombing missions in these provinces. Soviet efforts were relatively unsuccessful as mujahidiin groups cooperated in besieging and attacking Soviet and Afghan army posts in Khowst and made it almost impossible for the Soviets to resupply garrisons except through risky air routes. Virtually all resistance groups, both fundamentalist and traditionalist, were represented in these operations. Guerrilla attacks in Paktia and Konarha provinces resulted in Soviet airstrikes in efforts to relieve the pressure on their garrisons. When these airstrikes occasionally spilled over the border into Pakistan, Kabul accused Pakistani forces of attacking the garrisons in Afghanistan. Observers reported more than 43 violations of Pakistani airspace by Soviet-Afghan forces in 1984, and about 14 ground incursions resulted in an estimated 300 casualties. 

In the spring of 1985-after three weeks of heavy fighting that saw use of as many as 100 tanks, 80 helicopters, and 60 jet fighters for daily bombing-Soviet-Afghan forces broke the 11-month siege of the garrison of Barikot in Konarha Province, although mujahidiin continued to fire on the Soviet positions in this area from the mountains across the border. Western diplomatic sources reported that the Soviets hoped to make progress in sealing off the border in this area by replacing the small Afghan brigade and its Soviet advisers at Barikot with a brigade-strength base of 3,000 men, by establishing military posts elsewhere in the province with 100 men at each post, and by paving the tortuous 40-kilometer road from Asmar to Barikot to connect the border garrisons with each other. Observers and military experts were dubious, however, that the Soviets could keep these positions under their permanent control. 

Resistance forces in Paktia Province continued their attacks on Soviet-Afghan forces in the city of Khowst. The Soviets began an offensive in this area in the summer of 1985, reportedly using napalm bombs to drive the mujahidiin out of their positions around the city and increasing air and artillery attacks across the border in Pakistan to cut off the guerrillas' supply lines. Although Soviet-Afghan forces remained garrisoned in Khowst and Gardez in late 1985, there were high casualties on both sides. Resistance forces retained a formidable presence in the province and continued to attack the positions held by Soviet and Afghan army troops. 

A fall 1985 offensive by Soviet-Afghan troops in Paktia Province failed to cut off supplies entering Afghanistan from Pakistan, although by use of aerial bombardment and ground ambushes Soviet forces were able to drive the mujahidiin away from the more accessible trails. Use of routes through more difficult terrain and losses sustained from attacks on convoys of supplies from Pakistan made all goods needed by the guerrillas in Afghanistan more expensive, according to December 1985 reports in the Washington Post. There were also reports from the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) in late 1985 that the Soviets used commando units to launch attacks on convoys from Pakistan, using silencers on their rifles as well as mortars. 

Southern Afghanistan: Qandahar
Qandahar was the scene of the fiercest fighting in any Afghan city. Virtually every night of 1984-85 saw fighting in and around the city, and the inhabitants were subjected to almost daily bombing and strafing by Soviet helicopters from the nearby base, as well as arbitrary arrests and frequent ground combat between Afghan forces and the guerrillas. Terrence White of the Far Eastern Economic Review spent almost a month in Qandahar and reported that the guerrillas enjoyed remarkable freedom of movement in the city. Although an estimated 30,000 Soviet troops were positioned at the airport about 12 kilometers southeast of the city, there were no Soviet foot patrols and in early 1985 Afghan army forces usually did not leave their 30 or so posts in the city. Afghan resistance leaders interviewed in Pakistan reported that the 1984-85 fighting in Qandahar was the fiercest since the Soviet invasion in 1979. The Soviets relied increasingly on air attacks in an effort to drive the guerrillas out of the city. White reported that there was bombing every one of the 28 days he was in Qandahar. 

Even APCs were at risk on the road between the airport and the city, and it was reported that the governor of the province who had been in the habit of commuting to work in an APC, by mid-1985 was compelled to work out of the Soviet air base and to make his rare visits to Qandahar in a helicopter. Government officials were assassinated frequently and, according to a report in Le Monde, at least 40 civilians were killed by Soviet soldiers in January 1985 in a bazaar in Qandahar in reprisal for the assassination of an official of the PDPA. Guerrilla retaliation took the form of an ambush in February that reportedly killed 30 Soviet and Afghan soldiers. 

Western Afghanistan: Herat
According to a State Department report, as much as half of the city of Herat had been destroyed in bombardment by mid1985, and large sections of the city were deserted. Soviet forces carried out three major offensives against guerrilla forces in Herat in 1984-85. In a June 1984 operation 10,000 Soviet troops and 5,000 Afghan troops were deployed against the mujahidiin, who fought a delaying action until they could flee to the mountains in the north or to neighboring Iran. 

Another offensive began in late 1984 in Herat, which, like Qandahar, is temperate enough in climate to permit winter combat. Ismail Khan, guerrilla commander of Jamiat-i-Islami in Herat, told observers that the Soviets were following a scorched-earth policy and that the city was suffering from shortages of essential supplies. This offensive also included air attacks; one such attack against civilians resulted in an estimated 150 deaths. 

The Soviets planned a new offensive in Herat in the spring of 1985, and in the early months of the year they brought in Soviet and Afghan troops to supplement an already large number of soldiers stationed at three bases in the area. Despite this, the guerrillas staged a spectacular attack on Shindand Air Base in June 1985, destroying an estimated 20 Soviet-made MiG21s. Reports from intelligence sources indicated that the way the airplanes were blown up suggested sabotage rather than battle, and a month later some 20 Afghan air force officers were executed. The Soviets continued to be concerned about security at Herat, and there were reports that a large number of Soviet and Afghan aircraft had been relocated (from Qandahar as well as Herat) to Shindand Air Base. 

The Afghan Armed Forces, 1985
A high desertion rate and poor morale among soldiers who remained in the ranks drastically reduced the combat effectiveness of the Afghan armed forces in the mid-1980s. Despite infusions of aid and the presence of a large number of military advisers, the Soviets were unsuccessful in their effort to transform the army into a viable fighting force. Animosity between members of the Parcham and Khalq factions of the PDPA also hampered the army's ability to carry out its mission. Khalq officers and men expressed bitterness over the preferential treatment given their Parcham rivals by the Parchamdominated regime. Many actively gave assistance to the mujahidiin. 

Command and Control
The Fundamental Principles of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan designate the president of the Revolutionary Council (RC) as the commander of the armed forces (see Government Structure, ch. 4). Below the president in the chain of command are the minister of national defense and the chief of the general staff. In 1985 these two posts were held by Major General Nazar Muhammad and Lieutenant General Shah Nawaz Tannay, respectively. There were three geographically based corps commands, headquartered at Kabul, Qandahar, and Herat. 

Behind the formally established chain of command, Soviet advisers directed operations, their authority extending from the highest to the lowest levels. Like their civilian counterparts in government ministries, Afghan commanders enjoyed little or no autonomy. 

Army Manpower, Organization, and Equipment
On paper, the Afghan army had a strength of 110,000 men in 1978. The actual number at that time was closer to 80,000. By late 1980, a year after the Soviet invasion, desertion and casualties had thinned its ranks down to about 20,000 men. According to The Military Balance, 1985-1986, published by the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) in London, the number had increased to around 40,000 men by mid-1985. The IISS questioned the reliability of this figure, however. Rates of desertion and demobilization continued to be high. According to one analyst, David C. Isby, there was a turnover of about 10,000 men annually. 

Although officers and men were generously compensated by Afghan standards, the quality of personnel was notoriously poor. The ranks were filled with the dregs of Afghan society or with youths unfortunate enough to have been caught by regime press-gangs. The army consisted principally of conscripts. Coercion was generally used. Fullerton tells of a woman who was shot in the back by the authorities as she tried to prevent the dragging away of her 21-yearold son. The conscription season was usually late spring or summer, when weather permitted fighting around the country. There were cases of men being drafted, then deserting, only to be drafted again. Because of the shortage of able and willing young men, the draft age was lowered in 1984 from 17 to 16 years of age, and the term of service lengthened from three to four years; it had been lengthened from two to three years in 1982. This touched off mutinies and further desertions to the mujahidiin. 

Soldiers were given minimal training. Fullerton reports that conscripts were fortunate if they had the opportunity to fire an automatic weapon once before going into combat. Because potential deserters regarded stolen weapons as a ticket to good treatment and enrollment in the ranks of the mujahidiin, officers routinely ordered their men to turn in their guns and ammunition after an engagement. 

Thanks to Amin's efforts in the 1970s, the officer corps consisted largely of Khalqis. Given the shortage of trained and able personnel, Parcham leaders were obliged to retain their services rather than carry out a purge. Relations were strained because of years of interfactional violence. Khalqis complained that they were being used as "cannon-fodder" while Parcham adherents were awarded noncombatant posts. Khalqis made eager recruits for the resistance. Even when they did not desert, they often impeded Afghan army operations in such a way as to allow the mujahidiin to evade encirclement and defeat. There were also instances of skirmishes between Khalqi army units and Soviet forces. 

One remedy that the regime used to attempt to cut down on the desertion rate was to increase the ratio of officers to enlisted men. In certain cases, there could be as many as six officers to every 10 conscripts. The former had the role of watching their men as well as commanding them, although officers with strong Khalqi sympathies could not be relied on to do this. Shortage of loyal officers resulted in rapid promotion of inexperienced-and sometimes illiterate-men. Although captured enlisted men were usually welcomed by the mujahidiin, captured officers were viewed with suspicion. Their backgrounds and political sympathies were typically investigated before their fate was decided. Less fortunate captive officers were killed immediately by the mujahidiin. 

The Afghan army played a supplementary role in the Soviets' overall strategic planning. Units were often detailed to defend a fort or town of secondary importance in territory controlled by the mujahidiin. Unlike Soviet units, they received scanty air and artillery support. They were also used to spearhead major offensives. Afghan soldiers who attempted to desert were shot by Soviet troops posted immediately behind them. According to Fullerton, Afghan army casualties were estimated to be twice those of Soviet troops. But these were generally not very high. Afghan soldiers, facing the mujahidiin, often preferred to surrender or "play dead" rather than fight. 

Formally, the army was divided into 11 infantry divisions and three armored divisions in late 1985. There were also two mountain infantry regiments, a mechanized infantry brigade, an artillery brigade, three artillery regiments, a commando brigade, and three commando regiments. The IISS estimated in 1985 that divisions were at about quarter strength, i.e., about 2,500 men. 

Soviet advisers were generally reluctant to allow Afghan units access to the latest military equipment. Armored units in 1985 had a variety of Soviet-supplied armored vehicles. These included 100 T-62 main battle tanks, 300 T54/55 main battle tanks, 50 T-34 medium tanks, and 60 PT-76 light amphibious tanks. Its complement of fighting vehicles also included 40 BMP-1 mechanized infantry combat vehicles and over 400 APCs of the BTR-40, 50, 60, and 152 series. These weapons were, of course, of limited use in a guerrilla war, but they played a role in securing highways and open areas and in maintaining order in the towns and cities. 

There were several elite Afghan army units: the 24th Airborne Battalion, and the 37th, 38th, and 444th Commando Brigades. According to Isby, the status of the airborne brigade was unclear in late 1985; it had revolted in 1980. The commando units were considered politically loyal but had endured heavy casualties. As a result, they were reorganized as independent battalions. 

The Air Force
The Military Balance, 1985-1986 estimates the number of air force personnel at 7,000 in 1985. This included members of the Air Defense Command. There were about 150 combat aircraft. All of these were obsolete or obsolescent, Soviet-made varieties: four squadrons, totaling 50 MiG-17 jet fighters (Fresco-C); three squadrons composed of 40 MiG-21 jet interceptors (Fishbed); two squadrons comprised of about 25 Su7B ground attack fighters (FitterA); and a squadron composed of 12 Su-17 single-seat attack aircraft (Fitter-C). There were also three squadrons totaling about 20 I1-28 light bombers (Beagle). Transport aircraft included about 15 An-26 shorthaul transports (Curl). The air force had about 30 attack helicopters: Mi-24s, Mi-4s, and Mi-8s. There were also reconnaisance and training aircraft. The Air Defense Command was equipped with antiaircraft guns and surface-to-air missiles. 

Reportedly, there were as many as 5,000 Czechoslovak and Cuban military advisers attached to the Afghan air force, as well as Soviet personnel. The quality of pilots and other staff, in terms of training and reliability, was low. This was one reason why they were denied access to advanced aircraft. In July 1985 however, Afghan pilots succeeded in flying two late-model Mi-24D gunships to Pakistan. These had electronic equipment designed to adapt them for use in Afghanistan's mountainous terrain. 

Internal Security
Like the Bolsheviks in the years following the October Revolution, the Kabul regime faced a largely hostile, or at least nonsupportive, population. Both revolutionary regimes were involved in bloody civil wars. The constant use of coercion, rather than the fostering of an abiding sense of legitimacy, ensured their survival. In an atmosphere of internal and external violence, secrecy, and incessant plotting between factional rivals, the PDPA leadership depended on an internal security apparatus-similar in many ways to the Bolsheviks' dreaded Cheka secret police-to intimidate and punish opponents and undermine the armed resistance. By the mid-1980s KHAD had gained a fearsome reputation as the eyes, ears, and scourge of the regime. Its influence was pervasive, and its methods lawless. 

Less than a month after the PDPA came to power, President Taraki established a secret police. A decree issued on May 14, 1978, nullified Daoud's 1977 constitution, set up special "revolutionary military courts" to deal swiftly with enemies of the revolution, and established KHAD's predecessor, AGSA (Da Afghanistan da Gato da Satalo Adara, in Pashtu, and translated as Afghan Interests Protection Service). AGSA had wideranging powers. According to Taraki, "the criterion of our judgment regarding the removal of unhealthy elements from the administration is sabotage, antirevolutionary action, corruption, bad reputation, bribery, cruelty, oppression and administrative inefficiency of the officials." Given the PDPA's unpopularity and its internal purges, the secret police soon had its hands full. Taraki appointed Amin as its director. During the bloody year and five months between the coup d'etat and Taraki's fall from power, Amin used his enhanced power to build his own political base, eliminate rivals, and eventually seize power. Prisons in Kabul and other parts of Afghanistan overflowed with political prisoners. They were subjected to inhuman conditions and brutal torture. 

In September 1979, after Amin became president, he changed the name of AGSA to the Workers' Intelligence Institute (Kargari Astekhbarati Muassessa, in Pashtu,-KAM) and promised that it would act within the bounds of legality. He named his nephew, Asadullah Amin, as KAM's director. The Soviets donated the equivalent of US$6.7 million to KAM, despite their disenchantment with Amin. This apparently included the latest in Soviet interrogation and torture technology. After the December 1979 Soviet invasion, KAM was renamed KHAD. 

KHAD's Activities in the Mid-1980s
In the mid-1980s KHAD enjoyed a formidable measure of autonomy in relation to other Afghan state institutions. It was, however, under the de facto control of the Soviet secret police, the KGB. The organization was generously funded. Its cadres-estimated by Western observers as numbering anywhere between 25,000 and 60,000 persons-formed an intelligence network throughout Afghanistan and even beyond the country's borders. This included a uniformed KHAD brigade of 2,000 men. Many received training from the KGB and East German intelligence specialists. Its mission was multifaceted, including the detection and suppression of antiregime elements, the gathering of intelligence, and the sponsorship of organizations designed to win the population's adherence to the PDPA's ideology and programs. KHAD was responsible for the ideological education of new PDPA members and armed forces personnel. It set up a special school for the education of the children of party members and war orphans who were routinely shipped off to the Soviet Union for further education. It supervised the teaching of compulsory courses in ideology at Kabul University, the technical colleges, and secondary schools. KHAD personnel on the campuses ostensibly worked as "information officers." 

KHAD was the bulwark of "official" Islam. It provided subsidies to the Religious Affairs Directorate, an organization designed to use Islamic symbols to gain popular support for the regime. It was intimately associated with the Supreme Council of Ulama !see Glossary) in Kabul and allegedly founded the Society of Islamic Scholars and the Promotion of Islamic Traditions as a means of co-opting religious figures. According to Fullerton, KHAD encouraged proregime imams (see Glossary) to enlist mosque attendants as informers. Informers were apparently also included among the several thousand official pilgrims on the haj to Mecca in 1982. KHAD also directed its attention to Afghanistan's tiny Hindu and Sikh religious minorities. 

KHAD influence and power were naturally most pervasive in the capital. Kabul was reportedly divided into 182 residential blocks, designed to improve control of its inhabitants. Fullerton reports that each block had more than 100 informers paid by KHAD. The secret police had its own headquarters building with electronic equipment on the roof that was used to monitor the communications of foreign embassies. According to a late 1984 report by Amnesty International, KHAD also operated eight detention centers in the capital, which were located at KHAD headquarters; at the Ministry of Interior headquarters; at a location known as the "Central Interrogation Office"; at the headquarters of the department of KHAD responsible for monitoring the military; and at four other locations, including several formerly private houses. Qandahar, Jalalabad, Feyzabad, and other provincial cities also had detention centers. 

KHAD worked hand-in-hand with the Ministry of Nationalities and Tribal Affairs, headed in 1985 by Solayman Laeq, to extend regime control over the rural and tribal areas. According to Fullerton, the country was divided by KHAD and the ministry into three administrative sectors. The first encompassed non-Pashtun ethnic groups, largely in the northern part of the country, and was Laeq's responsibility. The other two regions-the Pashtun tribal areas reaching from the Pakistan border to Qandahar in the south and the Pashtun and Baluch tribal areas in Pakistan-were the responsibility of KHAD. KHAD operatives arranged meetings between government officials and their relatives in the minority or tribal areas to foster support for PDPA policies. They sponsored local jirgahs and distributed subsidies to cooperative individuals. A major goal of such activities was to establish a network of informers. The secret police also sowed dissension at various localities between traditional tribal and ethnic rivals in order to weaken local support for the mujahidiin. 

Thus, KHAD agents stirred up hostilities between Pashtun and Nuristanis in eastern Afghanistan and between Pashtuns and Hazaras in the central part of the country. This divide-andrule policy, similar to that of colonial authorities in many parts of the world, was often successful because of the age-old animosities that existed among different Afghan ethnic and tribal groups. Non-Pashtun ethnic groups in the north were offered cultural, linguistic, and administrative "autonomy" similar to that granted to Central Asia during the 1920s and 1930s. 

Infiltration of mujahidiin organizations in the countryside and the conversion of guerrilla leaders were high priorities. KHAD apparently experienced uneven success in carrying out these activities. Fullerton reports that in some areas, such as the northeast and the area around Qandahar, KHAD had planted large numbers of informers and agents among the mujahidiin. These were responsible for stirring up fighting between different guerrilla groups and the assassination of mujahidiin leaders. When discovered, however, KHAD informers were swiftly executed. In some cases, individual mujahidiin agreed to work for KHAD, received subsidies, but then became agents for the resistance, successfully infiltrating the secret police.

 
KHAD's activities reached beyond the borders of Afghanistan to neighboring Pakistan and Iran. Agents operated within emigre resistance organizations, refugee camps, and indigenous opposition groups in these two countries. KHAD's objectives in Pakistan were to promote mujahidiin disunity and de
fections by any means possible and to pose a threat to the Pakistani government sufficiently large as to give that country's president, Mohammad Zia ul Haq, second thoughts about offering sanctuary and aid to the resistance. Agents stirred up Pashtun separatist feeling among the tribes living along the Durand Line, giving rebellious tribal leaders funds and arms. They entered refugee camps east of the frontier, stirred up trouble between the volatile, well-armed refugees and the local population, and carried out assassinations of guerrilla leaders. The hand of KHAD was evident in much of the violent infighting that occurred between emigre groups. The secret police also offered support to opposition movements, such as the outlawed Mazdoor Kisan (Workers' and Peasants') Party. It also aided A1 Zulflkar, an extremist party formed by two sons of executed Pakistani prime minister, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. Based in Kabul until 1983, when the PDPA regime in a conciliatory move to Islamabad decided to expel it, Al Zulfikar was allegedly responsible for terrorist acts, including assassinations inside Pakistan and the hijacking of a Pakistani airliner to Kabul in March 1981. KHAD also reportedly subsidized several hundred Baluch separatists who engaged in subversive activities in Pakistan's Baluchistan Province. Little was known in the mid1980s of KHAD operations in Iran. 

KHAD's director in the mid-1980s was Najibullah. Trained as a physician, he was one of the few well-educated persons in the PDPA leadership and apparently carried out his covert tasks with dedication. He was a close associate of Karmal and a loyal Parchami. Consequently, KHAD evolved into a Parchami stronghold, equally zealous in the suppression of enemies of the revolution and Khalqis. There was an intense and bitter rivalry between KHAD and the police and paramilitary forces under the authority of Sayed Muhammad Gulabzoi, minister of interior. Gulabzoi was one of the few prominent Khalqis remaining in office in a Parcham-dominated regime. 

In a November 1985 Central Committee plenary session, Najibullah was appointed to one of the PDPA's eight party secretaryships. This is a prestigious and influential position, though subordinate to the party secretary general. The promotion reflected his abilities, his close ties to the Soviets, and the importance of KHAD's activities from a political as well as a security point of view. Some Western observers speculated that the Soviets considered Najib a likely successor to Karmal. It was, at least, a reward for the efficiency and ruthlessness of the secret police that was in sharp contrast to the performance of the poorly trained and demoralized armed forces. 


KHAD and Torture
Amnesty International reported in December 1984 that although the use of torture was widespread under the Taraki and Amin regimes, KHAD was the first to employ it in a systematic manner at its network of detention centers in Kabul and in other parts of the country. Torture was both physical and psychological. It included deprivation of food and sleep, beatings, burning victims' bodies with cigarettes, immersion in water, confinement in shackles for long periods, and electric shock treatment. Detainees were sometimes threatened with execution or forced to watch the torture of their relatives. Victims included people of both sexes ranging from adolescents to adults in their early sixties. Quite often, detainees were confined incommunicado for months and even years.

 
Amnesty International published testimonies of former prisoners, who after fleeing Afghanistan gave information about their treatment. A senior civil servant, arrested in August 1982, was detained by KHAD at one of its Kabul detention centers for six weeks. He wrote to his family that during this time he was constantly subjected to torture. This included beatings and the application of electric shock to his fingers and toes. 

According to the United States Department of State's Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1984, Afghan troops and KHAD agents conducted a house-to-house search, primarily in Kabul, in October 1984. They took children from their parents and held them under water to force the parents to divulge information about the resistance. 

The Sarandoy
The general ineffectiveness and unreliability of the Afghan army led the Kabul regime to organize a number of paramilitary internal security forces. Probably the most important of these in the mid-1980s was the Sarandoy (Defenders of the Revolution), an armed body under the control of the Khalqidominated Ministry of Interior. It was an outgrowth of the Daoud-era Gendarmerie that before 1978 had comprised about 20,000 men. The November 1985 issue of Jane's Defence Weekly gave approximately the same figure for the size of the Sarandoy in 1985. It was organized into six brigades or regiments, numbering around 6,000 men and based in Qandahar, Badakhshan, Baghlan, and Parvan provinces and in Kabul, which had two Sarandoy units; there were also 20 operational and mountain battalions, with an additional 6,000 men; personnel attached to the national and 28 provincial headquarters of the Sarandoy, numbering around 3,000 men; and other personnel attached to the Sarandoy Academy and to administrative, construction, and maintenance units. These totaled a further 4,000 men. Established in early 1981, the force played an active role in offensives against the mujahidiin, though its effectiveness was hampered by the rivalry between Parchamis and Khalqis. Sarandoy relations with Parcham-dominated KHAD were tense. 

Other Security Forces
Tribal militias operated under the aegis of the Ministry of Nationalities and Tribal Affairs. Many were former mujahidiin whose loyalty had been purchased, temporarily at least, by the regime. In 1985 they seemed to have totaled around 1,600 men, based in the provinces bordering Pakistan and organized into four regiments. The ministry was also responsible for continents of frontier troops. These were organized into five border brigades having an estimated 2,000 men. Another 2,000 men were apparently attached to other frontier units or administrative units. Frontier troops had originally been under the authority of the Ministry of National Defense but were transferred to the Ministry of Nationalities and Tribal Affairs in 1983. Other forces, generally characterized as militias, included armed contingents of PDPA cadresRevolution Defense Groups-and youth groups such as those attached to the Parcham and Khalq factions of the PDPA and the Pioneers. In cities and towns, militias had been organized by the Ministry of Interior. Although the total number of militia personnel was not known, it was estimated in 1985 to equal that of the army, around 40,000. Many of these, however, served only parttime. Because of their knowledge of local terrain and conditions, militias, when reliable, were useful in offensives against the mujahidiin; they were also used to forcibly round up recruits for the army. 

Hand in hand with militia units, the regular police carried out guard and patrol duties at government buildings and sensitive installations and, reportedly, sometimes participated in counterinsurgency operations. Like the urban militias, they were under the authority of the Ministry of Interior. The Daoud-era police, trained by specialists from the Federal Republlc of Germany (West Germany), remained loyal to the president during the April 1978 coup d'etat. Subsequently, police personnel were purged and the force was thoroughly reorganized and placed under the tutelage of East German and Soviet advisers. Like the Sarandoy and other forces controlled by the Ministry of Interior, the police were regarded as politically unreliable by the Parchamdominated regime. 

Resistance Forces
According to Isby "the Afghan resistance is not an army but rather a people in arms." Thus, it is impossible to characterize the resistance in conventional military terms. Reflecting the fragmentation of Afghan society, it was deeply divided along tribal ethnic, regional, religious, and ideological lines (see Political Bases of the Resistance, ch. 4). It remained, however, a formidable movement, capable of denying the regime control of as much as 80 percent of the countryside, assassinating state and party officials, and attacking regime and Soviet targets even in the heart of the capital.

Fighting men ranged from preadolescent boys to grizzled veterans of the Third Anglo-Afghan War of 1919. The total number of mujahidiin was difficult to estimate. The Military Balance, 1985-1986 published a figure of 90,000, backed by about 110,000 "reserves." Other Western estimates are in the 200,000 to 250,000 range and figures given by Afghan sources go as high as 744,000. Isby suggests that the actual number might be equal to about 10 percent of the rural population, the latter totaling about 7 to 9 million in the mid-1980s.

Dupree suggests that in the mid-1980s there were around 90 areas located throughout the country commanded by mujahidiin leaders. In the years since the first uprisings against the PDPA regime in late 1978, two trends had become apparent. One was the emergence of a new generation of resistance leaders who had gained prominence because of their fighting prowess rather than because of their status in the traditional social structure. These men won followers and local popular support, often overshadowing traditional secular and temporal elites in the regions where they operated. Probably the most striking representative of this new generation was Ahmad Shah Mahsud, a Tajik who commanded forces in the Panjsher Valley and had successfully thwarted repeated Soviet and Afghan army offensives. 

A second trend was a steady improvement in the fighting abilities of the mujahidiin and the coordination of different resistance groups. Afghan culture-particularly that of the Pashtuns-affirmed the value of a life under arms. But traditional fighting styles were highly individualistic and undisciplined. Afghan men were not "born guerrillas" but had to learn, often at great cost, the lessons of fighting a modern, well-equipped opponent. Greater coordination between groups was largely the achievement of the new generation of mujahidiin commanders. These men apparently were less firmly wedded to the old social and ethnic distinctions than their elders and thus were able to overlook old animosities and weld new alliances. Growth in intergroup cooperation was essential if the resistance was to counteract Soviet and PDPA attempts to apply a classic divide-andconquer strategy. 

Military Role of the Emigre Parties
Most Western observers were inclined to think of the resistance in terms of the seven major emigre parties based in and around the city of Peshawar in Pakistan. This was not entirely accurate, because emigre leaders, with perhaps one or two exceptions, did not command muJahidiin forces within Afghanistan. Local commanders were generally affiliated with one or another of the groups because they needed the funds, arms, and other supplies that the groups could provide. They were not, however, subordinate to them in a military chain of command. 

The groups did, however, reflect social, religious, and political differences between major sectors of the population and divisions within the mujahidiin. The seven major emigre parties formed two loose coalitions that both the guerrilla leaders and Western observers characterized as "traditionalist" and "fundamentalist." 

Traditionalists
The Mahaz-e Milli Islami (National Islamic Front) of Pir Sayyid Gilani had its strongest support in the areas around the cities of Qandahar and Kabul and among tribal Pashtuns living in the border regions and in Ghazni and Vardak provinces. Politically, it was conservative, and the leadership had close ties to the former royal family. Gilani's authority derived from his status as a pir or Sufi religious leader (see Sufis, ch.2). Westernized in taste and habits, he was an undynamic individual with little knowledge or understanding of military tactics. His attempts to introduce a military command structure and ranks among Pashtun tribesmen in the early 1980s ended in disaster. Within Afghanistan, the party claimed armed adherents ranging from an estimated 8,000 to 15,000 men. 

Sibaghatullah Mojadeddi's Jebh-e Nejat-e Milli (National Liberation Front) also had an organized strength of between 8,000 and 15,000 men, concentrated mostly in the Jalalabad, Lowgar, and Qandahar areas. Most of the party's followers were tribal Pashtuns. Its political views were similar to those of 
the Mahaz-e Milli Islami. The Harakat-e Inqelab Islami (Islamic Revolutionary Movement) of Muhammad Nabi Muhammadi was the largest traditionalist group, with a membership ranging from 10,000 to 25,000 armed men. Like the other groups, its following was primarily Pashtun, and it was active militarily
in Ghazni, Vardak, Badakhshan, Konarha, Lowgar, and Baghlan provinces. Militarily and politically, it was weakened by the defection of two groups, led by Nasrollah Mansoor and Rafiullah Moezzan, to the fundamentalist camp. It was considered, however, militarily the most effective of the traditionalist
parties.

Islamic Fundamentalists
Whereas the armed strength of the traditionalist parties tended to be organized in loose networks of adherents, the four Islamic fundamentalist parties had relatively coherent command structures that made them more effective militarily. The largest and most powerful party was the Hezb-i Islami of Gulbuddin Hikmatyar. In the mid1980s the number of its armed adherents was estimated at between 20,000 and 30,000. Hikmatyar, a Pashtun, was an able but ruthless leader. Rumors circulated that he had ties with Shia pro-Iranian groups and even the PDPA regime. His group received arms and other forms of aid from Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and China. The Hezb-i Islami was strongest in Paktia, Konarha, Badakhsham Nangarhar, and Baghlan provinces. 

Because of along-standing rivalry, relations between Hikmatyar's group and the Jamiat-i-Islami (Islamic Society) of Burhannudin Rabbani were tense in the mid-1980s. On several occasions, Hikmatyar's forces blocked supply routes to the Panjsher Valley, where mujahidiin commanded by Ahmad Shah Mahsud and loyal to the Jamiat-i-Islami were based. The latter party had between 15,000 and 25,000 armed adherents. 

Rabbani was a Tajik, and his following included such nonPashtun groups as Tajiks, Uzbeks, and Turkmen. In the mid1980s the party had its strongest contingents in the Darispeaking regions of Afghanistan, including Herat, Balkh, Badakhshan, Takhar, Parvan, and Farah provinces. 

A third party was the Hezb-i Islami (Islamic Party) of Yunis Khales. Khales was perhaps the only emigre leader to involve himself in actual fighting within Afghanistan. His group, however, was small, estimated to comprise between 5,00 and 7,000 armed adherents. Despite its size, it had a reputation for good organization and fighting effectiveness. The Ittehad-e Islami of Abdul Rasool Sayyaf had an undetermined number of adherents. Although Sayyaf had access to arms and funds from Arab countries and by virtue of this was named head of the coalition of four major and three minor fundamentalist parties known as the Ittehad-i-Islami Mujahidiin-i-Afghanistan (Islamic Alliance of Afghan Mujahidiin), his following was small and confined for the most part to his native Paghman, near Kabul. 

The Hazarajat, the region covering portions of the central provinces of Bamian, Oruzgan, and Ghowr that was the home of the minority Hazaras, contained three important Shia parties: the Shura-i Inqelabi (Revolutionary Council) of Sayyid Ali Beheshti; the Sazman-e Nasr (Organization for Victory), a group that supported Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini of Iran; and the Haraket-a Islami (Islamic Movement) of Shaykh Mohsini, which had originally been linked to Iran but in the mid1980s had become disillusioned with Khomeini's Islamic Revolution. The size of their forces was not known. Other groups, including leftist and ethnic resistance groups, also operated although they played a relatively minor role in the resistance. 

Strategies and Tactics
According to Imtiaz H. Bokhari, a military analyst, "the mujahidiin tactics indicate a three pronged strategy: firstly, to prove by large scale sabotage that the government at Kabul is not in control of the country; secondly, to alienate support of the government by assassinations, arson, and looting; and thirdly, to weaken the army by inciting defections and discouraging fresh recruitments." Few mujahidiin believed that by such tactics alone the Soviets could be driven out of their country or the PDPA regime overthrown. Rather, what was involved was a war of attrition that would end, guerrillas swore, only when the last of them was killed. 

Traditional fighting tactics-large groups of mujahidiin launching attacks against fortified points-were ineffective and costly in lives. In time, the mujahidiin refined and diversified their tactics. They staged ambushes of convoys or enemy troop contingents, destroyed bridges and electric and telephone lines, and laid mines on highways and other open areas where enemy troops and vehicles were expected to pass. First armed with antique rifles, the guerrillas gradually obtained more sophisticated weapons. These included British-, Chinese-, and Sovietmanufactured mortars, Soviet antitank rocket launchers, Chinesemade plastic-covered mines, and a few SAM-7 missiles. According to sources close to the scene, the most urgent need of the mujahidiin was for portable, heatseeking surface-to-air missiles that could be used against the Soviets' Mi-24 helicopters. 

Most of the information on national security in Afghanistan can be found in three major works on the country: Henry S. Bradsher's Afghanistan and the Soviet Union; Anthony Arnold's Afghanistan's Two-Party Communism: Parcham and Khalq and John Fullerton's The Soviet Occupation of Afghanistan. Also, many articles in the Jane's Defence Weekly (London) have focused on the Soviet tactics in Afghanistan. David Isby's "Soviet Tactics in the War in Afghanistan" and Mark L. Urban's "The Limited Contingent of Soviet Forces in Afghanistan" are invaluable readings on Soviet military tactics. Also, various yearly reports by the Department of State give a general chronology of important events. Also particularly useful in this regard are the articles in the Christian Science Monitor, the New York Times, and the Far Eastern Economic Review. (For further information and complete citations, see Bibliography.) 

This page maintained by Luke Griffin and last updated on 01/14/2002 .