Chapter 4: Government and Politics

AFGHANISTAN'S GOVERNMENT in the mid-1980s was dominated and controlled by the Soviet Union. A facade of independence was maintained, but the regime of President Babrak Karmal was subject to the dictates of Soviet advisers who directed his government's ministries and Afghanistan's pervasive secret police. The population was fully aware of Afghanistan's loss of independence following the Soviet invasion of December 27, 1979.

As much as 80 percent of the countryside was outside government control. Although this reflected in part the traditional autonomy of local political leaders, antiregime guerrillas-the mujahidiin-made it virtually impossible for the regime to maintain a system of local government outside major urban centers. The mujahidiin also made their presence known in Kabul, the capital, by launching rocket attacks and assassinating high government officials.

Even Afghans not actively involved in the resistance tended to regard the Karmal regime with contempt. To devout Muslims, the regime's collaboration with an atheist power, the Soviet Union, was unforgivable. Regime attempts to enlist the support of ethnic minorities, women, youth, tribal chiefs, and the ulama (Islamic scholars) met with very limited success. Observers estimated that only about 3 to 5 percent of the total population actively supported the regime.

Karmal's difficulties in presiding over a government with virtually no popular support were compounded by the bitter and longstanding rivalry between the Khalq (Masses) and Parcham (Banner) factions of the ruling People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA). In 1967 the PDPA split into these two groups, headed by Nur Muhammad Taraki and Karmal, respectively. The split reflected deep ethnic, class, and ideological differences. The Soviets coaxed a reunification of the party in 1977; but when the party came to power in April 1978, the animosity deepened as Khalq leaders purged, imprisoned, and even tortured their Parcham rivals. In late 1985 Soviet advisers were still unable to prevent violent confrontations between Khalqis and Parchamis, which often ended in fatalities.

The Soviet Union has had a substantial interest in Afghanistan since the reign of King Amanullah (1919-29). After World War II, Moscow was the most generous donor of economic and military aid. United States involvement in Afghanistan was substantially less, owing in part to Washington's support of Pakistan. Afghanistan and Pakistan were at odds over the issue of Pashtunistan, an Afghansupported campaign for the creation of an independent or autonomous state for the Pashtu-speaking nationals of Pakistan. After military supporters of the PDPA seized power and then ceded it to the civilian Revolutionary Council headed by Taraki in April 1978, the Soviets became increasingly tied up in Afghan internal politics. Because the PDPA had close ideological affinities with Moscow, it could not remain a neutral observer. Radical measures enacted by Taraki in the summer and autumn of 1978-particularly decrees relating to the abolition of usury, changes in marriage customs, and land reformcreated great resentment and misunderstanding among highly conservative villagers. Insurrection began in the Nuristan region of eastern Afghanistan and then spread to most other parts of the country. Mujahidiin, operating from bases outside the country, launched attacks against the government, while their ranks were swelled by desertions from the Afghan armed forces.

Although the Soviets increased drastically the volume of military aid, they were dissatisfied with the PDPA's radicalism. Top Soviet advisers attempted to pressure leaders to adopt a more moderate, united-front strategy, but with limited success. The chief obstacle was the brutal and ambitious Hafizullah Amin, Taraki's foreign minister and prime minister after March 1979. Taraki, with Soviet assistance, attempted to remove Amin on September 14, 1979; but Amin, turning the tables, arrested Taraki after a shootout at the House of the People (formerly the Presidential Palace), imprisoned him, and ordered his murder in early October. Relations between the Soviets and Amin grew distant. As the security situation deteriorated, Moscow ordered troops into the country. The plan, carried out on December 27, 1979, had been formulated over a period of several months. Highranking Soviet military officers who had been involved in the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968 played prominent roles.

The Soviets installed Karmal, exiled leader of the Parcham faction, as the country's new president and PDPA secretary general. Amin had apparently died fighting Soviet troops outside Kabul. Most observers believed that the principal factors in Moscow's decision to invade included the need to rescue a friendly scoialist regime from certain destruction and to thwart potential security threats to the Soviet Union itself. If a militantly Islamic regime, like Iran's, had been established in Afghanistan, it might have had destabilizing consequences for Soviet control of the Muslim populations of its Central Asian republics. Other observers interpreted the invasion as part of a comprehensive strategy to gain access to the Indian Ocean and a dominant position in South Asia and the Middle East. In the mid-1980s negotiations for the peaceful withdrawal of Soviet troops, sponsored by the United Nations, were under way. Few believed, however, that Soviet occupation of the country would be a short-lived phenomenon.

This page maintained by Luke Griffin and last updated on 01/14/2002 .