Agriculture

Despite the low level of technical development and the slow growth rate of its output, agriculture dominated the economy throughout the 1970s and 1980s. The share of agricultural output in GDP remained about 60 percent between 1961 and 1980. These figures were probably too low, for a great deal of agricultural output remained on the farms as subsistence production. The economy's overall growth, therefore, depended largely on this sector. Rapid growth was not forthcoming. From 1965 to 1976 total agricultural output rose only 25 percent. On a per capita basis, output fell 4 percent during this period. The sector's rate of growth slowed after the Soviet invasion, with increases averaging just 1.4 percent annually between 1981 and 1983. By the 1980s output was rising faster than the size of the agricultural labor force, indicating improved productivity, although it was still very low. The government statistics indicating these trends had to be regarded with some skepticism, however. Agriculture employed the majority of the work force although its share was decreasing, from 64 percent in 1977 to 56 percent in 1982. Agriculture was the foundation of the economy not only because of its large contribution to GDP and national employment but also because it provided many of the materials upon which much of the country's industry and trade depended. Cotton was the critical raw material for the textile industries and a valuable export; wool was the main input for the important carpet industry and was also an important export commodity. Cottonseed was the key input for the extraction, refining, and soap industries. The sugar beet crop was refined domestically, and there was also fruit and nut processing and packaging for export. Hides and skins, such as karakul, were key inputs for much of the local handicrafts industry and were also major export items. Agricultural products constituted 75 percent of the country's exports in 1977, but this fell to 43 percent in 1984 as natural gas exports increased.
After the drought of 1971-72 and the subsequent famine in parts of the country, self-sufficiency in food, especially wheat, became a major goal of the government. Production of cereals rose just enough during the 1970s to obviate the need for imports during years when the precipitation was normal. During dry years, however, such as 1977, the country had to import wheat and other staples. With the disruption of agriculture caused by the fighting after the coup, the government had to buy wheat from foreign suppliers to avoid scarcities. In 1982 Afghanistan imported over 200,000 tons of wheat from the Soviet Union, and estimates of imports in 1983 and 1984 rose to twice that figure.


Land Use Patterns
Of Afghanistan's surface area of 63 million hectares, only 8 million were arable, the remainder being high mountain land and arid wasteland. The arable land was scattered throughout the country, primarily in valleys along rivers and other water sources. The total irrigable area was about 5.3 million hectares, of which half was irrigated annually while the other half remained fallow. Only 1.4 million hectares of the land irrigated in sequence had sufficient water throughout the year to allow double cropping. Before 1978 the irrigated land area provided Afghanistan with 85 percent of all food and industrial crops produced. Another 1.4 million hectares of cultivated rain-fed land supplemented the irrigated areas. Thus, about 4 million hectares of land were cultivated annually before 1978 by 1.2 million farm families.

The most serious constraint on agriculture before 1978 was the scarcity of water. The cultivation of the soil depended on the farmers' ability to use water from the spring floods as the winter snows in the mountains melted. Traditionally, Afghan farmers developed a variety of systems to control the water supply and distribute it to their fields. Where the land was fairly flat, as in the northern plains, diversion dams of brush, mud, and stone were built to divert water into irrigation canals. A finely branched network of canals running side by side then channeled the water to the usually small plots of land set on terraces in the narrow river valleys. Throughout eastern, southern, and southwestern Afghanistan, farmers also used another traditional irrigation system, developed centuries ago by the Persians, called the karez, or qarez. The karez is an underground tunnel connected by vertical shafts. The underground canal intercepts the rising water table as the land slopes upward away from the riverbed and brings the water from the hillsides down to the cultivated land on the plains. These irrigation systems require considerable labor-intensive maintenance. The diversion dams are often washed away in the spring floods, and the irrigation canals are frequently blocked by silt and branches. The repair of the dams and canals may require hundreds of workers, depending on the size of the system. The irrigation system is entirely dependent on the weather, as was demonstrated during the drought of 1971-72 when the country's agricultural output sagged considerably. Even below-average snowfall, as occurred in 1977, can cause serious problems for dryland crops. In contrast, above-average precipitation, as occurred from 1972 to 1976, leads to very good harvests.
In response to the shortage of water, nearly all of the government's agricultural investment funds went into largescale irrigation projects, such as in the Helmand Valley. The large investments did not realize higher crop yields immediately because of problems with land development and local farming techniques. There were also serious difficulties with soil salinity as a result of faulty drainage systems in areas brought under irrigation.
The government's emphasis on large irrigation projects maintained the traditional farming techniques. The average farmer still followed the farming practices of his forebears, and his productivity remained very low. His equipment was rudimentary, often little more than wooden ploughs and hand sickles. The soil itself lacked basic nutrients and key trace elements, having been developed under arid conditions. The soil's natural deficiencies were exacerbated by traditional farming practices and the cultivation of soil-depleting crops, such as wheat, barley, rice, and corn. Little of the land was fertilized because animal manure was used for fuel. There was little crop rotation. In addition, farmers used old seed strains and had only limited access to chemical fertilizers and pesticides. For a Green Revolution, such as occurred in India and Pakistan, short-term credit was required for farmers to start using these expensive inputs. The large irrigation projects tied up most of the sector's funding, and as a result there was little financing available. Starting in the 1960s, modern inputs were available to Afghan farmers, and they responded well, but the instances remained few until the 1970s. Further aggravating the problem was the country's shortage of technical and agricultural specialist skills that limited the availability of extension services. It was also difficult to convince farmers of the value of producing surpluses when access to roads and cities was so limited. The continued isolation of so many villages fostered the belief in and the need for self-reliance in basic food production, which was reflected in the priority given to subsistence wheat farming.

By the mid-1970s, however, the country's agricultural sector was making modest achievements. The weather was more favorable, and the use of fertilizers and pesticides was expanded. Fertilizer use increased from 9,000 tons in 1967 to over 100,000 tons in 1978. In the 1960s the United States Agency for International Development (AID) began a program that was designed to raise wheat output through higher yielding varieties-notably Mexipak-so that wheat output would rise enough to achieve basic self-sufficiency. New varieties of rice, sugarcane, sugar beets, and cotton were also introduced into the country. Average yields rose during the decade before the PDPA coup. Wheat production, for example, increased from 867 kilograms per hectare in 1966 to 1,131 kilograms in 1978. Rice and sugar beets recorded similar yield increases. The higher wheat yields allowed farmers to grow larger amounts of cash crops, and in the 1970s increasing acreage was devoted to crops such as cotton, sugar beets, and fruit. During the same period the government raised prices of cotton and sugar relative to wheat, and farmers produced more of these cash crops.

Crops
Cereals, such as wheat, rice, corn, and barley, dominated the cropping pattern and occupied most of the arable land. Fruits and vegatables, such industrial crops as sugar beets and cotton, and forage crops occupied the remaining irrigated cultivation. Wheat was the main staple and was grown throughout Afghanistan. Before the outbreak of fighting, wheat took half of the irrigated land for a double cropping in winter and summer. It a .;o occupied most of the rain-fed land for a summer crop, s, "hat in the years before the Soviet invasion wheat cultivation occupied 2.4 million hectares. Production rose slowly before the invasion, peaking at over 2.9 million tons in 1976. Corn, the second most important crop, was grown throughout the country over an area comprising around 800,000 hectares. It was consumed by both people and animals. Barley cultivation took up 300,000 hectares in rain-fed highland areas. Production in the mid-1970s stayed near 400,000 tons annually. Rice was grown primarily in the north around Baghlan and Konduz, as well as Herat and Nangarhar. In the mid-1970s around 200,000 hectares were devoted to rice production, and output was over 400,000 tons per annum.
Cotton, the most important cash crop, competed with wheat for use of the irrigated land. The price of cotton was set by the government, and its profitability varied in relation to wheat. Before the outbreak of fighting, farmers were very responsive to prices when allocating land to cotton cultivation. In his study of the inhabitants of Konduz Province, anthropologist Thomas J. Barfield noted that farmers grew little cotton until its price rose to twice that of wheat; once the price ratio of cotton to wheat was two to one or greater, cotton farming became widespread because of its high cash value. Farmers did not, however, completely abandon wheat farming, because they saw no dependable alternative supply source. Rather, they grew enough for subsistence while using the rest of their land for cotton. Before 1978 cotton production increased steadily, from 71,000 tons grown on 55,000 hectares in 1968 to 165,000 tons from 112,000 hectares in 1976. Konduz, Takhar, and Baghlan provinces produced most of Afghanistan's cotton, but observers thought areas in western and southern Afghanistan, such as Herat and Helmand, were also favorable for cotton farming.

Sugar beets provided about two-thirds of domestically grown sugar, and sugarcane the rest. Sugar beet was grown primarily in the vicinity of the processing plant at Baghlan. It competed with cotton and wheat for available land, but its lower procurement price limited production before 1978, even though Afghanistan had to import 85 percent of its sugar needs in 1976. At that time Afghan sugar beet production was about 100,000 tons annually from 5,000 hectares cultivated. Sugarcane production was about 60,000 tons from 3,000 hectares farmed in the Jalalabad region.

Afghanistan was well known regionally for its variety of fruits and vegetables. The country's grapes, raisins, and melons were famous export commodities, and grapes constituted 30 percent of the total fruit production. Mulberry, however, was the most widely grown fruit, and its dried berries were an important element in the local diet. There were also many deciduous fruits, such as citrus and olives. The country's fruit output in 1976 amounted to around 900,000 tons produced from about 140,000 hectares. Nut trees, including walnut, almond, and pistachio, were also cultivated. Vegetable production reached 900,000 tons in 1976 from a cultivated area of 139,000 hectares. Potatoes constituted 40 percent of the country's vegetable output. Oilseed production was concentrated in linseed and sesame. It amounted to 62,000 tons in 1976 from an area of 106,000 hectares.

Developments after 1978
There continues to be a sharp divergence of views concerning the situation in the agriculture sector after the PDPA came to power. The Afghan government claimed that by 1984 farm output was near or at all-time highs for output of cereals, vegetables, and fruits. The government said that wheat production in 1983 totaled 3.75 million tons, an increase of more than 27 percent from the high mark recorded in 1976. The 1983 rice crop was said to be 650 million tons, a 45-percent improvement over the record 1976 harvest. Overall, the government boasted that the level of total agricultural output was more than 15 percent greater than the levels of the mid-1970s. It admitted to the notable exception of cotton, which fell from 155 million tons in 1976 to 45 million in 1983.

The government gave several reasons for the agricultural growth, chief among them that the area of cultivation was expanded. The government claimed that in 1983 wheat farming extended over 3 million hectares, an area over 25 percent greater than that used in the mid-1970s. The area for rice cultivation fell at the same time. The government's statistics showed that the quantity of irrigated land had increased by nearly 400,000 hectares from 1976 to 1984 and that the area devoted to orchards also rose slightly over that of the mid1970s. Moreover, the government claimed improved yields per unit of land cultivated. The average yield of wheat, for example, rose from 1.34 tons per hectare to 1.40 tons. The government conceded, however, that the yields per hectare of other crops, notably rice and cotton, declined by 18 and 45 percent, respectively. This appeared consistent with the acknowledged 14-percent drop in the average use of fertilizer per unit of land. National consumption of nitrogenous and phosphate fertilizers decreased by about 15 percent between 1978 and 1982. Despite these difficulties, the Afghan government claimed in late 1984 that the sector's output was high enough to provide for self-sufficiency and lower food prices.

Other observers sharply disagreed with the Afghan government's generally upbeat assessment of the state of agriculture. These analysts noted the crippling effect the war was having on the rural areas. The United States Department of Agriculture projected cereals production to be only 1.23 million tons in 1983, far less than the Afghan claim of 4.50 million tons. In a 1983 study an Afghan agronomist in Pakistan estimated that the agricultural output of Afghanistan fell dramatically between 1979 and 1982. According to Professor Azam Gul, wheat production declined by about 80 percent; corn, about 77 percent; rice and barley, each about 74 percent; and cotton, 88 percent. Although these rough estimates could provide only the basic outlines of the situation inside the country, they were congruous with information available concerning high levels of food imports and higher price levels.

In an effort to curb armed resistance activities in the countryside, the Afghan government and the Soviets pursued a "scorched earth" strategy that was seriously disrupting the rural economy in many regions. In the wake of government attacks and mass reprisals, entire regions that once were fertile became areas of barren waste. Various tactics were employed to spread terror and to destroy both food supplies and the means of food production. According to a broad range of reports from inside the country, farmers working in their fields were frequently targets of air assaults. Those peasants who did not flee the country often had to reverse the traditional working day and work in their fields only at night. The Soviets also targeted food supplies on which the guerrillas depended for sustenance. Many offensives and reprisal operations included the burning of wheat fields. Professor Louis Dupree noted there were two types of incendiary bombs in use in Afghanistan. One exploded on contact with the ground so that it destroyed wheat gathered for threshing, drying, or milling. The other exploded in midair, scattering phosphorous pellets over a wider area; this kind was employed against fields. Even more serious for the sector's longer term prospects were the attacks against the agricultural infrastructure. In many areas the local irrigation system had less capacity as a result of bombing attacks and the reduced levels of maintenance. Dams had not been rebuilt after the spring runoffs, and water canals had filled with sand and mud. This had serious effects. In Qandahar, for example, resistance sources said that many of the fruit orchards were dying for lack of water. Qandahar had been the source for 75 percent of Afghanistan's dried fruit output, and in 1983 Indian traders observed a sharp decline in the supply of dried fruit coming out of Afghanistan while prices doubled. These orchards would take years to replace.

By 1985 the harsh assaults on villages suspected of harboring guerrillas had depopulated large portions of the Afghan countryside. Entire families fled either to the larger cities or to neighboring countries to escape the fighting. Others fled to the hills to escape the government's forced enlistment of men for the army. Large numbers of the male farm labor force were fighting with the resistance, although their number was impossible to ascertain. This depopulation of the countryside reduced Afghanistan's agricultural capacity. In his study, Azam Gul stated that the shortage of labor in farming regions was the biggest single problem facing agriculture. Based on his surveys of refugees in Pakistan, he estimated that over half of the labor force in the countryside had disappeared. The average farm unit, therefore, which had had 4.6 workers in 1978, had only 2.2 in 1982.

The loss of manpower forced Afghan farmers to cultivate less land than they had before the onset of fighting, Azam Gul concluded. He estimated that by 1982 wheat acreage had fallen by two-thirds nationally. This directly contrasts with the government's claims. He noted that provinces with large farms, such as Farah, Qandahar, and Nimruz, had proportionally larger decreases in wheat acreage than provinces containing smaller farms. In addition to wheat, Azam Gul found that corn acreage dropped by two-thirds, barley by half, rice by 80 percent, and cotton by 85 percent. Government statistics agreed that cotton and rice acreage declined, but the official statistics admitted to only a fraction of the decreases estimated by Azam Gul. Acreage declines were also attributed to large price increases and lack of availability of equipment, seed, and gasoline. Wheat seed, for example, rose from Af62.6 per seer in 1978 to Af154 in 1982. (In Afghanistan a seer is equivalent to about 7.08 kilograms.) Generally, the price hikes reflected increasing scarcity. The labor shortage made mobilizing the large work crews to repair the irrigation systems far more difficult, and the higher prices came at a time when agricultural credit was severely curtailed.

Not only was the cultivated area reduced after 1978, but the crop yield per unit of land also fell, according to this study. Nationally, wheat output was 50 percent lower in 1982 than the 1978 figure. Similarly, rice yields fell by 65 percent, barley 40 percent, corn 63 percent, and cotton 70 percent. Several factors combined to reduce agricultural productivity. Highyield seeds were less available, and fertilizer use declined dramatically, according to refugee farmers. The damage to the irrigation system caused water supply problems. Finally, there was direct damage to crops from the fighting. The resultant combination of smaller cultivated acreages and lower yields drastically lowered farm production. As a result, by 1982 there were reports of hunger and severe malnutrition in parts of the country. A 1984 report by a British anthropologist, Frances D'Souza, estimated that half a million Afghans were starving or malnourished because of the smaller harvests and the disruption of internal trade. The food shortages were concentrated in Badakhshan, which had suffered during the 1971-72 famine. Parwan, an area of intense fighting, was also said to be food deficient, and Hazarajat was also sometimes mentioned as an area of particular food shortages. The national reduction in cash cropping showed a reversion to the local subsistence economy in response to uncertain transport and food supplies. In 1983 the winter snows were below average, heightening fears about potential famine inside the country. One of the new manifestations of reduced harvests was the plea by resistance groups in 1984 for food supplies rather than arms.

Not all observers, however, feared widespread famine, and they pointed out that the threat of famine was largely diminished by the depopulation of the country. There were few people in the countryside in the 1980s, and less food was required to maintain those still in the rural areas. Nor was the disruption of agricultural activities and the threat of hunger universal within Afghanistan. Northern provinces were said to have generally adequate food stocks. These northern regions were among the areas where the Soviets allowed trade and farming to flourish so they could provide supplies to Kabul and Soviet Central Asia. Regions along the borders of Iran and Pakistan were in less danger of famine because food supplies were smuggled across the borders. The higher prices, however, made it difficult for the rural poor to buy food.

To stabilize the deteriorating food situation, resistance groups began to intervene more often with community agricultural operations. The mujahidiin (literally, holy warriors; freedom fighters) increasingly took on the role of local governments and were responsible for providing greater security from both attack and food shortages. In the Panjsher, for example, they established stringent rules governing which crops were to be grown, how much of the harvest could be marketed and for what prices, and when animals could be sold. They even determined when farmers could leave. By 1984 the resistance often sought to prevent people from abandoning their farms for refugee camps. The resistance set up cadres of troops whose sole duty was to help with food production and distribution. They sought to prevent the transfer of food to government-controlled areas and tried to persuade people to hold on to their food stocks rather than participate in the inflationary money economy. The government countered by dispatching agents who secured as much grain as possible from village markets.

Land Tenure and Land Reform
The need for land reform had long been recognized, and both the Daoud and the PDPA governments sought to redistribute significant quantities of land to poorer rural families. Little was known about the prevailing landholding patterns before 1978, but the best study, a 1967 agricultural census, showed the average size of farm holdings was 3.5 hectares. Over 70 percent of the holdings were smaller.

A 1979 PDPA study put this figure at 82 percent and said that four-fifths of the population owned only a third of the country's total arable land. According to this study, another 5 percent of the rural landholders owned more than 45 percent of the total arable land, having holdings of at least 10 hectares. In general, Afghanistan was a land of small farmers, with a majority of farms owner operated. About a third of the rural dwellers were thought to be landless laborers, sharecroppers, or tenants. The size and nature of farm holdings varied greatly between different regions of the country. According to the 1967 survey, the largest average landholdings were in the northern and western parts of the country where dry farming was frequently found. Even in the Helmand Valley, landholdings were large, and sharecropping predominated. In the central and eastern regions, where there was more irrigable land, holdings were smaller than the national average. This stemmed from the large ratio of people to irrigable land and from inheritance laws that subdivided land into smaller parcels. The structure of farm ownership was considered an economic problem by analysts in and out of the government. The large landholdings were farmed by tenants and sharecroppers who traditionally received a fifth of the harvest for their labor. Often the crop was divided evenly if the tenant contributed other inputs, such as seed or fertilizer. Tenants and sharecroppers had reduced incentive to develop the land or use the best inputs. On the other side of the spectrum, a large number of small-scale holdings were often not productive because farmers could not afford to use the expensive modern inputs.

In addition to the inequalities of landownership, the high costs of credit in the countryside burdened peasants further. Debts were a regular feature of rural life. The small farmers needed annual credit in the form of cash, seeds, or livestock. They obtained these either from wealthier neighbors or from nomad creditors. Under the prevalent gerau system, a borrower could receive a loan up to the full value of his land. He was then obligated to turn over half his crop to the lender every year until the debt was repaid in cash. Because the borrower needed most of his remaining harvest for his family, there was rarely much surplus left for sale, and loans took years to pay back. If the borrower died, his family inherited his debt, although they technically still owned the land. The gerau gave the lender, in effect, very high interest rates. The effect was somewhat mitigated, for the borrower usually claimed a very low harvest and the lender seldom got his full share. Still, peasants frequently lost their land de jure to creditors when they proved unable to liquidate the debts.

The Daoud government responded to the inequities of the existing land tenure conditions by issuing a Land Reform Law in 1975. In order to ease the social and economic problems connected with the skewed distribution of landownership, the government limited individual holdings to a maximum of 20 hectares of irrigated, double-cropped land. Larger holdings were allowed for less productive land. The government was to expropriate all surplus land and pay compensation. To prevent the proliferation of small, uneconomic holdings, priority for redistributed lands was to be given to neighboring farmers with two hectares or less.

Landless sharecroppers, laborers, tenants, and nomads had next priority. Despite the government's rhetorical commitment to land reform, the program was quickly postponed. Because the government's landholding limits applied to families, not individuals, wealthy families avoided expropriation by dividing their lands nominally between family members. The high ceilings for landholdings restricted the amount of land actually subject to redistribution. Finally, the government lacked the technical data and organizational bodies to pursue the program after it was announced.

When the PDPA took power, it quickly moved to remove both landownership inequalities and usury. The first step was Decree No. 6, which canceled gerau and other mortgage debts of agricultural laborers, tenants, and small landowners with less than two hectares of land. The cancellation applied only to debts contracted before 1973. The government decided that, given the high interest rates, the lenders had received enough to repay the principal and still have a small profit. The government claimed that 81 percent of the country's peasant families would benefit from this relief. The new government immediately encountered administrative difficulties with the millions of mortgage and debt agreements. Many documents were forged to make ordinary private debts look agrarian. Only three weeks after the decree's publication, the government had to issue a clarification limiting the applicability of the law to agricultural loans. The new regime did not, however, end the small farmers' need for credit, and it failed to establish a viable alternative for agricultural loans. In the new environment, loans were harder to obtain, and the effective interest rates on credit rose. As a result, financial conditions in the countryside deteriorated.

A more important element of the government agrarian reform was its Decree No. 8 of November 1978, establishing new landholdings from the 20 hectares of prime irrigated land in the 1975 law to just six hectares. It divided all land into seven classes and again allowed for larger holdings of less productive land. Nor was there to be any compensation for government-expropriated surplus land. The government projected that there would be about 1 million hectares of surplus cultivable land available for redistribution to landless or nearly landless peasants. The PDPA planners acted on the assumption that there was a high concentration of landownership in large estates. They estimated that only 4 percent of the landowners would be affected by redistribution measures. Decree No. 8 also established categories of farmers who had priority for redistributed land; sharecroppers already working on the land had highest priority. The government lacked hard data on which to base its reform, as had its republican predecessor. By the mid-1980s there had never been a thorough cadastral survey of all the rural areas. The government's projections of the area of land, its fertility, the numbers of existing and deserving landowners, and the initial distribution of land were all guesstimates.

The land redistribution program was not, however, the easy success the regime initally claimed it to be. The central government immediately found that the scarcity of cultivable land, and especially irrigable land, made it practically impossible to grant one-hectare plots of first-grade land or its equivalent to every land-hungry peasant. Instead there was a shortage approaching 350,000 hectares of first-grade land. Later the government realized this deficit was even greater when the nomadic population was considered. The government also found that providing formerly landless peasants with plots of low-yield dryland was of little value without other resources, which were also unavailable. Part of the government's problem with the land reform project stemmed from the haste with which it began the program in order to gain political strength. President Babrak Karmal noted the government's inadequate planning in a 1984 speech:

with courage we can say that Decree No. 8 and the start of its implementation took place in an extremely hurried situation. This is an important and major point. A great step was taken without careful and profound study or collection of information from all corners of the country, without scientific study of land questions, national and historic characteristics, characteristics of the situation of peasants in the country, or the nature of the land question, although the aim of this step was lofty and sacred.

Once the program began, it created social disorder in rural areas, which fueled the opposition already under way against the regime. Under the uncertain security conditions, the land reform program was even harder to implement. There was less land redistributed in central and eastern Afghanistan not only because of the prevailing tenure structure of smaller plots but also because those regions were controlled by the mujahidiin and were not subject to any authority of the central government. Farmers often proved unwilling to work redistributed land because of uncertainties of ownership. The land reform measures were one of the causes for the decline in agricultural output after 1978.

By 1981 outside observers believed the government had quietly shelved the land reform program. In 1985, however, the government claimed that land reform had continued apace after the onset of "the new development stage of the Sawr (April) Revolution." According to the government, between 1978 and July 1985 about 688,520 hectares had been redistributed among 319 538 families. In March 1984 the government had announced several amendments to Decree No. 8 to enhance its acceptance in the countryside. These amendments exempted peasants from several property taxes. The modifications also called for the organization of village farm councils with broad jurisdiction to oversee land and water reform.

In addition to land redistribution, the government's agrarian reform program called for the collectivization of farmers into various kinds of cooperatives and the establishment of large-scale, stateowned mechanized farms. Farmers who were members of agricultural cooperatives were to have easier access to improved seeds, fertilizers, pesticides, and equipment as well as better marketing facilities. The government claimed steady success in attracting farmers into the cooperatives. In 1979 the government claimed there were 959 agricultural cooperatives with 125,000 members; in 1981 the figures had grown to 1,211 cooperatives with 191,000 members. A German researcher doubted that these cooperatives had significant value to their members because the working capital was only Af300 per member. He also noted the lack of skilled expertise among cooperative members, a problem the government sought to rectify by establishing a cooperative institute with Soviet help. The government also set up agricultural mechanized stations in Kabul, Balkh, Jowzjan, Baghlan, and Herat provinces. These stations were to rent Soviet-made equipment to neighboring farmers. There were also by 1985 mechanized farms scattered throughout the country to produce cereals, cotton, sugar beets, and high-yield seeds. These were presumably set up on some of the 3,000 hectares reserved by the government in 1979, concentrated primarily in the northern provinces.

Livestock
Almost all of the rural population was connected in some way with animal husbandry, for either income, food, or draft power. Animal products, including meat, milk, skins, hides, and wool, contributed 7 percent of GDP and about 15 percent of exports in 1976. In addition, there were unofficial exports of live sheep to Iran before the war, involving 1 million head valued at around US$3 million annually. The importance of animal husbandry was all the greater because without it there would be little use for the 40 million hectares of remote, harsh rangelands it used. All the meat and milk consumed in the country were produced domestically, except for donated milk products, usually powders. Before the fighting, per capita meat consumption was 11.5 kilograms annually, although the average for rural and urban poor was far less-around four kilograms per capita. The supply of meat was seasonal, with peaks in late spring and late autumn. Milk consumption was 60 kilograms. Fresh milk was mainly available to families who owned cows; sheep's milk was available in the country for only about two months in the spring after lambing. There were no collection, storage, and marketing facilities for dairy products.

Animal husbandry consisted primarily of extensive sheepherding and goatherding. The nomadic population owned about 80 percent of the sheep and goat flocks, thought to number 20 million and 3.3 million, respectively. These flocks moved annually between winter grazing in the semiarid plains and summer grazing in high mountain pastures in the Hindu Kush. In areas with irrigated farming, 3.6 million cattle were maintained, primarily for draft oxen and dairy products and occasionally for meat. Camels were kept for transport, milk, and meat. Horses and donkeys were also used for transport. There was also some poultry production, but it was highly irregular and was mainly backyard scavenging.

The livestock sector suffered from very low productivity for a variety of reasons. As with crop production, the scarcity of water was the most serious constraint. The lack of water reduced the available feed supply. Because of the high ratio of animals to forage, there was widespread animal malnutrition, especially in winter. The rangelands over which the nomadic flocks roamed were considered community property, and there was inadequate care taken to prevent overgrazing. Only the crop residues, mainly wheat and barley straw, were available on a cash basis for supplementary winter feeding. During periods of drought the animal herds suffered badly, with a decrease of 40 percent estimated in flocks during the 1971-72 drought. In addition, there were high disease and mortality rates, in part because of poor nutrition and lack of veterinary services.

A particularly important segment of the livestock subsector was the karakul sheep, whose pelts were highly valued. Afghanistan was one of only three important karakul-producing countries, the others being South Africa and the Soviet Union. During the 1970s Afghanistan was not the largest producer, but it was the largest exporter of the high-priced gray pelts. Karakul pelts were always a prime agricultural export and an important source of foreign exchange, although their share of foreign exchange receipts fell steadily as other exports rose in volume and value. During the 1970s annual exports averaged 1.3 million pelts. The afghani value of pelts rose in the decade before 1978, climbing from Af442 in 1968 to Af950 in 1977, an increase of 215 percent.

In 1979 the number of karakul sheep was estimated at about 4.8 million or approximately a quarter of the total sheep population. Karakul production was centered in the north and northwestern provinces, among both sedentary and nomadic flock owners. The best quality pelts were produced under harsh conditions, and production was therefore susceptible to droughts and feed shortages. During the relatively moderate drought of 1976, the karakul population decreased by nearly 25 percent. In addition to pelts, the sheep produced milk and meat. Mature karakul produced a coarse, multicolored wool. Karakul lambs were slaughtered for their pelts in spring, and the flock owners sold the salted pelts to dealers, who sent them to curing houses. The government's Karakul Institute, established in 1946, received the cured pelts and, after grading them on the basis of color, curl, and quality, arranged for selling and shipping. In 1983 auctions in London continued to sell most of the pelts; Leningrad was the other main auction site. The government was seeking to diversify the markets for karakul into the German Democratic Republic (East Germany) and elsewhere in Eastern Europe. There were also reports that it was building a new garment factory in Kabul to use the lower grade pelts for clothes for export to Europe. Further peltprocessing capacity was scheduled for 1985 in Kabul using Czechoslovak equipment.

The effects of the fighting on Afghan livestock were hard to evaluate in any statistical sense. The government claimed that by 1983 the numbers of sheep, cattle, and goats all equaled or surpassed their prewar figures. It also claimed increases in 1982 of 14 percent and 26 percent in beef and mutton production over the 1978 figures. The numbers of animal hides and skins were also said to have risen slightly. According to wartime visitors to Afghanistan, the war generally had a cruel effect on animal stocks because of direct attacks and mines scattered in fields. The director of Doctors Without Borders (Medecins Sans Frontieres), a French medical assistance organization, observed that injured animals lacked any veterinary care and died from secondary infections. In the exodus of rural refugees, many animal owners took their livestock with them. In early 1981 the refugees were estimated to have taken 1.25 million cattle with them to Pakistan. There were also reports of a large number of sheep being moved to Iran after the outbreak of fighting. The karakul pelt industry was disrupted. In 1984 about 1 million pelts were produced, compared with 1.3 to 1.5 million a decade earlier. The much higher prices for meat in Afghanistan would also correlate with projections of significant drops in meat production.

This page maintained by Luke Griffin and last updated on 10/25/2006 .