Abdur Rahman Khan, 1880-1901

As far as British interests were concerned, Abdur Rahman came almost as an answer to prayer: a forceful, intelligent leader capable of welding his fractured peoples into a state, yet willing to accept the limitations on his power imposed by British control of Afghan foreign affairs and the British buffer-state policy. His 21-year reign was marked by his efforts to modernize and establish control of the kingdom, which was, during the same period, delineated in its modern borders by the two empires that surrounded it. Caught between the Russians and the British, Abdur Rahman turned his formidable energies to what turned out to be virtually the creation of the modern state of Afghanistan, while the British and the Russians, with the Afghans as bystanders, determined the borders of the Afghan state.

Abdur Rahman consolidated the Afghan state in three ways. First, he suppressed various rebellions and followed up his victories with harsh punishment, execution, and deportation. Second, he broke the power of many Pashtun tribes, most notably by forcibly transplanting them. He moved his most powerful Pashtun enemies, the Ghilzai, and other tribes from southern and south-central Afghanistan to areas north of the Hindu Kush that had predominantly non-Pashtun populations, whether Tajik, Uzbek, Hazara, or Turkmen. Although they had revolted against Durrani rule in their original homelands, the Pashtun tribes who relocated in non-Pashtun areas supported the Durrani leader, who shrewdly managed to keep the tribal leaders in Kabul under his control by creating a council that presumably advised him but which in fact had no power at all. Abdur Rahman also ingratiated himself with non-Pashtun people by lifting the tax with which Sher Ali had burdened them.

A third mechanism Abdur Rahman used to cement the fragmented state was the creation of a system of provincial governorates that were not synonymous with old tribal boundaries. Provincial governors had a great deal of power in local matters, and an army was placed at their disposal to enforce tax collection and suppress dissent. Abdur Rahman kept a close eye on these governors, however, by creating an effective intelligence system. During his reign tribal organization in some areas began to erode as provincial government officials allowed land to change hands outside the traditional clan and tribal limits.

In addition to forging a nation from the splintered regions that made up Afghanistan, Abdur Rahman tried to modernize his kingdom by creating a regular army and the society's first institutionalized bureaucracy, which included government agencies that functioned like cabinet ministries. Although distinctly authoritarian, Abdur Rahman also established a general assembly (the Loya Jirgah), in addition to his royal council. The latter, which had only advisory powers, included tribal leaders, various advisers, and agency heads, as well as state secretaries for the major regions of the country. The Loya Jirgah (jirgahsee Glossary), which did not interfere with Abdur Rahman's autocracy any more than the council, included royal princes, important notables from other regions of the country, and religious leaders. Although these bodies and the government agencies he created did not have independent powers, their creation bespoke the ruler's concern for more efficient administration as well as more centralized rule. According to Abdur Rahman's autobiography (which he never saw in its final form but which Poullada suggests is generally consistent with what is known of the ruler's views from other sources), Abdur Rahman had three goals: subjugation of the tribes, extension of government control through the creation of a strong army, and reinforcement of the power of the ruler and the royal family.

Another aspect of Abdur Rahman's modernization was his attention to technological development. He brought to Afghanistan foreign physicians, engineers (especially for mining), geologists, and printers. He imported European machinery and encouraged the establishment of small factories for soap, candles, and leather goods. He sought outside advice on communications, transport, and irrigation.

Despite his strong internal policies, Abdur Rahman's foreign policy was completely in foreign hands. Vigorous leader though he was, he could not stand up to the overwhelming force represented by the two empires, which faced one another with his kingdom in the middle. Abdur Rahman honored his commitment to give the British control of Afghan foreign relations.

The first important frontier dispute was the Panjdeh crisis of 1885, brought on by Russian advances in Central Asia. Having seized the Merv (now Mary) Oasis by 1884, Russian forces were now directly adjacent to Afghanistan. There were conflicting claims to the Panjdeh Oasis, but the Russians were keen to take over all the Turkomen domains of this area before a planned Russian-British border commission could meet to decide on the border. The British urged the Russians not to attack the Panjdeh area, but they worded their warning against an attack on Herat so much more strongly that the Russians were apparently left in doubt about what the British would do if they attacked Panjdeh. After a battle with Afghan forces in March-April 1885, the Russians seized the oasis. As war clouds gathered, Russian newspapers urged their government to seize Herat as a prelude to moving all the way to the Indian Ocean. Troops were called up in both Russia and Britain, but the two powers were willing to compromise: Russia had what it wanted, and the British felt they could now keep the Russians from advancing any farther. Without Afghan participation the British and the Russians agreed that the latter would give up the area that was the farthest point of their advance but keep Panjdeh. After much disagreement over previous agreements and demarcations, the joint Anglo-Russian Boundary Commission of 1886 finally agreed on a boundary along the Amu Darya. The Russian-British agreement on these sections of the border achieved a permanent northern frontier for Afghanistan but the loss of much territory, especially around Panjdeh.

The second area of the Afghan border that was demarcated (at least partially) during Abdur Rahman's reign was in the Wakhan area (see fig. 4). In 1891 the Russians began to explore this area all the way to the Amu Darya. The British reacted with great dispatch, deeply concerned that the Russians might outflank Afghanistan and threaten India. The British insisted that Abdur Rahman accept sovereignty over the Wakhan Corridor. Although he was reluctant to rule this remote region in which unruly Kirghiz held sway, he had no choice but to accept the compromise that Britain desired. In 1895 and 1896 another joint Anglo-Russian Boundary Commission agreed on the frontier to the far northeast of Afghanistan, reaching to Chinese territory (although the Chinese did not formally agree on a border with Afghanistan until 1964). Although the frontiers between Afghanistan and Russia now appeared quite clear, by some oversight no agreement was reached on exactly where on the Amu Darya the border was to be fixed. A subject of disagreement over many years, this issue was not finally resolved until 1946, when the border was fixed at the thalweg line (the mid-point of the channel of the river).

Because the British were primarily concerned with Afghanistan as a buffer between India and the Russians, their greatest interest lay in the definition of the Afghan boundary with Russia. For Abdur Rahman, however, the delineation of the boundary with India, through the Pashtun area, was far more significant, and it was during his reign that the Durand Line was drawn. By the early 1890s the situation in these areas was unsatisfactory both to the British and to the Afghan ruler. In the preceding years the Indian government had pushed farther and farther into Pashtun lands at the expense of Afghan governments that were in no position to gainsay British firepower. Nevertheless, the British were concerned about incursions by the fierce mountain tribes. For his part, Abdur Rahman feared continuing British encroachment into Pashtun areas, and in 1892 he sent his concerns directly to London, bypassing Delhi, which he doubted would treat him fairly in this matter.

Under pressure, Abdur Rahman agreed in 1893 to accept a mission headed by the British Indian foreign secretary, Sir Mortimer Durand, to delineate the limits of British and Afghan control in the Pashtun areas. Abdur Rahman at first seemed to welcome the mission, perhaps because of British railroad construction that was aimed toward Qandahar and Kabul, which he called °a knife into my vitals" and which made him fear further British encroachment unless an agreement were reached. Boundary limitations were agreed upon between Durand and Abdur Rahman before the end of 1893, but there is some question about the degree to which Abdur Rahman willingly ceded certain areas. Scholars have found in his papers and autobiography indications that he regarded the Durand Line as a delimitation of areas of political responsibility, not permanent international frontiers, and that he did not explicitly cede control over the areas (such as Kurram and Chitral) that had already come under British control under the Treaty of Gandamak. The amir's reluctant agreement to the Durand Line was only achieved with an increase of his subsidy from the British government and quiet threats by Durand.

Although Fraser-Tytler argues that the Durand Line may have been the best line possible under the circumstances, it made little sense. The Durand Line cut through tribes and even villages and bore little relation to the realities of topography, demography, or even military strategy. Devised to divide the tribes that looked to Kabul for leadership from those that looked to Peshawar or other areas under British control, and designed to establish tranquility in the border areas, the Durand Line did neither. It resulted in bloodshed even as it was being fixed, and it laid the foundation not for the peace of the border regions but for heated disagreement between the governments of Afghanistan and British India and, later, between Afghanistan and Pakistan.

The clearest manifestation of Abdur Rahman's establishment of control in Afghanistan was the peaceful succession of his son, Habibullah, to the throne upon his father's death in October 1901. Although Abdur Rahman had fathered many children, he had groomed Habibullah to succeed him, and he had made it difficult for other sons to contest the succession by preventing them from assuming positions of power and by keeping them in Kabul under his control.

This page maintained by Luke Griffin and last updated on 10/25/2006 .